Originally published on Global Voices

Feature image by Arzu Geybullayeva, created using Canva Pro.

The October verdict in the case of 15-year-old Mattia Ahmet Minguzzi — fatally stabbed on January 24, 2025 in Istanbul — did more than shock the nation. Two teenage defendants identified as B.B. and U.B. were sentenced to 24 years each, the maximum term for minors under Turkish law, for “deliberately killing a child,” while two other accused minors were acquitted and subsequently released.

The trial, which proceeded amid intense media and public pressure, resurfaced an ongoing debate about the independence, transparency and fairness of Turkey's judicial system.

A judiciary under pressure: structure, critique and politics

Critics of the Turkish legal system highlight long-standing patterns of politicization and lack of institutional insulation from executive power. Prominent human-rights lawyer Eren Keskin argues that “the republic has never been a state governed by the rule of law.” She traces this back not only to the founding years of the republic, but to long-standing laws applied unevenly — such as in Kurdish-majority regions — where emergency decrees, anti-terror laws and sweeping executive powers replaced classical separation of powers.

Academic work supports this: an empirical study using synthetic control methods found a “severe breakdown and erosion of judicial independence” in Turkey following constitutional reforms and populist legal changes. The picture it paints is one of institutions whose formal independence exists on paper, but whose functional autonomy is compromised.

In this context, could the Minguzzi decision be viewed as less of an isolated case and more as a symptom of a legal system operating under constraint? Either way, public outrage, media visibility, and political signalling all impact the terrain in which judges and prosecutors act.

Political prosecutions and the fate of opposition justice

If the Minguzzi case shines a light on general institutional frailty, the prosecutions of prominent figures in the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) demonstrate how legal tools are being marshalled for political ends.

Back in March, Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu — a central opposition figure and presumed presidential candidate — was arrested on corruption and bribery charges, triggering mass protests which, as at the time of writing, are ongoing. The court has rejected appeals for his release, raising concerns about due process. Meanwhile, the Istanbul Chief Prosecutor’s Office (CPO) launched waves of detentions and investigations targeting opposition-led municipalities and CHP party leadership.

Most recently, the CPO accused İmamoğlu of espionage. The new charges came “after a cybersecurity consultant already in custody on espionage charges agreed to cooperate with prosecutors.” Police also arrested television channel TELE1 Editor-in-Chief Merdan Yanardağ as part of the same investigation. In addition to İmamoğlu and Yanardağ, İmamoğlu’s campaign manager Necati Özkan is also being viewed as a suspect. Since March, İmamoğlu and Özkan have been in pretrial detention on corruption charges.

The CPO also alleged that Yanardağ exchanged multiple messages with a man named Hüseyin Gün, a cybersecurity consultant turned state witness who, after spending months in detention, agreed to cooperate with prosecutors by claiming they were both involved in “espionage activities” tied to İmamoğlu. The pro-government outlet Daily Sabah reported on the CPO's claims that evidence tied Yanardağ to the network, alleging that he “organized the press leg of the election process in exchange for benefits provided by Gün” and cooperated with foreign intelligence to influence 2019's municipal election. During their testimony on October 26, all three men denied the allegations. CHP Leader Özgür Özel, when naming Gün in an address to those gathered outside the courtroom that day, said the espionage accusations were fabricated.

Journalists note that had the investigations launched against opposition-led municipalities been genuine, the same investigations should apply to former leaders of municipalities once under the control of the government and managed by the members of the ruling party.

Rights at risk

Beyond politics and criminal justice, the rule of law in Turkey is being challenged on other fronts: press freedom, minority rights and legislative changes that tilt legal protections. A notable illustration is the proposed 11th Judicial Package (11. Yargı Paketi), which includes clauses that would criminalize what is termed “behavior contrary to one’s biological sex and public morality,” and impose penalties for “promoting” such behavior.

Rights groups emphasize that this not only threatens LGBTQ+ individuals’ rights, but also targets journalists covering these topics: “Journalists reporting on LGBTQ+ issues such as human rights violations, sexual health, Pride marches etc. risk criminal prosecution on the grounds of ‘promotion.’”

Kezban Konukçu, an Istanbul Member of Parliament (MP) from the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), has submitted a parliamentary inquiry regarding anti-LGBTQ+ clauses reportedly included in the draft, calling the proposal “not merely a legal regulation but a reflection of a homophobic, transphobic, and discriminatory political climate.” Konukçu questioned the Ministry of Justice's assessment in the framework of the draft's incompatibility with international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and challenged whether it understands that such a law — if adopted — could fuel further violence and social exclusion against women and LGBTQ+ individuals, undermining rule of law and democratic values.

MP Sevda Karaca from the Labor Party (EMEP) condemned the proposed reforms at a press briefing in Ankara, describing them as “a fascist law of domination that turns personal life into a field of state punishment.” She argued the draft mirrors a proposal by the Islamist HÜDA PAR party, openly targeting LGBTQ+ existence: “This is not just about LGBTQ+ people — it’s a rehearsal of government violence against society at large. If this law passes, anyone deemed ‘unacceptable’ by the government could be criminalized. A man with long hair or a woman with short hair could go to jail for violating ‘biological sex norms.’ The state is basically declaring: ‘We will commit hate crimes.’”

A state of law in limbo

According to Article 2 of the country's Constitution, “The Republic of Türkiye is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law.” However, the disconnect between form and function is growing.

The Minguzzi verdict illustrates the judiciary operating under visible stress. The opposition prosecutions illustrate how the judiciary is being politicized. The legal reforms targeting journalists and minorities highlight how law is being reshaped to govern identities and dissent, more than tackle crime.

If the developments in the last eight months alone are indicative of the state of law in Turkey, its judiciary may be coming across as a battleground of interests rather than a fulcrum of rights. Whether that battleground gives way to institutional reform, genuine rule of law, or deeper entrenchment of political justice remains the question of the moment.

Originally published on Global Voices

Image by Mariam Nikuradze/OC Media. Used with permission.

On October 4, Georgia held municipal elections in a climate of escalating political tension. Protests organized by the opposition on the day of the vote saw significant police intervention, with scores being arrested following an investigation launched by the country's Interior Ministry.

The incumbent Georgian Dream party claimed sweeping victory — both proportionally and in mayoral races — across all 64 municipalities. Official voter turnout hovered around 40.9 percent; in the capital of Tbilisi, it was only 31 percent, a record low. According to analysis by Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), the international non-profit, non-partisan, public policy institution, “Out of nearly one million registered voters, the ruling party candidate received about 250,000.” In previous local elections held in 2021, the voter turnout was at 39 percent.

The socio-political backdrop

The municipal election took place amid a year of protests which started in response to the government’s announcement to delay EU integration. In 2024, there was a contested parliamentary election, which both the country’s opposition and independent international observers described as flawed. Despite the ongoing protests, the ruling party has not budged, only raising the pressure bar over citizens and the remaining members of independent civil society. Arrests and prison sentences have continued, even as the government faces growing scrutiny over Georgia's democratic backsliding over the course of the past year.

In the lead-up to the local elections on October 4, opposition and human rights groups had raised concerns that changes to electoral laws — including removing thresholds requiring runoffs, increasing majoritarian seats, and reshaping municipal boundaries and seat allocations — favored the incumbents. This has been accompanied by a year-long crackdown on dissent and civil society, including the jailing of opposition figures, mounting pressure against NGOs, and restrictions on local independent media, all of which have cumulatively tilted the playing field in favor of the government.

As a result, eight major opposition parties — including Freedom Square, European Georgia, United National Movement, Strategy Agmashenebeli, Girchi–More Freedom and others — announced they were boycotting the municipal elections, saying that participating would be tantamount to legitimizing what they call an illegitimate regime. Only a couple of opposition actors (the Lelo-Strong Georgia alliance; ex-Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia’s For Georgia) with one joint candidate contested.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) refused to field an observer mission due to the short notice of their invitation, further eroding confidence in oversight. Other international observer missions and prominent local election observers, including the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, and Transparency International, also did not deploy any missions, citing a repressive environment and inability for fair and free elections to take place.

Protests, clashes, and repression

On the day of the vote, large demonstrations across Tbilisi encountered heavy police intervention. The organizers of the protests described the demonstrations as a “peaceful revolution,” but City Hall denied them permission for most of their requested locations, granting only one out of four areas with a caveat that roads should remain open in order not to block people from accessing polling stations.

Protesters eventually broke through the gates of the presidential residence; police responded with pepper spray, water cannons and tear gas. According to official counts, 21 security personnel and six protesters were injured.

In a tweet, at least one member of parliament described the protesters as a “violent mob” and “radical opposition.” The Ministry of the Interior later advised that an investigation had been launched regarding four separate criminal charges — attempted overthrow of the constitutional order, group violence, seizure or blocking of a strategic facility, and damage or destruction of property. Among the 36 arrested so far are opposition figures and scores of demonstrators.

Domestic and international reaction

On October 7, the European Parliament issued a joint statement on election outcomes in Georgia, describing the environment in which the local elections took place as “restrictive,” expressing concern over violent police response to the protests, and calling on the government “to stop its assault on democracy and respect the fundamental rights of freedom of assembly and expression.”

In a statement on October 7, OSCE/ODIHR Director Maria Telalian called on the authorities to respect citizens’ rights to peaceful assembly. “Peaceful protesters in Georgia continue to be detained, sentenced, and fined for exercising their rights. The authorities have an obligation to implement their OSCE human rights commitments and international obligations, including respect for the right to peaceful assembly,” she said. “I would like to urge once again the Georgian authorities to ensure that civil society and human rights defenders are not targeted and that their voices are heard, as their work is crucial in fostering a vibrant democratic society.”

EU High Representative Kaja Kallas and Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos issued a joint statement urging Georgia to uphold freedom of assembly and expression. “Months of raids on independent media, the passing of laws targeting civil society, the jailing of opponents and activists, or amendments to the electoral code favoring the ruling party, drastically reduced the possibility of having competitive elections,” they explained, adding that “a large part of the opposition boycotted these elections, and the turnout was relatively low.”

Several other international responses echoed the sentiments of the EU officials, holding the ruling government accountable for elections that they said failed to meet democratic election standards, void of transparency and fair vote. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze claimed the protest was an attempt to overthrow democratic order, and accused the EU of foreign involvement.

Too little, too late?

For some observers, Western condemnation is not enough. According to Laura Thornton, the senior director for global democracy programs at the McCain Institute, Western stakeholders must bear the responsibility for not doing enough ahead of what unfolded on October 4. She suggested that the EU and the US had failed to adopt legislation which could have been used to financially sanction and weaken the ruling party, but maintained there was still a possibility to “economically isolate the Georgian regime.”

