Originally published on Global Voices

Feature image by Arzu Geybullayeva, created using Canva Pro.

The October verdict in the case of 15-year-old Mattia Ahmet Minguzzi — fatally stabbed on January 24, 2025 in Istanbul — did more than shock the nation. Two teenage defendants identified as B.B. and U.B. were sentenced to 24 years each, the maximum term for minors under Turkish law, for “deliberately killing a child,” while two other accused minors were acquitted and subsequently released.

The trial, which proceeded amid intense media and public pressure, resurfaced an ongoing debate about the independence, transparency and fairness of Turkey's judicial system.

A judiciary under pressure: structure, critique and politics

Critics of the Turkish legal system highlight long-standing patterns of politicization and lack of institutional insulation from executive power. Prominent human-rights lawyer Eren Keskin argues that “the republic has never been a state governed by the rule of law.” She traces this back not only to the founding years of the republic, but to long-standing laws applied unevenly — such as in Kurdish-majority regions — where emergency decrees, anti-terror laws and sweeping executive powers replaced classical separation of powers.

Academic work supports this: an empirical study using synthetic control methods found a “severe breakdown and erosion of judicial independence” in Turkey following constitutional reforms and populist legal changes. The picture it paints is one of institutions whose formal independence exists on paper, but whose functional autonomy is compromised.

In this context, could the Minguzzi decision be viewed as less of an isolated case and more as a symptom of a legal system operating under constraint? Either way, public outrage, media visibility, and political signalling all impact the terrain in which judges and prosecutors act.

Political prosecutions and the fate of opposition justice

If the Minguzzi case shines a light on general institutional frailty, the prosecutions of prominent figures in the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) demonstrate how legal tools are being marshalled for political ends.

Back in March, Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu — a central opposition figure and presumed presidential candidate — was arrested on corruption and bribery charges, triggering mass protests which, as at the time of writing, are ongoing. The court has rejected appeals for his release, raising concerns about due process. Meanwhile, the Istanbul Chief Prosecutor’s Office (CPO) launched waves of detentions and investigations targeting opposition-led municipalities and CHP party leadership.

Most recently, the CPO accused İmamoğlu of espionage. The new charges came “after a cybersecurity consultant already in custody on espionage charges agreed to cooperate with prosecutors.” Police also arrested television channel TELE1 Editor-in-Chief Merdan Yanardağ as part of the same investigation. In addition to İmamoğlu and Yanardağ, İmamoğlu’s campaign manager Necati Özkan is also being viewed as a suspect. Since March, İmamoğlu and Özkan have been in pretrial detention on corruption charges.

The CPO also alleged that Yanardağ exchanged multiple messages with a man named Hüseyin Gün, a cybersecurity consultant turned state witness who, after spending months in detention, agreed to cooperate with prosecutors by claiming they were both involved in “espionage activities” tied to İmamoğlu. The pro-government outlet Daily Sabah reported on the CPO's claims that evidence tied Yanardağ to the network, alleging that he “organized the press leg of the election process in exchange for benefits provided by Gün” and cooperated with foreign intelligence to influence 2019's municipal election. During their testimony on October 26, all three men denied the allegations. CHP Leader Özgür Özel, when naming Gün in an address to those gathered outside the courtroom that day, said the espionage accusations were fabricated.

Journalists note that had the investigations launched against opposition-led municipalities been genuine, the same investigations should apply to former leaders of municipalities once under the control of the government and managed by the members of the ruling party.

Rights at risk

Beyond politics and criminal justice, the rule of law in Turkey is being challenged on other fronts: press freedom, minority rights and legislative changes that tilt legal protections. A notable illustration is the proposed 11th Judicial Package (11. Yargı Paketi), which includes clauses that would criminalize what is termed “behavior contrary to one’s biological sex and public morality,” and impose penalties for “promoting” such behavior.

Rights groups emphasize that this not only threatens LGBTQ+ individuals’ rights, but also targets journalists covering these topics: “Journalists reporting on LGBTQ+ issues such as human rights violations, sexual health, Pride marches etc. risk criminal prosecution on the grounds of ‘promotion.’”

Kezban Konukçu, an Istanbul Member of Parliament (MP) from the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), has submitted a parliamentary inquiry regarding anti-LGBTQ+ clauses reportedly included in the draft, calling the proposal “not merely a legal regulation but a reflection of a homophobic, transphobic, and discriminatory political climate.” Konukçu questioned the Ministry of Justice's assessment in the framework of the draft's incompatibility with international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and challenged whether it understands that such a law — if adopted — could fuel further violence and social exclusion against women and LGBTQ+ individuals, undermining rule of law and democratic values.

