Feature image by Arzu Geybullayeva, created using Canva Pro.

The October verdict in the case of 15-year-old Mattia Ahmet Minguzzi — fatally stabbed on January 24, 2025 in Istanbul — did more than shock the nation. Two teenage defendants identified as B.B. and U.B. were sentenced to 24 years each, the maximum term for minors under Turkish law, for “deliberately killing a child,” while two other accused minors were acquitted and subsequently released.

The trial, which proceeded amid intense media and public pressure, resurfaced an ongoing debate about the independence, transparency and fairness of Turkey's judicial system.

A judiciary under pressure: structure, critique and politics

Critics of the Turkish legal system highlight long-standing patterns of politicization and lack of institutional insulation from executive power. Prominent human-rights lawyer Eren Keskin argues that “the republic has never been a state governed by the rule of law.” She traces this back not only to the founding years of the republic, but to long-standing laws applied unevenly — such as in Kurdish-majority regions — where emergency decrees, anti-terror laws and sweeping executive powers replaced classical separation of powers.

Academic work supports this: an empirical study using synthetic control methods found a “severe breakdown and erosion of judicial independence” in Turkey following constitutional reforms and populist legal changes. The picture it paints is one of institutions whose formal independence exists on paper, but whose functional autonomy is compromised.

In this context, could the Minguzzi decision be viewed as less of an isolated case and more as a symptom of a legal system operating under constraint? Either way, public outrage, media visibility, and political signalling all impact the terrain in which judges and prosecutors act.

Political prosecutions and the fate of opposition justice

If the Minguzzi case shines a light on general institutional frailty, the prosecutions of prominent figures in the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) demonstrate how legal tools are being marshalled for political ends.

Back in March, Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu — a central opposition figure and presumed presidential candidate — was arrested on corruption and bribery charges, triggering mass protests which, as at the time of writing, are ongoing. The court has rejected appeals for his release, raising concerns about due process. Meanwhile, the Istanbul Chief Prosecutor’s Office (CPO) launched waves of detentions and investigations targeting opposition-led municipalities and CHP party leadership.

Most recently, the CPO accused İmamoğlu of espionage. The new charges came “after a cybersecurity consultant already in custody on espionage charges agreed to cooperate with prosecutors.” Police also arrested television channel TELE1 Editor-in-Chief Merdan Yanardağ as part of the same investigation. In addition to İmamoğlu and Yanardağ, İmamoğlu’s campaign manager Necati Özkan is also being viewed as a suspect. Since March, İmamoğlu and Özkan have been in pretrial detention on corruption charges.

The CPO also alleged that Yanardağ exchanged multiple messages with a man named Hüseyin Gün, a cybersecurity consultant turned state witness who, after spending months in detention, agreed to cooperate with prosecutors by claiming they were both involved in “espionage activities” tied to İmamoğlu. The pro-government outlet Daily Sabah reported on the CPO's claims that evidence tied Yanardağ to the network, alleging that he “organized the press leg of the election process in exchange for benefits provided by Gün” and cooperated with foreign intelligence to influence 2019's municipal election. During their testimony on October 26, all three men denied the allegations. CHP Leader Özgür Özel, when naming Gün in an address to those gathered outside the courtroom that day, said the espionage accusations were fabricated.

Journalists note that had the investigations launched against opposition-led municipalities been genuine, the same investigations should apply to former leaders of municipalities once under the control of the government and managed by the members of the ruling party.

Rights at risk

Beyond politics and criminal justice, the rule of law in Turkey is being challenged on other fronts: press freedom, minority rights and legislative changes that tilt legal protections. A notable illustration is the proposed 11th Judicial Package (11. Yargı Paketi), which includes clauses that would criminalize what is termed “behavior contrary to one’s biological sex and public morality,” and impose penalties for “promoting” such behavior.

Rights groups emphasize that this not only threatens LGBTQ+ individuals’ rights, but also targets journalists covering these topics: “Journalists reporting on LGBTQ+ issues such as human rights violations, sexual health, Pride marches etc. risk criminal prosecution on the grounds of ‘promotion.’”

Kezban Konukçu, an Istanbul Member of Parliament (MP) from the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), has submitted a parliamentary inquiry regarding anti-LGBTQ+ clauses reportedly included in the draft, calling the proposal “not merely a legal regulation but a reflection of a homophobic, transphobic, and discriminatory political climate.” Konukçu questioned the Ministry of Justice's assessment in the framework of the draft's incompatibility with international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and challenged whether it understands that such a law — if adopted — could fuel further violence and social exclusion against women and LGBTQ+ individuals, undermining rule of law and democratic values.

MP Sevda Karaca from the Labor Party (EMEP) condemned the proposed reforms at a press briefing in Ankara, describing them as “a fascist law of domination that turns personal life into a field of state punishment.” She argued the draft mirrors a proposal by the Islamist HÜDA PAR party, openly targeting LGBTQ+ existence: “This is not just about LGBTQ+ people — it’s a rehearsal of government violence against society at large. If this law passes, anyone deemed ‘unacceptable’ by the government could be criminalized. A man with long hair or a woman with short hair could go to jail for violating ‘biological sex norms.’ The state is basically declaring: ‘We will commit hate crimes.’”

A state of law in limbo

According to Article 2 of the country's Constitution, “The Republic of Türkiye is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law.” However, the disconnect between form and function is growing.

The Minguzzi verdict illustrates the judiciary operating under visible stress. The opposition prosecutions illustrate how the judiciary is being politicized. The legal reforms targeting journalists and minorities highlight how law is being reshaped to govern identities and dissent, more than tackle crime.

If the developments in the last eight months alone are indicative of the state of law in Turkey, its judiciary may be coming across as a battleground of interests rather than a fulcrum of rights. Whether that battleground gives way to institutional reform, genuine rule of law, or deeper entrenchment of political justice remains the question of the moment.