Despite Georgian Dream claiming a landslide victory in these elections, Hans Gutbrod, a professor in Public Policy and longtime Georgia observer, suggested in an analysis that the party may not be as strong as it appears: “In the end, it comes back to this. The dominance of the Georgian Dream across institutions conceals that they are not that strong. Across the world, those that today are described as post-liberal populists have real grievances that they run on, ranging from immigration to historical humiliation (Trianon, Sèvres, “regional power”, and so forth). The Georgian Dream? It has to make up entirely imaginary enemies,” Gutbrod wrote.

The 2025 municipal elections underscored the growing political polarization and institutional strain in Georgia. Despite the ruling party securing victories across all municipalities, the combination of a historically low turnout, opposition boycotts, and the absence of major observer missions has raised questions about the overall credibility of the vote. The protests and ensuing police response further highlighted the tense environment in which the elections were conducted.

As Georgia faces scrutiny over its democratic trajectory and relations with its Western partners, the aftermath of the elections is likely to shape both the country’s internal political landscape and the future of its engagement with the European Union and broader international community.

Originally published on Global Voices

Image by Arzu Geybullayeva, created using Canva Pro.

Turkey is celebrating 2025 as the “Year of the Family.” It is against this backdrop that, on September 18, the country's regulatory watchdog Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) issued fines to several large streaming platforms — including Netflix, Disney+, HBO Max, Prime Video and Mubi — for violating family values.

The films that prompted the measure were “Cobalt Blue” (Netflix); “Those About to Die” (Prime Video); “Benedetta” (Mubi); “All of Us Strangers” (Disney+); and “Looking: the Movie” (HBO Max), all of which were removed from streaming platforms in Turkey. RTÜK claims that these films “promote homosexuality,” “disregard family values,” and “conflict with the shared values of society.”

Rights defenders say these measures are part of a broader crackdown on LGBTQ+ visibility in Turkey. Since 2015, Istanbul Pride has been routinely banned, with police dispersing demonstrators using tear gas and detentions. Public officials have increasingly framed LGBTQ+ identities as a “threat to family values,” echoing the language used by RTÜK in its rulings against streaming platforms.

One member of the RTÜK Council, Tuncay Keser, criticised the decision: “While the institution of the family is almost daily undermined in daytime programs for the sake of ratings, RTÜK’s claim of ‘protecting society’ through smart-labeled fictional content on encrypted, subscription-based platforms, which adults access by paying a fee, represents a serious contradiction and double standard.”

This is the not the first time that RTÜK has fined streaming platforms. In 2023, Netflix, Prime, Disney+, Mubi, Bein, and Blu TV were fined for allegedly promoting homosexuality and undermining moral values in Turkey. At the time, Keser told VoA in an interview, “RTÜK has no duty to impose a family model on adults. By setting the agenda through daily political debates, the entire media is being intimidated.”

In 2022, RTÜK launched a probe into Netflix's animated “Jurassic World: Camp Cretaceous” series. “We are determined not to allow content that may negatively impact our children and youth and that disregard our values,” tweeted Ebubekir Sahin, the head of RTÜK at the time. The show reportedly featured LGBTQ+ characters.

In December 2021, another film on Netflix was subject to fines. According to RTÜK, “More the Merrier” was “based on a fiction in which homosexuality, incest relationships, and swinging are intensely experienced.” The platform was ordered to remove the film from streaming in Turkey.

In May that same year, Spotify was ordered to remove “inappropriate content” from its site. By 2022, the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office launched an investigation against the platform on the grounds that it was featuring playlists “insulting religious values and state officials.” The issue, however, was not so much the songs as the names of the playlists, as Spotify's rules extend rights to users creating playlists without the platform’s approval or oversight.

The power vested in RTÜK to oversee digital streaming platforms stems from a 2018 regulatory change, adopted in 2019, which empowered the agency to impose administrative measures including warnings, suspension of programming, temporary broadcast bans, revocation of broadcasting licenses and, in the most recent case, fines. At the time, prominent Turkish experts on freedom of expression noted the dangers of the decision to extend censorship across all platforms in a country where censorship was already common.

By 2023, RTÜK imposed broadcasting licenses — not typically required of pro-government online outlets — upon the digital media platforms of DW, Euronews and VoA; when they refused to comply, their platforms were blocked in Turkey. One organisation contested RTÜK's broad powers regarding licensing, but lost the case on the grounds that such powers did not allegedly constitute a restriction on freedom of the media. By 2024, RTÜK announced that programs on YouTube which produce news must also obtain broadcasting licenses.

RTÜK’s actions also extend to local broadcasters. In a December 2024 report, the Media and Law Studies Association (MLSA) calculated that the watchdog imposed USD 4.5 million worth of fines between January 1, 2023 and June 30, 2024, issuing 1,357 broadcast suspensions during the same period. According to the report, fines were applied to media critical of the government, but also to topics ranging from religious sects, social issues, Kurdish issues, and LGBTQ+ content. Even street interviews have not been spared.

Morality and obscenity under the spotlight

Turkish artists have also come under the microscope. In September, the popular girl band Manifest was investigated over their concert outfits. On September 6, after their concert in Istanbul, the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office launched a probe on the grounds the singers were engaged in “obscene behavior” and “exhibitionism” through their dance and performance.

Presidential Chief Advisor Oktay Saral went as far as to accuse the singers of being “immoral, shameless, indecent creatures,” and called for prosecution in order to “prevent them from ever engaging in this exhibitionism again.” As a result of the investigations, the singers were placed under a travel ban and have to regularly check in at the police station.

Women’s rights advocates warn that such interventions reinforce a wider rollback on gender equality. Turkey’s 2021 withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention — a landmark treaty to combat violence against women — marked a turning point. Since then, feminist organizations and campaigners have faced smear campaigns, investigations, and growing restrictions on public demonstrations.

Meanwhile, domestic violence remains a persistent crisis. According to We Will Stop Femicide, at least 394 women were murdered in Turkey in 2024, most of them by partners or relatives. In the first six months of 2025, 136 women were victims of femicide, while 145 died under suspicious circumstances.

Around the time that Manifest was being investigated, popular singer and song writer Mabel Matiz had his recently released song blocked on streaming platforms over what the Family and Social Services Ministry claimed was a threat to “public order and general health,” and “contrary to the traditions and customs of Turkish family.” According to reporting by Bianet, the incident marked “the first time authorities have formally requested a court to block access to a specific song.”

Matiz has faced criticism in the past. In 2022, he released a love song on the last day of Pride month that featured a same-sex love story. RTÜK’s response was swift, calling music television channels and threatening them with heavy consequences if they released the song.

In January 2022, the iconic singer/songwriter Sezen Aksu was also targeted by the media watchdog, which warned television channels not to broadcast her song “It is a Wonderful Thing to Live,” on the grounds it degraded religious values thanks to a sentence in the song that read, “Give my regards to the ignorant Eve and Adam.” Aksu responded with a song called “The Hunter,” in which one verse read, “You cannot kill me, I have my voice, my music, and work. When I say, I, I am everyone.”

Obscenity charges have also been previously used against online content creators. In December 2023, Gizem Bağdaçiçek, a creator of adult content, was detained on obscenity charges. In November 2023, another TikTok content creator was detained on similar charges; they were both subsequently released.

In January 2024, similar measures were taken against another online content producer, with prosecutors citing “semi-naked” images as the reason for the detention. The content creator was arrested on charges of “facilitating the publication of obscene content.” Most online adult content has been blocked in Turkey.

Just six months later, in July 2025, model and activist Melisa Aydınalp was detained after posting a performance in which she criticized state-imposed policies about normal birth. She was accused of alleged public indecency and promotion of obscene content, but was released after one night at the police station due to lack of evidence, and placed under a travel ban.

According to Article 226 of Turkey's Penal Code, the distribution of obscene content via media is prohibited and punishable by a prison sentence. Yet, there is no clear definition of what obscenity means. According to Keser, RTÜK “has no duty” imposing a “family model on adults.”

The censorship of LGBTQ+ expression, artistic performances, and women’s voices reflects not only moral policing, but also a broader strategy of silencing dissent. By framing diverse identities and critical art as “obscenity,” the authorities consolidate control over public life, narrowing the space for free expression in Turkey.

Originally published on Global Voices

Hungarian journalist László Mézes after the assault during the demonstration outside the campaign office of Tbilisi mayoral candidate Kakha Kaladze. Photo by Mariam Nikuradze, OC Media. Used with permission.

In Georgia, politically-motivated crackdowns on dissenters by the ruling Georgian Dream party continues unabated. From arrests and repressive actions towards the media and civil society, to purges in the civil service and other forms of pressure and intimidation, the rift between the government and its critics is deepening.

Meanwhile, if — as indicated in a letter from the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs to Georgia's Minister of Foreign Affairs — the government fails to show progress on key reforms and human rights–related demands, Western stakeholders are considering various measures, including expelling the country from the Council of Europe, and suspending visa-free travel to Georgian citizens.

Targeting civil society and media

On September 2, in a significant escalation, the Prosecutor General’s Office summoned the heads of several prominent Georgian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for an investigation into an alleged sabotage case. This action followed the freezing of bank accounts belonging to seven civil society organizations, which were accused of allegedly facilitating violence during anti-government protests. The investigation claims that protective equipment, like respiratory masks and goggles discovered during the police search of the organizations’ offices, were evidence they were using funds to aid protesters.

The pressure is not limited to civil society. A Georgian journalist was recently sentenced to two years in prison, sparking outrage at home and abroad and highlighting the increasing repression in the country’s media landscape. On September 8, during a rally in Tbilisi, Hungarian journalist László Mézes was attacked, resulting in injuries to his face and a broken finger. Two journalists from the Georgian outlet Publika were also attacked.

Javid Ahmedov, an Azerbaijan journalist pursuing a master's degree in Tbilisi, was the latest example of blocked entry into the country, both for journalists and other foreigners in recent months, including an American diplomat, a stand-up comedian, a French photographer, and others.

Sentencing and detentions of protesters

Also on September 2, the Tbilisi City Court sentenced eight protesters to prison terms ranging from two to two-and-a-half years, on charges of organizing or participating in “group violence.” Government critics and family members of the detainees, who have been protesting for their release, insist the cases are fabricated and based on insufficient evidence. Despite the convictions, the families have shown defiance, with one mother proclaiming, “Let the regime fear mothers!”

Since November 2024, the country has witnessed ongoing protests ignited by the government's November 2024 decision to suspend talks on Georgia's European Union accession. Hundreds of people have been detained, with criminal cases launched in over 50 instances. Several protesters have already been convicted and sentenced to years in prison.

On September 3, the same court sentenced Saba Skhvitaridze, a member of the opposition Ahali party, to two years behind bars. The initial criminal charge brought against him involved harming a police officer’s health while on duty, which carries a sentence of seven to 11 years’ incarceration. Skhvitaridze later explained that he had confronted the individual in response to an attack on a woman and insults hurled at bystanders during a demonstration on December 5, 2024.