MP Sevda Karaca from the Labor Party (EMEP) condemned the proposed reforms at a press briefing in Ankara, describing them as “a fascist law of domination that turns personal life into a field of state punishment.” She argued the draft mirrors a proposal by the Islamist HÜDA PAR party, openly targeting LGBTQ+ existence: “This is not just about LGBTQ+ people — it’s a rehearsal of government violence against society at large. If this law passes, anyone deemed ‘unacceptable’ by the government could be criminalized. A man with long hair or a woman with short hair could go to jail for violating ‘biological sex norms.’ The state is basically declaring: ‘We will commit hate crimes.’”

A state of law in limbo

According to Article 2 of the country's Constitution, “The Republic of Türkiye is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law.” However, the disconnect between form and function is growing.

The Minguzzi verdict illustrates the judiciary operating under visible stress. The opposition prosecutions illustrate how the judiciary is being politicized. The legal reforms targeting journalists and minorities highlight how law is being reshaped to govern identities and dissent, more than tackle crime.

If the developments in the last eight months alone are indicative of the state of law in Turkey, its judiciary may be coming across as a battleground of interests rather than a fulcrum of rights. Whether that battleground gives way to institutional reform, genuine rule of law, or deeper entrenchment of political justice remains the question of the moment.

Originally published on Global Voices

Image via Caracas Chronicles, used with permission.

María Corina Machado, the Venezuelan opposition politician who has been in hiding since January this year, was awarded the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize on Friday, October 10. Her award marks Venezuela’s first individual Nobel Prize in any category; she is the second Latin American woman (after Guatemala’s Rigoberta Menchú) and the 19th individual female laureate in the prize's 124-year old history.

While Machado’s political career spans three decades, the Nobel Prize recognized her leadership during the Venezuelan 2024 presidential election, when she spearheaded one of Venezuela’s most ambitious civic electoral monitoring efforts: a nationwide initiative that proved essential in documenting and verifying Nicolás Maduro’s extensive electoral fraud.

The committee said, “As the leader of the democracy movement in Venezuela, Maria Corina Machado is one of the most extraordinary examples of civilian courage in Latin America in recent times.” It added that Machado has been “a key, unifying figure in a political opposition that was once deeply divided,” but managed to find common ground when it came to advocating for free elections and representative government: “This is precisely what lies at the heart of democracy: our shared willingness to defend the principles of popular rule, even though we disagree.”

When Machado received the call at 3:00 a.m. local time, she could hardly believe the news. Her first words reflected the scale of the social organization that had emerged during the 2024 elections: “I thank you deeply, but I hope you understand this is a movement — an achievement of an entire society. I am just one person. I certainly don’t deserve it,” she told Kristian Berg Harpviken, secretary of the Nobel Committee, in a clip shared on social media.

Reactions to Machado’s win have been both supportive and critical. She continues to live in hiding following her brief and violent abduction by official security forces in January 2025, interacting with followers and journalists only through social media or video calls. Her restricted movement means she cannot freely engage with either her critics or her supporters to defend or explain herself.

A career defined by defiance; a campaign under siege

Machado is no newcomer to Venezuelan politics. A 58-year-old industrial engineer from Caracas, she first entered the public arena in 2002 through Súmate, an NGO devoted to electoral monitoring. The organization gained prominence after leading a campaign that gathered 3.2 million signatures to trigger the 2004 recall referendum against then-president Hugo Chávez.

Machado later pursued elected office, serving as an independent member of parliament from 2011 to 2014. In 2012, she founded Vente Venezuela, a center-right political movement that promotes liberal economic policies and individual freedoms. As El País noted in 2023, her political vision evokes that of Margaret Thatcher or Ronald Reagan. Today, Vente Venezuela remains unrecognized as an official party by the country’s electoral authority and has become the most severely persecuted party in Venezuela.

Her rise to full leadership of Venezuela’s opposition came in 2024, after Machado decisively won the November 2023 primary meant to unite opposition forces behind a single presidential contender. Her victory, however, was short-lived: within days, the Maduro government disqualified her from public office, so she threw her support behind former diplomat Edmundo González Urrutia, who would ultimately appear on the ballot.

During the elections campaign, Machado helped organize a vast citizen-led monitoring network comprising more than half a million volunteers — many of them women — who tracked and verified voting tallies across the country. The data collected by her teams indicated a clear victory for González Urrutia, with roughly 70 percent of the vote, in sharp contrast to the National Electoral Council’s official declaration that Nicolás Maduro had been re-elected.

When the results were announced, Machado urged peaceful nationwide demonstrations but soon went into hiding amid escalating threats from state security forces. She maintained contact only through social media.