The officer was not wearing a uniform; rather, he was dressed as what Georgians refer to as Titushki — or as a U.S. State Department Report describes them, “unidentified assailants typically dressed in all black with their faces covered.” After prosecutors reclassified the charge as intentional infliction of less serious bodily harm, the judge chose to sentence Skhvitaridze rather than opt for house arrest and community service.

That same day, the court sentenced a group of 11 protesters to two-year prison terms. “I am proud, truly proud, that I raised two heroic sons!” Marina Terishvili said after the verdict. One of her children, Mamuka, was killed at a demonstration in 1992, and her other son, Giorgi, was among the 11 sentenced.

Detentions and arrests have not subsided. On September 2, at least 20 people were detained in central Tbilisi during a demonstration against the government's parliamentary commission, which was established in February 2025 to investigate alleged crimes under the United National Movement (UNM) rule from 2003-2012. Since then, the commission has expanded its scope, allowing Georgian Dream to implicate any opposition figure; this has led to the arrests of several high-profile political leaders.

While police claimed the detentions were for “not complying with the police's lawful order” to clear the roadway, visual recordings and images from the scene indicate otherwise:

Look how they are almost strangling our @DroaParty member and veteran activist Shushana Matsaberidze! This time she was just standing for herself on the pavement and even reproached me for being in front. The police just recognizes her and wants to get rid of her.… https://t.co/qPTwOfqHgO pic.twitter.com/HT1GtnlQtX

— Marika Mikiashvili (@Mikiashvili_M) September 2, 2025

On September 3, the ruling party published a 471-page report summarizing the results of the commission's investigation outlining the alleged crimes committed by the former ruling UNM and its leader; imprisoned the former president, Mikheil Saakashvili; and detained members of other opposition groups. Georgian Dream has repeatedly said it intends to use the findings of the investigation to ban Georgia’s opposition.

International response

In May, the United States House of Representatives passed the Mobilising and Enhancing Georgia’s Options for Building Accountability, Resilience, and Independence (MEGOBARI) Act, which calls for the sanctioning of Georgia government officials, and others responsible for “advancing […] Russian-style foreign agent legislation or undermining or suppressing lawful popular or civil society opposition.”

In July, the foreign ministers of Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the High Representative of the European Union issued a joint statement expressing their concern about the deteriorating situation in Georgia.

That same month, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) expressed its concern over “the arrests of dozens of protestors in recent months and reports of the lack of respect for fair trial standards, as well as of increased pressure on human rights defenders and civil society actors while carrying out their legitimate work.” The European Parliament, in a plenary session on July 9, deplored the democratic backsliding in Georgia. In August, the U.S. State Department's Human Rights Report highlighted “notable negative human rights developments in Georgia.”

As seen during the most recent protest on September 8, despite international criticism, Georgia's government is continuing to suppress political opposition and silence critical voices — but the resilience and defiance of protesters and their families signal that the struggle for democratic space is far from over.

Originally published on Global Voices

Screenshot of the police storming CHP party headquarters is taken from the Financial Express YouTube video “Istanbul Protest: Riot Police Clash With CHP Supporters At Party HQ”. Fair use. 

Turkey’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), is facing an escalating political crisis. On September 2, a ruling of the 45th Civil Court of First Instance annulled the CHP's Istanbul Provincial Congress, held in October 2023. As a result, Özgür Çelik, the party's current provincial chair — along with 196 delegates — was dismissed. In their place, a team of trustees, reportedly aligned with the former party leadership, was appointed.

The CHP's leadership has dismissed the ruling as null and void, even as it faces another court hearing, scheduled for September 15, which revolves around a “mutlak butlan” (absolute nullity) case aiming to annul the party's 38th Ordinary Congress, held in November 2023. This congress led to election of Özgür Özel as the new party leader, ousting long-time chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.

The September 2 court ruling stated there were procedural violations during the vote. A similar argument was made for absolute nullity case, as a lawsuit initiated by a party member reportedly aligned with Kılıçdaroğlu alleged procedural violations and potential “vote buying” during the party congress.

Despite Özel's legal team maintaining the case should be dismissed on the basis of invalidity due to the lawsuit's expired filing period, and because political party conventions fall under electoral board jurisdiction rather than civil courts, the hearing is scheduled to proceed. Should the court conclude that violations did indeed happen, such a ruling would nullify all decisions taken by the party's current leadership since the congress.

In response, some 900 party delegates called for an extraordinary congress against the possibility of a similar court ruling. Özel said if the court were to deliver a ruling that affects the party's leadership and a trustee is appointed to replace him, “that trustee would last no more than six days.” The party's extraordinary congress is scheduled to take place on September 24.

Others have been questioning whether such an outcome would be possible. According to journalist Barış Terkoğlu, assuming Kılıçdaroğlu secures his seat as party leader following the court decision on September 15, his first move would be to cancel the upcoming congress.

Academic Berk Esen, however, disagreed. Writing on X, Essen opined that he does not think Kılıçdaroğlu “will act as harshly,” given that he “is a passive politician” who will try to prolong the process by delaying holding the congress. “This way,” Esen explained, “he will attempt to undermine the Özel-İmamoğlu team. Instead of expulsion, he will prefer the path of resignation and pushing toward a separate party.”

On the heels of the September 2 court decision, the crisis reached a new peak when police escorted court-appointed trustee Gürsel Tekin into the CHP’s Istanbul provincial headquarters on September 8, amid widespread protests and internet restrictions that throttled access to YouTube, X, Instagram and WhatsApp.

The night before, police surrounded and barricaded party headquarters to prevent any demonstrations by supporters. The Istanbul Governor’s Office, meanwhile, announced a ban on rallies, press statements, marches, setting up tents, opening stands, sit-ins, signature campaigns, and commemorative events in the districts of Beşiktaş, Beyoğlu, Eyüpsultan, Kağıthane, Sarıyer, and Şişli between September 7 and 10.

Journalist Gonca Tokyol summed up the situation on X:

Another tense night in Turkey: CHP’s Istanbul HQ is under heavy police blockade. Roads sealed after the youth wing urged supporters to “defend” the building from the appointed trustee board set to arrive tomorrow. Inside, party members stage a sit-in, calling for support. https://t.co/4YO4S4U1ti

— Gonca Tokyol (@goncatokyol) September 7, 2025

The bans and barricades did not stop people from showing up, but those who did were violently dispersed by riot police on September 8. On September 9, the party's 102nd anniversary, ousted provincial leader Çelik posted on X: “Good morning Istanbul. No blockade or attack can stop the Republican People's Party's march to power.”

In an interview with The Financial Times, Özel said the ruling government was staging “a coup against the future ruling party.” For almost a year now, the ruling Justice and Development Party government has been on the offensive against the main opposition party, culminating with the arrest of popular Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu on March 19, 2025 on various charges, including corruption. Both prior to and after the mayor's arrest, multiple CHP members were also detained on similar grounds.

Speaking to the digital news outlet Fayn about the recent court ruling, constitutional law expert and faculty member at Galatasaray University’s Faculty of Law Professor Şule Özsoy Boyunsuz said, “Democratic political life in Turkey, as we know it, has come to an end.” She elaborated:

The national will is expressed from the bottom up through political parties. Therefore, in democratic states governed by the rule of law, parties cannot and must not be appointed by the state. Once you break the chain that runs freely from party grassroots to members, from members to delegates, and from delegates to leadership, and instead begin appointing administrators, it means the state is intervening.

Who is the state in Turkey? A single person. The president and the public officials appointed by him.

Others voices soon chimed in. In April, political scientist Şebnem Gümüşçü noted that the government has taken hold over the public sphere through its control over the media, the judiciary, and other key institutions. As such, she argued, “Turkey is at a crossroads: it will either democratize or move toward full authoritarianism, where elections have no meaning.”

A group of academics signed a petition in which they expressed support for the opposition and its leadership. “As academics concerned about the future of this country, we support the CHP and the leadership of Özgür Özel in their struggle for democracy and dignity, and we call on all civil initiatives to strongly expand this struggle,” read the statement.

Responding to the blocking of the party building on September 7, political scientist Kemal Büyükyükse noted on X:

THREAD – What is happening in Turkey right now and why it should matter to the world

Today in Istanbul, police barricaded the main opposition CHP’s HQ after a court annulled its 2023 congress. This is not routine repression. It is a soft coup against the opposition. ++ pic.twitter.com/uTEx47AErG

— Kemal Büyükyüksel (@KBuyukyuksel) September 8, 2025

Büyükyükse continued, “The next step is clear, trusteeship for CHP nationally, paving the way for liquidation. This is historic. For 75 years, multiparty politics survived even through coups. Never before has the principal opposition been dismantled while governing major cities and leading polls. What is happening is not simply the erosion of democracy, it is blatant shameless demolition.”

Between now and September 15, all eyes are on the opposition party and its leadership. In the aftermath, all eyes will be on Turkey and the future of its citizens.

Originally published on Global Voices

Image by Arzu Geybullayeva, created using Canva Pro.

More than a hundred men working in Turkey’s arts and entertainment industry, including photographers, musicians, actors, comedians and publishers, have been accused of sexual harassment and assault in recent weeks. As women and LGBTQ+ people take to social media to share stories of abuse, their testimonies — widely compared to the global #MeToo movement — have shaken Turkey’s cultural scene, implicating high-profile figures and prompting several institutions to cut ties with accused individuals.

It all began with a group of women sharing their experiences with male photographers who they say coerced them into taking nude photographs, and then shared the intimate images without their consent. These photographers allegedly used their influence and power to harass and physically assault several women. Other women, from various cultural, arts and entertainment spaces, soon came forward as well; in fact, new stories keep coming even as this article was being written.

One of the prominent accusations involves Gökhan Özoğuz, the lead singer of Athena, a Turkish ska-punk band. In her testimony shared on X, a woman said that after tagging Özoğuz in a concert selfie, he allegedly messaged her asking for nude photos and invited her to his hotel. While she didn't take him up on the offer, the fact that it was even made goes against local cultural norms, as Özoğuz was married at the time and has children.

Meanwhile, multiple women accused comedian Mesut Süre of harassment and attempted sexual assault over the course of a decade. Following the revelations, the producers of his hit YouTube show “İlişki Testi” (“Relationship Test”) said they would no longer work with him. In a post shared on the show’s Instagram account, the producers expressed solidarity with the victims, promising to dedicate their page to more unheard stories.

At Oda Tiyatrosu, an İstanbul-based theater collective, fingers were pointed at one unnamed director for exploiting young actors through coercive “undressed auditions.” Acknowledging that it had received complaints about unethical audition and rehearsal practices, the Actors’ Union of Turkey urged victims to report any boundary violations.

Media and publishing figures implicated

The cultural press has not been spared. For instance, there have been complaints against Kültigin Kağan Akbulut, founder and editor-in-chief of the online magazine Argonotlar, for both unwanted physical contact and verbal harassment. In a rare admission, the publication confirmed that Akbulut did not deny the allegations and announced he would step down.

In the case of filmmaker Selim Evci, the streaming service Mubi Turkey removed his films, while the art center Akbank Sanat severed ties with his company ahead of its annual short film festival. Evci is being accused of physically assaulting a woman during her internship interview seven years ago.

Next steps unclear

Even as testimonies continue to be shared, thus far, no charges have been laid and there is no information being released regarding what the next course of action will be.

In some cases, men who have been named in testimonies have had projects pulled as some organizations opt to no longer work with them. In others, men like Evci have taken the women to court for targeting them. For his part, actor Tayanc Ayaydin rejected the accusations, saying that while what he did may have been thoughtless, it should not qualify as harassment.

In Turkey, for an investigation to be initiated in relation to a crime, the victim must generally file a complaint within six months of the incident taking place — but, as is often the case with this type of abuse, many of the acts identified in these testimonies happened well outside this timeframe.

The legal process itself is also exhausting, putting the burden of proof on the victim, who who must provide all the evidence. According to a recent DW article, Ministry of Justice statistics show that — compared to other crimes — conviction rates for sexual assault and harassment are low: “A significant portion of cases are acquitted or dismissed, reinforcing the perception among victims that crimes go unpunished.” As a result, public scrutiny and exposure often work better than the legal system.

A cultural shift in the making?

In a statement, the actors’ union described the testimonies as “a cycle where actors feel isolated, powerless, and often forced into silence.” Assuring the victims that they are not alone, it added that breaking the cycle requires solidarity and collective action.

Reflecting on the broader significance of the testimonies, veteran editor Evrim Kepenek wrote about the frequency with which perpetrators are exonerated, usually on the grounds that victims did not speak up sooner. She went on to explain, “One of the main reasons survivors speak up late is that they freeze in the moment of harassment or abuse, meaning their defense mechanisms shut down.” Quoting a tweet by sociologist Zeynep Duygu, Kepenek further underscored the reasons for delayed testimonies:

Delayed disclosure isn’t a contradiction; it is the result of trauma, power dynamics and social pressure. Trauma silences the victim, the perpetrator’s power makes speaking impossible, and society's accusatory language deepens the silence. The delay does not diminish the reality of the violence; on the contrary, it reveals the pressures under which the victim was silenced. The time for disclosure, however, is related to the victim's safety, social conditions, and the support network. Therefore, every disclosure, regardless of when it is made, is essential and expresses the truth.

Commenting on the recent revelations, writer Sema Kaygusuz posted:

To those questioning the prolonged silence of women who have been subjected to harassment, sexual assault, and aggravated sexual assault, I have a few words. These crimes exploit silence. Unlike murder, theft, or robbery, which are momentary; the destruction they cause lasts for years. It makes you sick, destroys self-worth. Due to its unprovability, it turns into a dark narrative that is constantly repeated; searched for inconsistencies.

Originally published on Global Voices

Image by Arzu Geybullayeva, created using Canva Pro.

Since August 4, Turkey has been gripped by revelations of a wide-ranging forgery network accused of producing fake university diplomas, altering academic records, and even manipulating driver’s license exams. According to prosecutors, suspects infiltrated Turkey’s e-government system, e-Devlet (e-State), by fraudulently obtaining electronic signatures belonging to senior officials at ministries, universities, and regulatory agencies.

With these stolen digital credentials, they created fake university diplomas in law, psychology, and civil engineering; altered transcripts to boost students’ grades or facilitate transfers; and even tampered with driver’s license tests, registering failing candidates — including some who were illiterate — as successful.

According to The Financial Times, “Among the most scandalous items was a supposedly fake degree issued to a civil engineer whose company has won major infrastructure tenders, and the stolen identities of lawyers who died in the massive 2023 earthquake.”

Turkey's long history of data leaks

Turkish citizens have long been exposed to personal data breaches, including one in 2016, when the personal data of some 50 million people — names, addresses, parents’ first names, cities of birth, birth dates, and national ID numbers — were leaked. The following year, some 60 million subscribers of Turkey's major Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) operator, Turkcell, had their personal data breached.

In 2021, a cyberattack on the country's biggest food delivery app, Yemeksepeti, resulted in a leak of the data of 19 million customers, including logins, phone numbers, emails, and address information. In 2023, following a hack on the country's main public administration portal, the personal data of 85 million Turkish citizens and millions of residents were also leaked.

By 2024, a cyber attack on the information management system of a local hospital in Istanbul resulted in a leak of the medical records of millions of patients. That same year, Turkish authorities revealed that a data breach during the pandemic led to the stolen data of over 100 million citizens, including those living abroad, refugees, and other individuals whose names were registered with official institutions.

January 2025 also saw a breach of satellite data; by March, Turkey adopted a new cybersecurity law, which introduced stringent measures such as criminalizing reporting on data leaks and granting extraordinary powers to the head of the newly created Cybersecurity Directorate. At the time, critics argued that the law's vague and far-reaching language places disproportionate emphasis on controlling online narratives rather than securing digital infrastructure. The Council of Higher Education (YÖK), a government institution in charge of supervising the universities, later announced it had filed criminal complaints against individuals and institutions spreading such allegations.

The Interior Ministry, meanwhile, confirmed it was aware of the most recent breach. Through the details were only made public in August, the ministry started an investigation a year ago and have already detained nearly 200 suspects in connection with the breach. In a tweet on X, the Minister of the Interior said at least 57 fake diplomas, 108 forged driver’s licenses, and four counterfeit high school diplomas were uncovered as a result of these ongoing investigations.

On August 6, Tülay Hatimoğulları and Tuncer Bakırhan, co-chairs of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Parti), submitted a complaint to the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor requesting a comprehensive criminal investigation into both individuals and state institutions involved in the breach.

Institutional backlash and denials

As news of the scandal spread, YÖK firmly denied the reports, saying that none of the suspects under investigation worked as academics in Turkish universities.

Calling for full accountability and the harshest penalties for those responsible, the Istanbul Bar Association described the scandal as both a blow to public order and a “grave disrespect” to colleagues who lost their lives in the earthquakes, whose academic records were unlawfully altered.

The Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB) called it one of the most severe forgery cases in the history of the republic, linking it to years of eroded meritocracy and weakened oversight. “This is not an isolated incident,” TMMOB chair Emin Koramaz said, “but a manifestation of systemic decay where public trust has been undermined and professional standards ignored.”

Demanding accountability, including resignations and the initiation of an independent technical review, the Chamber of Computer Engineers (BMO) highlighted how copied e-signatures exposed serious flaws in digital infrastructure, while the Turkish Psychologists Association (TPD) pointed to alarming cases of fake psychologists treating patients for fees, warning that such practices put public health at risk and renewing calls for a long-delayed professional law.

The DEM Parti's Nurdan Kılıç underlined that the scandal is not simply a case of isolated wrongdoing, but a multi-dimensional criminal structure that has penetrated various tiers of the state, undermining public order, trust, and meritocracy. The diploma scandal has emerged alongside other forgery investigations, including allegations that civil registry officials issued fake passports and IDs to foreign nationals in exchange for bribes.

For many observers, the affair underscores a broader structural problem: the weakening of oversight, the neglect of merit-based systems, and the erosion of accountability.

At a press conference, Suat Özçağdaş, the Istanbul deputy and party vice chair of the Republican People's Party (CHP), sharply criticized the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) and its president, Abdullah Karagözoğlu, who is responsible for cybersecurity: “He didn’t even notice his own e-signature being duplicated. If he had any sense of shame, both the Minister of Transport and the BTK head would have resigned by now. They haven’t said a word. It’s like the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for cyber-security.”

On August 7, the BTK shared a public announcement that stated “35 fraudulent e-signatures detected by BTK were immediately canceled, and in subsequent efforts, 9 additional fraudulent e-signatures were also revoked.” The statement continued, “Security mechanisms against fraud have been enhanced, and stronger measures have been implemented. To raise public awareness, an SMS with a header containing the Elektronik Sertifika Hizmet Sağlayıcı [Electronic Certificate Service Provider] title was sent to all mobile numbers registered to the [national] identity numbers of Nitelikli Elektronik Sertifika [secure electronic signature] holders.”

This however, rang hollow and the CHP continued to criticize the BTK in its continued calls for accountability. “When such a scandal breaks, the relevant minister — and anyone else in the chain of responsibility — should all resign,” said CHP Vice Chair and Istanbul deputy Ulaş Karasu on August 8.

“BTK, responsible for data security,” he continued, “cannot shirk responsibility with its two-line statement. The question ‘Which chain of institutional neglect across which state bodies caused these data breaches?’ must be answered first by the Ministry of Transport, its minister, and all related institutions.”

The BTK is quite controversial. In 2022, the online news platform Medyascope.tv published an investigation revealing that, beginning in 2021, the state institution was collecting private user data in a massive breach of privacy.

On August 8, the Cumhuriyet newspaper published an interview with a member of the diploma forgery gang, who admitted that the network’s operations went far beyond diplomas. The interviewee, who spoke on condition of anonymity, revealed that the gang also forged the identities of judges, prosecutors, soldiers, and police officers, as well as press cards, pregnancy and ultrasound reports, and disability health reports. The age group of their “clients” ranged from 23 to 48 years old — citizens who were already active in the workforce and were seeking diplomas for promotion, status, or egotistical reasons.

Fixing the problem

More than a series of individual crimes, the diploma forgery scandal is a symptom of systemic weaknesses in Turkey’s digital infrastructure, oversight mechanisms, and accountability structures.

From stolen e-signatures to altered diplomas and compromised personal data, the controversy has exposed how easily public trust can be undermined when institutions fail to safeguard both meritocracy and privacy. Addressing these vulnerabilities will require not only technical fixes and stronger cybersecurity measures, but also clear accountability, legal reform, and a commitment to transparency.

Without such measures, Turkey risks further breaches that could erode confidence in its institutions and compromise the safety and rights of its citizens.

Originally published on Global Voices

Screenshot of the trilateral meeting that included President Donald Trump, President Ilham Aliyev, and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan taken from the Associated Press YouTube video “LIVE: Trump hosts Armenia and Azerbaijan for a peace summit”; fair use.

On August 8, 2025, the White House hosted a trilateral meeting in which U.S. President Donald Trump, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signed a series of agreements aimed at establishing long-term peace in the South Caucasus. The meeting took place just a month after Aliyev and Pashinyan met in Abu Dhabi, where they discussed — among other things — border delimitation, the opening and development of the Zangezur corridor, and the initialing of the peace agreement.

A joint, seven-point declaration outlining what had been agreed upon, as well as the draft peace agreement coming out of Abu Dhabi, were shared shortly after the meeting. However, no date was announced as to when the final peace agreement would be signed.

Back at the White House, Trump called the day one that “will go down in history” as the moment “two enemies became friends.” During the signing ceremony, at which he thanked his fellow leaders and remarked that the European Union, Russia, and “Sleepy Joe Biden” had failed to achieve similar results in the past, Trump said, “For a long time — 35 years — they were at war, and now they are friends. And they will be friends for a long time.”