Following the disputed vote, Maduro’s government escalated its campaign of repression. Beyond consolidating the electoral fraud, authorities targeted protests in low-income neighborhoods with unprecedented force, resulting in 25 deaths, more than 2,000 detentions, and dozens of illegal raids under Operación Tun Tun.

Over 800 political prisoners remain unjustly detained in imprisonment centers to date, many of them victims of the 2024 post-electoral repression. This number includes human rights defenders, foreigners and even minors, further confirmed by the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, which has been active in the country since 2019.

A boost for Venezuelan democracy?

Machado’s political career is not without controversy. In 2014, she was one of the leaders of La Salida, a wave of anti-government protests that became one of the most violently repressed episodes in Venezuela’s recent history.

Over the years, she has also aligned herself with right-wing international figures, maintaining a long, though distant relationship with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and currently backing an alliance with US President Donald Trump, whose administration has taken an aggressive stance toward Venezuela, including the deployment of warships in the Caribbean to target the so-called “Cartel de los Soles.”

Machado even thanked Trump in her speech in Spanish, then added in a post in English on X: “I dedicate the prize to the suffering people of Venezuela and to President Trump for his decisive support of our cause!”

Polarized reactions, silenced coverage

Inside Venezuela, public celebrations for the Nobel Peace Prize were muted, with local independent media covering the news in a limited fashion. According to the National Syndicate for Press Workers, journalists from major outlets who did report on the award were subsequently threatened or temporarily suspended from their positions.

International social media reaction to the prize was mixed. Supporters celebrated Machado’s leadership and her commitment to non-violent protest during the contentious July 2024 elections, whereas critics challenged the characterization of her tactics as entirely “peaceful.”

Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, the Argentinean recipient of the 1980 Nobel Peace Prize for his opposition to his country's last civil-military dictatorship (1976–1983), criticized Machado's nod towards Donald Trump:

Me preocupa que no hayas dedicado el Nobel a tu pueblo y sí al agresor de Venezuela. Creo Corina que tienes que analizar y saber dónde estás parada, si eres una pieza más del coloniaje de Estados Unidos, sometida a sus intereses de dominación, lo que nunca puede ser para el bien de tu pueblo.

I am concerned that you dedicated the Nobel to Venezuela’s aggressor, and not to your people. I believe Corina that you must analyze and know your standpoint, whether you are another piece of the United States’ colonialism, subjected to their domination interests. Something that can never bring good to your people.

Iria Puyosa, a Venezuelan Global Voices contributor and researcher, highlighted how the prize ultimately means a recognition for the long fight of fellow Venezuelans against the repression of Maduro’s rule, as well as that of his predecessor, Hugo Chávez:

Hoy, las reacciones de centenares de conocidos, amigos, colegas, compañeros de viaje, no me han dejado dudas. La gente siente que se trata de un premio a quienes han luchado durante más de 20 años por recuperar la democracia en Venezuela. Un premio para quienes no hemos cedido ante la persecución y la represión.

Today, reactions from hundreds of acquaintances, friends, colleagues, travel partners, left no doubts. People feel that it is a recognition for those who have fought for more than 20 years to recover Venezuela's democracy. A prize for those of us who have not given in to persecution and repression.

Venezuelan journalist Rafael Osío Cabrices, meanwhile, suggested that the Nobel Peace Prize has shifted the political landscape for the Maduro administration. In his view, with Machado now recognized internationally, any attempt to target her carries a higher diplomatic and political cost. At the same time, the prize exposes the limits of Maduro’s propaganda strategy, which seeks to portray him as a victim in response to Trump’s military deployments in the Caribbean.

Originally published on Global Voices

The two presidential candidates: Simone Ehivet Gbagbo (left) and Henriette Lagou Adjoua (right). Screenshots from the video “Presidential Elections in Côte d’Ivoire: Henriette Lagou’s Campaign” on the France24 YouTube channel. Edited on Canva.

The Ivory Coast held its presidential elections on October 25, 2025. Two women, including a former First Lady, were among the five candidates running for the highest political office for the next five years.

The Ivorian electoral process, in which the president is elected through universal suffrage, is fraught with tension. This is due to the disqualification of some key opposition candidates and the approval of others, such as Alassane Ouattara, who has been president since 2011 and is seeking reelection in a fourth consecutive term.

Incumbent president and candidate for the Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP), Alassane Ouattara, faced four opposition candidates: Simone Éhivet Gbagbo, former First Lady and candidate for the Movement of Capable Generations (MGC); Ahoua Don Mello, professor and independent candidate; Henriette Lagou Adjoua, candidate for the Group of Political Partners for Peace (GP-PAIX), and Jean-Louis Billon, 60, candidate for the Democratic Congress.