Decades of tensions

The Nagorno-Karabakh area has been under the control of its ethnic Armenian population as a self-declared state since a war fought in the early 1990s, which ended with a ceasefire and an Armenian military victory in 1994. In the aftermath, a new, internationally unrecognized, de facto Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was established, and seven adjacent regions were occupied by the Armenian forces. According to the International Crisis Group, more than a million people were forced from their homes as a result of the conflict: “Azerbaijanis fled Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the adjacent territories, while Armenians left homes in Azerbaijan.”

Tensions lingered over the following decades, culminating in the second Karabakh war in 2020 and an ensuing military operation in September 2023, with the latter paving the way for Azerbaijan to regain full control over Karabakh.

Both countries have been engaged in negotiations and countless meetings mediated by international stakeholders since the Second Karabakh War in 2020, centered around reaching a final bilateral agreement and settling their remaining disagreements.

The parameters of peace

The draft peace agreement, announced in March 2025, reportedly included major concessions from Armenia, such as the removal of European Union monitors from the border and the dropping of lawsuits in international courts. Azerbaijan has consistently criticized the EU monitors since their deployment in October 2022, accusing them of “creating military and intelligence cover for the Armenian side.” The EU mission's expansion in February 2023, following an Azerbaijani offensive in Armenia in September 2022, further strained relations with Baku and Moscow, both of whom questioned its purpose and legitimacy.

Azerbaijan's demands also included Armenia amending its constitution to remove any perceived territorial claims to Azerbaijan — specifically, references within its preamble to the 1990 Declaration of Independence. Armenia's constitution does not make direct references to Karabakh; the preamble refers to the Declaration of Independence that “references the 1989 joint decision of the Armenian SSR Supreme Council and the Artsakh National Council on the Reunification of the Armenian SSR and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh.”

Prime Minister Pashinyan has publicly supported adopting a new constitution through a national referendum, with plans for a vote in 2027.

The talks in Abu Dhabi underscored a significant shift in the regional power balance, as Russia — once considered a primary mediator — appeared increasingly sidelined. While Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov diplomatically welcomed the direct dialogue, the Abu Dhabi meeting signaled Moscow's waning influence in mediating. The EU has also been largely sidelined.

The “Trump Route” — a corridor for peace and prosperity

The most prominent element of the agreement is the Zangezur Corridor which, since the trilateral meeting, has been branded as the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP). The corridor is a vital transport link through Armenia, connecting Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan, sandwiched between Armenia, Turkey, and Iran. This corridor holds significant potential for facilitating trade and transit between Europe and Asia, offering new economic opportunities for all parties involved. While the route will remain under Armenia’s sovereignty, the right to develop and administer the corridor will be granted for 99 years to an operator selected by the United States.

Since the end of the second Karabakh War, key points of contention have arisen in negotiations over the corridor. First, its name: Armenia rejects the term “Zangezur Corridor,” viewing it as a threat to the sovereignty over Syunik, Armenia's southern territory bordering Nakhchivan. Azerbaijan, in turn, opposes full Armenian control, citing concerns over reliable access, while Armenia refuses to cede control of the 32-kilometer (nearly 20-mile) route to any third party.

The proposal for the U.S. to take over the control of corridor was made in July in a press briefing in July by Tom Barrack, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey. During the briefing, Barrack said, “Give us the 32 kilometers of road on a 100-year lease, and you can all share it.’” At the time of the statement, Middle East Eye's analysis pointed out this was “the first official confirmation that the Trump administration offered to manage the corridor through a private U.S. commercial operator, which would serve as a neutral guarantor.”

Strategic partnership and lifting of restrictions

Highlighting the significance of Trump’s decision to repeal Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act — which for decades had prohibited U.S. government assistance to Azerbaijan — and announcing that the two countries were becoming strategic partners, Aliyev hailed the meeting as a “historic day.”

“I'm sure that Armenia and Azerbaijan will find courage and responsibility to reconcile,” he said, “And also the people will reconcile. We will turn the page of standoff, confrontation and bloodshed, and provide [a] bright and safe future for our children.”

Trade, travel, and diplomacy

Under the agreement, the parties pledged to permanently cease hostilities, open up trade and travel, establish diplomatic relations, and respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Trump described Aliyev and Pashinyan as “two very special people,” emphasising their strong personal relationship.

When asked by journalists what would happen if one party backtracked on the deal, Trump replied that such a scenario was unlikely, but if “small problems” did arise, they would resolve them.

Aliyev said, “If [either] of us, Prime Minister Pashinyan or myself, had in mind to step back, we wouldn't have come here. So you can be absolutely sure […] that what has happened today will result in peace, a long lasting peace, eternal peace in the Caucasus.” For his part, Pashinyan simply said, “I fully agree and have nothing to add.”

Regional and international reactions

Iran, while publicly welcoming the peace agreement as “an important step,” explicitly rejected foreign-imposed changes near its borders. Tehran warned that it would act if geopolitical shifts threatened its security.

Turkey responded more positively, with a statement from its Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcoming the negotiations.

Western stakeholders also hailed the deal as a significant step toward regional stability. In a joint statement, President Costa of the European Council and President von der Leyen of the European Commission said the meeting was “a major development for both Armenia and Azerbaijan, paving the way to lasting, sustainable peace for both countries and across the entire region, also culminating years of EU efforts.”

In Moscow, official reactions were more reserved. The Kremlin said it would “carefully study the details” before making a full assessment. However, prominent Russian state TV host and propagandist Vladimir Solovyov delivered a stark warning during his evening broadcast, in which he expressed deep concern over the shifting balance in the South Caucasus, hinting at the possibility of a new Russian “special military operation” in the region.

“What is happening in the South Caucasus is a very big problem,” he said, “and the Caspian could soon find itself in a situation where NATO bases might appear there. This is so dangerous that, from a geopolitical standpoint, it could lead to consequences that might result in not the last special military operation of our generation. That is why all possible diplomatic means must be used to make sure that Russia’s interests are respected.”

Pro-government Azerbaijani media interpreted Solovyov's comments as a veiled threat toward Azerbaijan, describing them as representative of Moscow’s unease over any U.S.-led diplomatic success in its traditional sphere of influence.

Whether the agreement signed in Washington signals the beginning of a new chapter or a fragile truce remains to be seen. It could mark the beginning of a new era of peace for the South Caucasus or, as some fear, amount to nothing more than a geopolitical manoeuvre. The implementation of the “Trump Route” promises economic opportunities, but against a backdrop of deep historical grievances, its success will depend heavily on mutual trust and credible international guarantees.

Originally published on Global Voices

Image created by Arzu Geybullayeva, using Canva Pro.

The deal was signed in January 2023, but the story of Azerbaijan-linked Pasha Holding’s investment in the Mandarin Oriental Bodrum luxury resort on Turkey’s Aegean coast resurfaced in July 2025, when its name was added to the resort’s signage. Pasha Holdings’ shareholders include Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev’s daughters Arzu and Leyla Aliyeva, and First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva’s father, Arif Pashayev.

When independent Azerbaijani news outlets first covered the new venture, the reports said only that the holding had purchased a 50 percent stake in the hotel. Now, multiple Turkish outlets are reporting that Pasha Holding acquired the stake for approximately EUR 500 million (nearly USD 580 million), but this price has not been confirmed in any public filing. According to resort owner Vedat Aşçı, the agreed amount was “far more modest,” though in an interview with Forbes Türkiye he declined to elaborate.

Not-so-modest prices

On paper, the deal reads like a straightforward real estate transaction in one of Turkey’s elite vacation destinations. But “straightforward” rarely applies when a ruling family-linked business appears in the news — especially when that family has been central to international investigations into money laundering, corruption, and the accumulation of offshore wealth. The Aliyev name has been mentioned in the Panama Papers, Daphne Project, Azerbaijan Laundromat, and Pandora Papers.

It is also difficult to speak of “modesty” when describing the Mandarin Oriental Bodrum’s rates. Spread across 600 acres with 2.5 kilometers of private coastline and three bays, the resort’s cheapest room starts at EUR 1,190 (USD 1,380) per night. A sea-view room costs roughly double; apartments are in the same bracket. The cheapest suite and entry-level villa both start around EUR 4,000 (close to USD 4,700) per night, according to the resort’s website and archived listings. Prices vary seasonally, with property purchase listings running into the millions on the luxury real estate sites reviewed by Global Voices.

Founded in 2006, Pasha Holding has grown into one of Azerbaijan’s most influential conglomerates, with operations spanning Turkey and Georgia. The organization is involved in a diversity of sectors, including “banking, insurance, construction, IT, property development, and tourism.” Investigations by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and Radio Free Europe (RFE/RL) describe the group as operating in a quasi-monopolistic environment, enabled by state favoritism that facilitates privileged access to markets and contracts.

Pattern of operation

The Aliyev family’s property acquisitions abroad are well documented. In 2021, the Pandora Papers revealed their purchase of nearly USD 700 million in London real estate through shell companies. In 2010, the Washington Post reported that Aliyev’s three children — then aged 13 to 24 — acquired Dubai properties worth USD 75 million. In 2012, the OCCRP found that Arzu Aliyeva owned a EUR one million (close to USD 1,160,000) villa in Karlovy Vary via a Prague-based company, while Arif Pashayev owned additional Czech properties.

The same year, Azerbaijan’s parliament voted to restrict public access to company ownership data, a move widely interpreted as an effort to shield ruling elite interests from scrutiny. Subsequent projects — the Daphne Project in 2018 and Proyekt Media in 2019 — linked the family to luxury hotels in Dubai and residences in Russia.

From Moscow to London to the French Riviera, the Aliyev family demonstrates a consistent pattern: converting opaque, hydrocarbon-derived wealth into high-prestige, low-scrutiny assets abroad, with the Bodrum deal fitting squarely within this trajectory.

Complicit behavior

Official records show that in 2022, PD Turizm ve Gayrimenkul Yatırım A.Ş. (PD Tourism and Real Estate Investment Inc.) was granted permission to acquire shares in Asta Cennetköy Turizm ve İşletmecilik A.Ş. (Asta Cennetköy Tourism and Management Inc.), part of Astaş Holding. PD Turizm is linked to Pasha Holding via Vugar Mustafayev, its then-chairman who served as director of Pasha Holding Türkiye until 2023, as well as through Hikmet Cenk Eynehan, CEO of Pasha Bank Türkiye, who sits on PD Turizm’s board.

When the stake acquisition closed in early 2023, Astaş described it as a “strategic partnership” to bring in foreign capital and set a model for similar deals. Pasha Holding CEO Jalal Gasimov called Turkey a “core market” for its long-term tourism and real estate strategy.

More than merely a financial transaction, the Bodrum investment is a case study in how authoritarian wealth moves: from hydrocarbons to holding companies, through offshore conduits, into luxury assets. The resort’s exclusivity and private jet-friendly location insulate it from public scrutiny while amplifying prestige.

Transparency International ranks Turkey among five countries where real estate registers are shielded from public view and “transactions can take place without the involvement of a professional subject to anti-money-laundering obligations.” Such systemic gaps make high-end resorts like Mandarin Oriental Bodrum ideal endpoints for untraceable capital.

Originally published on Global Voices

Image by Arzu Geybullayeva, created using Canva Pro.

At its recent launch, Next Sosyal was touted as the country's first “domestic social media application,” offering users a new generation of social media free from ads and harassment. It was unveiled ahead of this year's annual TEKNOFEST, a major technology and defense event in Turkey. However, the claim of it being a purely domestic product was quickly challenged.

Just days after its public launch on July 28 — which attracted over 500,000 subscribers — users discovered that the platform was not a unique site developed from scratch, but rather, a Mastodon server. The website confirmed this, stating, “[The] sosyal.teknofest.app is an open-source Mastodon-based social media platform developed by TEKNOFEST entrepreneurs.”

Sadullah Uzun, the general director of technology at the Ministry of Industry and Technology, praised the platform's success. He tweeted, in what appeared to be a dig at other apps, “A good technical team can build a very good social media platform with hard work. But can they attract an audience? Will people become users of the platform? No! It will just take its place in the app graveyard as ‘yet another app.’ This is where Next Sosyal's difference lies! People are curious, they want to be a part of it, and they are flocking to it.”

Uzun credited the platform's appeal to “the youth's big brother Selçuk.” Selçuk Bayraktar, the 46-year-old owner of Baykar, a company known for its drones and other defense technology, is the son-in-law of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the face of the annual TEKNOFEST event.

The same day that the new platform went live, Bayraktar himself tweeted about it via his personal X account:

#TeknofestKuşağı’nın en son eseri: NEXT

NEXT — The latest innovation from the #TeknofestGeneration

Biz buradayız – We are here https://t.co/apx9lxERzz pic.twitter.com/9zI4e4gs0V

— Selçuk Bayraktar (@Selcuk) July 28, 2025

Among hundreds of replies, there was one from the official Mastodon account, which tweeted at Bayraktar:

hello, please contact us via direct message.

— Mastodon (@Mastodon@mastodon.social) (@joinmastodon) July 29, 2025

Andy Piper, Mastodon's head of communications, shared a statement with Global Voices: “We first attempted to contact the service owner to remind and inform them of their license obligations via email on July 8. Since then, we have made several other attempts to contact the service owner, but the emails either bounced, or were ignored. After a number of additional messages from members of the public over the weekend of July 27-28, on July 29 our official X account replied to a prominent post referring to Next Sosyal, in another effort to make contact with the service owner. We look forward to the full source code for the Next Sosyal service being made available, according to the requirements of the AGPL license.”

The GNU Affero General Public License (AGPL) is a free software license designed for software like web applications, which can be accessed over a network.

On July 30, Mastodon's founder, Eugen Rochko, posted on Mastodon: “Our team is aware that the new Turkish social media platform Next Sosyal is using Mastodon code without following the terms of the license and we have already reached out to them.”

This is not the first time that a project branded as “domestic and national” has used foreign open-source infrastructure. As journalist Fusun Nebil noted, similar projects — including Turkcell’s YAANi, a local search engine, and the national post office's PTT Messenger — have all used open-source code from existing global applications while being presented as if they had ben developed locally. “In short,” Nebil concluded, “despite the ‘Next’ in its name and the TEKNOFEST branding, Next Sosyal is neither locally developed nor nationally produced.”

Making the situation more complex is the fact that Bayraktar, in a tweet on July 4 — before the public launch — acknowledged that the new platform was based on Mastodon. This raises questions about why, in the days following its release, the platform was so heavily marketed as a purely local product.

In the written statement viewed by Global Voices, Piper added, “The related site appears to be running the Mastodon software, which is licensed under the GNU Affero General Public License (AGPL). However, it appears to have been modified, and references to the Mastodon code and copyrights have largely been removed from the user interface and site. We have also been made aware that the mobile apps appear to be based on our own application code. The GNU Affero General Public License is a modified version of the ordinary GNU GPL version 3. It has one added requirement: if you run a modified program on a server and let other users communicate with it there, your server must also allow them to download the source code corresponding to the modified version running there. A Mastodon server must have a visible link to the source code for the software on the main page of the service at a minimum.”

Piper later confirmed that Mastodon finally established “contact with the service owner [and] they have stated that they will be making efforts to comply with the license obligations.” The matter is expected to be resolved within the coming days.

Originally published on Global Voices

Image by Arzu Geybullayeva, created using Canva Pro.

This article by Sevinc Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, and Elnara Gasimova first appeared in Abzas Media on July 17, 2025. An edited version is being republished on Global Voices under a content partnership agreement.

When investigative journalist Sevinc Vagifgizi asked her family to bring her a simple fan to help her cope with the suffocating heat of her prison cell, she likely did not expect that her right to breathe freely would become a form of leverage for prison authorities.

Sentenced to nine years behind bars in connection with the Abzas Media case, Vagifgizi told her family that the head of the Baku Pretrial Detention Center, Elnur Ismayilov, offered to allow the fan inside — on the condition that she delete her published reports about prison conditions. “The warden said if letting the fan in would make him look like the ‘good guy,’ and if the articles were deleted, then he’d allow it,” Vagifgizi told her family, adding, “but I’m not bargaining. I have a right to that fan. It’s not on any prohibited list and should be allowed in, just as it is for other inmates. We must not be subjected to discrimination.”

Vagifgizi's story is a window into Azerbaijan’s prison system, rife with neglect and systemic corruption, where basic human rights are weaponized or denied altogether. These conclusions were at the center of the most recent piece written by Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, and Elnara Gasimova, two of her imprisoned colleagues.

Where does the money go?

In 2025, the Azerbaijani government allocated AZN 196million (approximately USD 115 million) to the penitentiary service. The journalists’ exposé, in documenting the daily reality for the 153 women held at the facility, questioned where that money goes.

Inmates depend on weekly visits from family members for food, which is supposed to be stored in communal fridges. Of the nine refrigerators at the prison, one is completely broken, four are from the Soviet era, and one was purchased by the inmates themselves, while the remaining few are so overstuffed that the doors barely shut. Spoiled food is common. Arguments between inmates and prison wards erupt daily over where to store perishables. The facility is legally obligated to meet prisoners’ basic needs — including the provision of proper equipment — but no one can remember when a new fridge was brought in. Everyone agrees: “This has always been a problem.”

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When complaints reached the prison administration, Deputy Warden Ahad Abdiyev “solved” the issue by ordering freon to be pumped into the fridges — a fix that’s unlikely to make a difference, especially since the doors keep falling off.

Heat levels in the prison are another concern. Inmates count on fans for relief from the oppressive temperatures, but even these are in short supply — and typically, only available to those who can buy them. In Cell 41, there are only three fans — all personally purchased — to cool 11 inmates. Cell 46, which also houses 11, is only slightly better off, with four fans — three provided by the facility and one bought by inmates. In Cell 33, 10 inmates share two fans — one bought from the prison store for AZN 40 (about USD 24), and the other provided by the state; one of the inmates in that cell is pregnant. Cell 71, meant for 10 people, now holds 12, two of whom sleep on the floor; they share three fans, all inmate-purchased. Cell 53, meanwhile, has 11 prisoners and three fans, left there by former inmates. Other cells, like 48, 54, and 38, show a similar pattern: fans are either old, broken, or entirely prisoner-funded.

The prison has no working central ventilation or cooling system, an issue that consecutive administrations have failed to address. Prison cells rely on two small ventilation holes and barred windows that open to tightly enclosed exercise yards surrounded by barbed wire. Between 11:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., the cells become unbearably hot. Those with health conditions — hypertension, diabetes, heart issues — suffer the most. There are no qualified doctors on site, and medical treatment is often inadequate.

The water at the prison is chlorine-heavy and therefore undrinkable. No one knows when the tanks were last cleaned. Hot water is available just five hours per week, forcing women to shower in pairs. In some cells that lack basic bathroom infrastructure, there are no showers at all; women must either kneel under a tap or fill a bucket and wash by hand. Added to this, the water temperature is unstable — either scalding hot or freezing cold — and when inmates plead through the air vents for adjustments, they are ignored until the water is cut off.

In response, inmates have been known to use electric kettles as makeshift water heaters, but these frequently break down — and when they do, must be replaced at their own expense. Some have considered leaving 20-liter jugs in the prison yard to warm under the scorching sun, but lugging such heavy containers back and forth causes back pain, and cleaning materials are not provided. Inmates, therefore, rely entirely on their families.

“This is a prison, not a resort”

When prisoners ask for more water, working fans, or basic hygiene supplies, the answer is often the same: “This is a prison, not a resort.” Yet, over the past five years, some AZN 837 million (nearly USD 500 million) has been allocated to the country's prison system.

These state budget allocations are in addition to the European Union (EU) funding the country has received. In 2017, the Azerbaijani penitentiary service was granted over a million euros as part of a reform package designed and funded by the EU and the Council of Europe. This, according to reporting by Forbidden Stories as well as publicly available documents, on top of the 23 million euros (about USD 27 million) provided since 2014 to finance development programs meant to generate “capacity building of the judicial system,” “training for staff,” “increased oversight of prison conditions,” and “action to improve transparency and prevent corruption,” among others.

In addition to poor prison conditions, ill-treatment and torture are common. Instances of mistreatment have been repeatedly documented by local journalists as well as by the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), which issued a statement in July 2024, citing the outright refusal of the Azerbaijani authorities to cooperate with the CPT, the lack of action taken by Azerbaijan's Ministry of Internal Affairs to end ill-treatment, and even instances of torture by police officers. The CPT also published a report in response to this failure to act.

As recently as July 20, Abzas Media director Ulvi Hasanli informed his family during a prison visit that he had begun an indefinite hunger strike. His protest was triggered by the penitentiary service’s refusal to comply with a court ruling ordering his transfer back to the Baku Pretrial Detention Center.

The following day, other imprisoned members of the Abzas Media team — including Vagifgizi, Absalamova, and Gasimova — announced they would join him in the strike beginning July 22, in an effort to demand that the court order be enforced. In solidarity, journalists from Meydan TV who are currently on trial — Aynur Elgunes, Aytac Tapdig, Khayala Aghayeva, Aysel Umudova, and Fatima Movlamli — also declared they would join the strike.

Instead of addressing the journalists’ demands, however, prison authorities retaliated. The same day the other Abzas journalists were to join the hunger strike, they found themselves being forcibly transferred to unsanitary, unventilated cells with no access to showers. Absalamova, who refused to leave her cell voluntarily, was physically assaulted and left with visible bruises on her arms. Meanwhile, Hasanli was placed in solitary confinement in response to his peaceful protest.

Other inmates are feeling the ripple effects. In the section where Vagifgizi, Absalamova, and Gasimova are now being held, prison management has reduced the water supply to just 15 minutes a day, cutting the hot water altogether. The journalists put out a statement: “Since our hunger strike, 153 women inmates cannot shower, wash their dirty dishes, or fill in the empty water tanks. [Inmates store buckets of water in their cells for times when they are unable to access water at all.] They are complaining that these restrictions are due to our hunger strike. We know that [the] aim is to incite the prisoners against us, and to provoke them to harm us.”

The fact that Azerbaijani prisons now have more journalists behind bars than ever before, however, has been helping to expose the stark realities of prison life to the wider public. For this, they continue to pay a personal price — but whether their reporting will change the environment of impunity, graft, and rights violations remains to be seen.

Originally published on Global Voices

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After a while, it all becomes a blur.

Cobblestone streets, bike lane-lined roads, canals, and rivers winding through cities both small and sprawling. Traffic jams, traffic lights, narrow alleys, and wide boulevards. The hum of cities, their layered smells. Don’t even get me started on museums, galleries, and exhibitions — then concerts, recitals, theater, and shows. And then, silence. A silence that sweeps in like fog, only to lift the next day, as the cycle starts all over again.

I consider myself privileged: I hold a valid passport, a visa, a roof I can return to and call home, and a stable income.

But that privilege has come at a cost.

One I still struggle to fully evaluate — exiled from my home, resettled in a foreign land, refusing to be silenced, yet exhausted by the endless, grinding struggle for justice. A struggle that feels more universal now than ever, touching countless countries and countless lives.

As I write these words, I am walking toward the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. I’m scheduled to speak on the state of human rights and the safety of journalists in Azerbaijan.

That’s right — Azerbaijan. The country where I was born. The country that once held my dreams, my aspirations, my hopes. All of which slowly unraveled when I realized those hopes did not align with those of the country’s leaders.

Resettling

Leaving for good was never the plan. My work took me places, but I always counted on the luxury of returning — even briefly. That was enough for a while.

As I grew older, my connection to Azerbaijan shifted. I no longer missed the country itself so much as the sensory memories it held: people, family, food, the aromas and textures of a place that shaped me. These days, when I forget which city I’ve landed in, I sometimes mentally walk the streets of Baku, my hometown. I remember the scent of partridge grass steeping in tea, the aroma of freshly baked pakhlava, shekerbura, and qogal filling our kitchen during Novruz.

Oddly, it’s those familiar smells I now chase in unfamiliar cities — ghosts of a home I can’t return to.

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Then, of course, there is Istanbul. The place I’ve chosen to settle. A city that never lets you forget where you are: the cry of seagulls overhead, ferries crisscrossing the Bosphorus, donut-shaped pastries sold on every corner, the chaotic rhythm of its streets, and the frustrated honks of drivers stalled in endless traffic. The perpetual hum of construction machinery grinds through the cityscape.

And yet, it’s not quite the same. The tea tastes more bitter. The desserts, too sweet. Even with the right spices, the food lacks the depth of flavor I remember. There’s always something missing, something intangible. Despite having lived here for more than half my life, that absence remains.

Sometimes I think I don’t belong here. In truth, it’s a thought that follows me everywhere I go. A quiet suspicion that I belong nowhere.

I’ve made peace with that. I tell myself: I’m a nomad. And that’s fine.

Because I carry the essence of what I cherish in my memories. My identity becomes irrelevant — something adjusted and reframed like an image filtered before posting on social media. Maybe it’s accompanied by a song, too.

On identity

Lately, I’ve stopped clinging to the idea of identity altogether. It’s no longer something I want to be defined by. To me, it’s our lived experiences and the decisions we make that shape who we are. Identity has become so politicized, so misused — often to divide, to dehumanize — that I find myself repelled by the idea of being tied to a single nation, language, history, or ethnicity.

We — the nomads, the non-identifiers, the black sheep — are constantly being asked to align ourselves with the past, to carry its burdens as our own. But perhaps what we should be doing instead is living in the present, and imagining a future where fear-driven ideologies and demagogues no longer shape the terms of our existence. A future where we are free simply to live, to exist, to be.

I watch the waves form and dissolve in the wake of a ferry's engine — maybe even catch a glimpse of a dolphin’s tail flipping briefly above the surface. Seagulls circle above, hoping for a piece of bagel tossed by a passenger. And I find myself wishing I could live like a wave: formed, then dissolved, as if I had never been. Only to reappear again when called upon.

Originally published on Global Voices

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The latest conviction of Istanbul’s mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu, marks a critical escalation in Turkey's ongoing erosion of judicial independence and democratic norms. As one of the most prominent opposition figures in the country, İmamoğlu’s legal troubles highlight what rights groups call a pattern of political persecution ahead of the 2028 general elections.

On January 20, an investigation was launched against İmamoğlu for allegedly “threatening” Istanbul's Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek and his family. The charges relate to a comment İmamoğlu made during a panel on law and politicization of the judiciary in Turkey.

In a sweeping crackdown framed around alleged corruption and terror links on March 19 — just as İmamoğlu was poised to be nominated as the CHP’s presidential candidate for the 2028 elections — he was detained and then arrested. Since then, a systematic campaign of arrests and investigations targeting the CHP and other civic actors has continued unabated, putting both Turkey's democratic path and its rule of law under the spotlight.

On July 16, the court convicted İmamoğlu of insulting and threatening Gürlek, but acquitted him of the charge of publicly identifying him with the intent of making him a target. The popular mayor was sentenced to a year and seven months in prison. Having denied the charges, İmamoğlu is expected to appeal the verdict.

Gürlek has presided over high profile political trials including that of Selahattin Demirtaş, the former co-chair of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP); Sırrı Süreyya Önder, the now-deceased HDP deputy; and Canan Kaftancıoğlu, the İstanbul chair of the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) who was sentenced to nine years and eight months in prison over her social media posts.

The prosecutor also issued an order to confiscate the properties of journalist Can Dündar, whom he declared a “fugitive,” and sentenced Sebnem Korur-Fincancı, the head of the Turkish Medical Association, to two years and six months in prison on charges of alleged “terrorist organization propaganda.”

On July 21, the CHP filed a complaint with the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK) against Gürlek and two other prosecutors involved in the investigation into the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İBB), suggesting that some of the presiding judge's past rulings were political and not in keeping with the transparency of the judicial process. In its statement, the CHP emphasized that the investigations into the charges leveled against İmamoğlu and other party members have become systematic in nature, violating not only individual rights and freedoms but also the core principles of a democratic state governed by the rule of law.

As of July 21, at least 16 mayors representing the CHP have been suspended from office due to alleged corruption charges.  According to reporting by Bianet, the charges include “establishing a criminal organization,” “bribery,” “extortion,” and “bid rigging.” The charges mirror those used during the March crackdown that targeted the opposition in general, and the mayor of Istanbul in particular. Dozens of municipality staff have also been arrested or detained, most recently on July 18 and 21. Among the allegations leveled against them are bribery and manipulation of public tenders.

Meanwhile, the CHP faces a mutlak butlan (absolute nullity) lawsuit initiated by a party member reportedly aligned with its former chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who was replaced by Özgür Özel at the party's 38th Ordinary Congress in November 2023. The lawsuit alleges procedural violations and potential vote-buying during the congress, raising questions about the legitimacy of Özel's leadership.

Özel's legal team argues the case should be dismissed, citing the expiration of the filing deadline and the fact that party conventions fall under electoral board jurisdiction, not civil courts. Should the courts rule the 2023 congress legally void, it could trigger a leadership crisis, potentially paving the way for Kılıçdaroğlu's return. Such a ruling would also nullify all decisions taken by the party's current leadership since the congress.

On June 19, all 81 provincial chairpersons of the CHP met in Ankara, and issued a joint statement refusing to recognize any such court order. Supporters of Özel view the lawsuit as an act of political revenge aimed at regaining control of the party and ultimately purging internal rivals such as İmamoğlu. Under Kılıçdaroğlu's 13-year of leadership, the party lost every nationwide election, including the 2023 general election.

İmamoğlu’s sentencing, coupled with a broader crackdown on opposition mayors and civil society, reflects an alarming trend in Turkey’s democratic backsliding. As the country moves toward the 2028 elections, the judiciary appears increasingly instrumentalized, not just sidelining political rivals but also weakening the guardrails of accountability and dissent. Whether the opposition can regroup amid legal turmoil and internal fractures remains to be seen — but the stakes for Turkey’s democratic future could not be higher.

Originally published on Global Voices

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On July 10, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met in Abu Dhabi for what marked the first unmediated bilateral contact between the two leaders, signaling a significant departure from the multi-decade tradition of peace discussions being primarily facilitated by external actors like the European Union, Russia, or the United States.

While the specifics of the discussions were largely kept under wraps, with only broad implications emerging from the respective foreign ministries’ statements, both sides affirmed that “bilateral negotiations represent the most efficient format to address all issues concerning the normalization process.”

The pro-government Azerbaijan Press Agency reported that “serious and substantive discussions were held on key aspects of the peace agenda between Armenia and Azerbaijan — including border delimitation, the opening and development of the Zangezur corridor, the initialing of the peace agreement, and other issues.”

An agreement in principle

The Abu Dhabi meeting follows a significant development from March of this year, when Armenia and Azerbaijan announced they had agreed on the terms of a peace deal for the first time. This came after countless meetings and rounds of negotiations mediated by international stakeholders since the Second Karabakh War in 2020, all centered on reaching a final bilateral agreement and settling any remaining disagreements.

The Nagorno-Karabakh area has been under the control of its ethnic Armenian population as a self-declared state since a war fought in the early 1990s, which ended with a ceasefire and an Armenian military victory in 1994. In the aftermath, a new, internationally unrecognized, de facto Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was established, and seven adjacent regions occupied by the Armenian forces. According to the International Crisis Group, as a result of the conflict more than a million people were forced from their homes: “Azerbaijanis fled Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the adjacent territories, while Armenians left homes in Azerbaijan.”

Tensions lingered over the following decades, culminating in the second Karabakh war in 2020 and an ensuing military operation in September 2023, with the latter paving the way for Azerbaijan to regain full control over Karabakh.

The draft peace agreement reportedly included major concessions from Armenia, such as the removal of European Union monitors from the border and the dropping of lawsuits in international courts. Azerbaijan has consistently criticized the EU monitors since their deployment in October 2022, accusing them of “creating military and intelligence cover for the Armenian side.” The EU mission's expansion in February 2023, following an Azerbaijani offensive in Armenia in September 2022, further strained relations with Baku and Moscow, both of whom questioned its purpose and legitimacy.

Azerbaijan's demands also included Armenia amending its constitution to remove any perceived territorial claims to Azerbaijan, specifically references within its preamble to the 1990 Declaration of Independence. Armenia's constitution does not make direct references to Karabakh; the preamble refers to the Declaration of Independence that “references the 1989 joint decision of the Armenian SSR Supreme Council and the Artsakh National Council on the Reunification of the Armenian SSR and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh.”

Prime Minister Pashinyan has publicly supported adopting a new constitution through a national referendum, with plans for a vote in 2027.

Regional stakeholders and the Zangezur Corridor

Several regional powers have a vested interest in securing a lasting peace deal. Turkey, a close ally of Azerbaijan, has actively engaged in the process. In June 2025, Prime Minister Pashinyan's visit to Istanbul for talks with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was described by Armenia as a “historic” step towards regional peace, with Turkey pledging support for Armenia’s peace efforts with Azerbaijan.

A key point of interest for all stakeholders is the proposed Zangezur Corridor — a vital transport link through Armenia connecting Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan, sandwiched between Armenia, Turkey, and Iran. This corridor holds significant potential for facilitating trade and transit between Europe and Asia, offering new economic opportunities for all parties involved.

Key points of contention have arisen in negotiations over the corridor. First, its name: Armenia rejects the term “Zangezur Corridor,” viewing it as a threat to the sovereignty over Syunik, Armenia's southern territory bordering Nakhchivan. Azerbaijan, in turn, opposes full Armenian control, citing concerns over reliable access, while Armenia refuses to cede control of the 32-kilometer (nearly 20-mile) route to any third party.

The US has proposed a potential solution. In a press briefing on July 11, Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Turkey, said, “So what happens is that America steps in and says, ‘Okay, we’ll take it over. Give us the 32 kilometers of road on a hundred-year lease, and you can all share it.’” According to Middle East Eye's analysis of the these developments, “Barrack's comments mark the first official confirmation that the Trump administration offered to manage the corridor through a private US commercial operator, which would serve as a neutral guarantor.”

In its May 2025 report, the International Crisis Group emphasized that resolving the modalities of such transport links, including questions of sovereignty and inspection, remains central to the peace process.

Russia sidelined?

The talks in Abu Dhabi underscore a significant shift in the regional power balance, as Russia — once considered a primary mediator — appears increasingly sidelined. While Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov diplomatically welcomed the direct dialogue, Moscow's influence continues to wane amid deteriorating diplomatic relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

According to political analyst Zaur Shiriyev, “Azerbaijan no longer needs Russian mediation, which can create opportunities for real progress.” Armenia-Russia relations have drastically suffered since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, with Yerevan accusing Moscow and its military alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), of failing to defend it against Azerbaijani attacks in 2021 and 2022.

Azerbaijan's relations with Russia have also soured following a contentious plane crash on December 25, 2024. Baku has accused Russia of mistakenly targeting an Azerbaijan Airlines flight with air defense missiles, a claim strongly disputed by Moscow. This incident, alongside the recent deaths of two Azerbaijani brothers during a Russian police raid in Yekaterinburg, has fueled an unprecedented public spat and deepening resentment, reducing Russia's capacity to act as an undisputed regional arbiter.

Challenges remain

Despite the positive signal the direct talk have sent, significant hurdles remain. Domestically, Pashinyan faces considerable pressure from opposition, church, and oligarchic circles, which some analysts believe are backed by the Kremlin.

Similarly, the detention of Russian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who controls Armenia’s national power grid and had expressed political ambitions by backing the church — which has been at odds with the prime minister's office for some time — further underscores the internal strife.

According to Richard Giragosian, director of the Regional Studies Center in Yerevan, of the frequent “coup attempts” against the democratically elected government — five since 2018 — “none [have] been very serious.” He told Euronews that these moves are “designed to appeal for Russian support” more than they are “driven by Russian activity” — even as Russia itself is “overwhelmed by everything Ukraine.”

Giragosian also took note of two separate Russian disinformation campaigns. The first involves fabricated reports of Russian military buildup at their base in Gyumri, intended to both alarm the EU monitors and pressure Yerevan as it increasingly aligns with Europe. The second, which Giragosian dismissed as “equally absurd,” involves Russian allegations of a “bio weapons facility in Armenia orchestrated by the Americans” — a claim Moscow has previously used against Ukraine and Georgia. These campaigns, Giragosian argued, paradoxically “point to Russia's weakness,” despite the looming “storm on the horizon” as Russia seeks to regain lost influence.

The path to a comprehensive and lasting peace agreement is intricate. While the unmediated nature of the Abu Dhabi meeting marks a crucial breakthrough, the concretization of the outcome will depend on the ability of both leaders to navigate complex domestic politics, maintain diplomatic momentum, and secure the coordinated support of interested international players beyond Moscow. As the South Caucasus continues to redefine its geopolitical landscape, the world watches to see if this new direct dialogue can finally transform decades of conflict into a sustainable peace.

Originally published on Global Voices

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On July 2, Turkey commemorated the 32nd anniversary of the Madımak Massacre, in which a fundamentalist mob killed 33 intellectuals and artists – most of them Alevi, Turkey's largest religious minority – as well as two staff members of the Madımak Hotel in the country's Sivas province. Thousands marked the day by laying carnations at the site and renewing calls to transform the hotel into a museum as a poignant reminder of Turkey's history of religiously motivated violence.

In Istanbul just two days prior, a similarly charged crowd gathered outside the offices of LeMan, one of Turkey’s last remaining satirical magazines, driven by a cartoon published in its June 26 issue. Authorities claimed that the drawing – in which two figures they identified as Muhammad and Moses greet each other amid war-torn scenes alluding to the wars in Gaza and Iran – “openly insulted religious values.” This sparked a chain of events: protests, arrests, and criminal and financial investigations into LeMan and its staff.

On June 30, an extremist mob protested outside the magazine's Istanbul office chanting Sharia slogans, throwing stones and attempting forced entry. Mob members were left untouched while four of the magazine's staff were arrested.

A targeted campaign against LeMan

Despite government claims that the cartoon depicted prophets, LeMan's editorial team quickly refuted these accusations. In a June 30 tweet, and later in an interview with AFP, Editor-in-Chief Tuncay Akgün clarified that the cartoon had “nothing to do with prophet Muhammad,” but rather depicted a Muslim named Muhammad “killed in the bombardments of Israel.” Akgün stressed that “there are more than 200 million people in the Islamic world named Muhammad” and that the magazine “would never take such a risk.”

The LeMan team is acutely aware of the dangers it faces. In a 2016 interview with DW, Akgün noted that “there is hardly any law under which [the magazine hasn't] been prosecuted,” adding, “We've been imprisoned and received serious threats.” While he previously spoke of common charges like “disrespecting state leaders or officials,” nine years later, “publicly insulting religious values” has been added to the list.

Police arrested Ali Yavuz, a manager at LeMan; editor Zafer Aknar; cartoonist Doğan Pehlevan; and Cebrail Okçu, a graphic designer. Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya shared videos of the operation, stating that the four were apprehended for “publicly insulting religious values” under Article 216 of the country's penal code. Authorities raided the office, seized copies of the June issue, and launched a financial probe into the magazine's funding. Meanwhile, the angry protesters who showed up outside the magazine's office, chanting slogans and attacking people at nearby bars and restaurants, went largely ignored by the police.

Journalist Ezgi Başaran suggested there was little likelihood of this escalation being “accidental.” In a personal analysis, she noted that the group behind the mob attack was an offshoot of the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders’ Front (IBDA-C), the same group responsible for the Sivas attack 32 years ago. “Though mostly dormant in recent years,” she wrote, “the group has a documented record of attacking secular institutions – bookstores, cinemas, newsrooms –particularly during the tumultuous 1990s.”

Among those interpreting the cartoon differently from the way in which LeMan intended was Justice Minister Yılmaz Tunç, who tweeted, “No freedom grants the right to make sacred elements of a faith the subject of vulgar humor.” He promised “necessary legal action” and, on July 2, confirmed the arrest of all four staff members, with a warrant issued for two other team members who are currently abroad.

In stark contrast, the radical Islamist protesters faced no criminal proceedings. Başaran pointed out this impunity, stating, “That a crowd aligned with a banned militant group could gather unimpeded in central Istanbul speaks volumes. Obviously not about freedom of assembly, but about the regime’s selective toleration of gatherings. This is the same government that does not even allow a dozen people to assemble and protest, say, spoiled milk, fearing that any small grievance might crystallize into political opposition and pose a threat to the AKP’s rule.”

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan weighed in on the issue at a ruling Justice and Development Party Provincial Leaders meeting, labeling the cartoon a “vile provocation.” He declared, “The disrespect shown to the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) by certain shameless individuals who lack the values, decency, and manners of this nation is absolutely unacceptable. Those who show insolence toward our Prophet and other prophets will be held accountable before the law.” 

The international response was swift. Reporters Without Borders (RSF), along with organizations like Cartooning for Peace and Cartoonists Rights, issued a joint statement condemning the arrests as “a new attack on press freedom in Turkey.” RSF currently ranks Turkey 159th out of 180 countries in its Press Freedom Index.

Echoes of Madımak

The parallels between the LeMan incident and the 1993 Madımak Massacre are stark. In both cases, accusations of religious insult ignited mass outrage, culminating in violent mob action. At Madımak, the fury was sparked by claims of atheistic or anti-Islamic sentiment at the Pir Sultan Abdal Festival. In 2025, the trigger was a satirical cartoon that was either misunderstood or distorted as a depiction of the Prophet Muhammad.

At Madımak, the mob chanted “Sivas will be the grave of secularists” before setting the hotel ablaze. At LeMan, demonstrators chanted slogans like “Either they die, or we will die.” While the Madımak tragedy resulted in lethal violence, the LeMan incident escalated into state-backed repression, with police detaining staff and shuttering access to the magazine's platforms. In both instances, the mobs largely went unpunished.

In 1993, security forces passively watched the Madımak Hotel burn. In 2025, the Turkish government actively pursued criminal charges against LeMan staff while ignoring threats made by protesters. Police, who often use full force to disperse rights groups or citizens protesting social injustice, barely employed their usual arsenal of crowd dispersement methods against the extremist mob.

Regarding the Madımak massacre itself, 124 people were arrested in relation to the fire. In the seven-year trial process that followed, 33 individuals who were initially sentenced to death later had their sentences commuted to aggravated life imprisonment; 85 people received prison sentences ranging from two to 15 years; and 37 defendants were acquitted. On March 13, 2012, the Ankara 11th Heavy Penal Court controversially dropped all charges, citing the statute of limitations as per the prosecutor's demand.

The Madımak Massacre marked a terrifying rupture between religious conservatism and secular artistic expression. Now, the LeMan incident, playing out in a deeply polarized and digitally amplified society, suggests that the lines of that culture war remain intact. According to Assistant Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Lisel Hintz, “We can read the LeMan attack and the government’s handling of it as an escalation of the culture war Erdoğan has been waging as a way to vilify and delegitimize opposition writ large.”

While methods may have changed – Molotov cocktails swapped for court orders, mobs for media campaigns – the underlying message remains clear: dissent is dangerous and satire, once a tool for laughing at power, is now treated as an act of rebellion.