These five candidates, who the Constitutional Council has approved, campaigned throughout the country, which has over 32 million citizens and is listed as a hybrid democratic regime in The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2024 report.

The two women candidates were close to Laurent Gbagbo, president from 2000–2011. Simone was the former president’s wife, and Henriette Lagou Adjoua worked with Gbagbo as a minister.

Who is Simone Éhivet Gbagbo?

Born in Moossou, a small village in the Grand-Bassam commune, 43 kilometers east of Abidjan, in the Ivory Coast in 1949, Simone Ehivet Gbagbo is a professional historian. She was also a teacher, enabling her to participate in the 1982 teachers’ strikes before embarking on a political career with the creation of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), a political party she founded with her ex-husband and other politicians. Simone held a political position as a member of parliament for her party from 1996 until 2004.

Her influence on the Ivorian political scene was particularly notable for her position as First Lady between 2000 and 2010. In 2011, during the crisis after Alassane Ouattara’s election, which the Gbagbo family contested, Simone and her ex-husband were arrested. While her ex-husband appeared before the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2012, an Ivorian court sentenced her to 20 years’ imprisonment in 2015, before acquitting her in 2018.

For the October 2025 elections, she sought to build on her experience, offering the Ivory Coast a program geared towards justice, healthcare reform, security, and the economy.

She also has considerable support on the Ivorian political scene, especially from Charles Blé Goudé, president of the Pan-African Congress for Justice and Equality of Peoples (COJEP), whose candidacy was rejected.

Who is Henriette Lagou Adjoua

Born in Daoukro, a town in east-central Ivory Coast, on June 22, 1959, Henriette Adjoua Lagou graduated in social security after extensive studies in her home country and France. In October 2000, she started out in politics as the Minister of Family, Women, and Children in Pascal Affi N’Guessan’s government.

As a writer, she raised the debate on the barriers preventing Ivorian female politicians from rising to the nation’s highest office in her 2025 book “Why Not a Woman?”

She is also known for fighting for women’s rights in the Ivory Coast. As a former unsuccessful candidate in the 2015 presidential elections, she will run for a second time. Henriette put peace, national reconciliation, stability, dialogue, and social cohesion at the center of her election campaign for sustainable development.

High tensions ahead of the vote

The election campaigns began throughout the country on October 10, 2025, against this backdrop of tension. All candidates that the Constitutional Council approved did their utmost to appeal to and convince the Ivorian people with their social projects.

Meanwhile, excluded candidates call on their supporters to protest against these elections going ahead. Instead, they demand inclusive dialogue, as explained in this Africa News video report:

Despite the ban on protests, citizens poured onto the streets of Abidjan and other towns across the country to denounce the current regime’s power grab. These protests often resulted in arrests. According to an article by media group Jeune Afrique, the authorities announced the arrest of around 700 protesters. Fifty were sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for acts of “public disorder, unlawful assembly, and participation in a banned march.”

On October 17, 2025, Sansan Kambilé, Ivorian Minister of Justice, suggested a possible restriction on the freedom to protest. He said:

(…) l’exercice du droit de manifester peut « faire l’objet de restrictions […] dans l’intérêt de la sécurité nationale, de la sûreté publique, de l’ordre public ». (…) les manifestations qui ont eu lieu depuis samedi « revêtent un caractère subversif » et sont « marquées par une violence incompatible avec les exigences de la loi ».

Exercising the right to protest ‘may be subject to restrictions in the interest of national security, public safety, and public order.’ The protests that have taken place since Saturday are of a subversive nature and are marked by violence incompatible with the requirements of the law.

In total, more than 8.7 million voters went to the polls.

Today, women’s involvement in politics allows all women to dream of holding presidential office in the Ivory Coast and across the continent. Two African women have already done it: Samia Suluhu, President of the Republic of Tanzania since March 19, 2021, and Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, President of the Republic of Namibia since March 21, 2025.

The ballots are still being tallied, though early counts indicate incumbent Alassane Ouattara may be the winner.

Read our special coverage: Côte d’Ivoire: Regional powerhouse

Originally published on Global Voices

Image by Mariam Nikuradze/OC Media. Used with permission.

On October 4, Georgia held municipal elections in a climate of escalating political tension. Protests organized by the opposition on the day of the vote saw significant police intervention, with scores being arrested following an investigation launched by the country's Interior Ministry.

The incumbent Georgian Dream party claimed sweeping victory — both proportionally and in mayoral races — across all 64 municipalities. Official voter turnout hovered around 40.9 percent; in the capital of Tbilisi, it was only 31 percent, a record low. According to analysis by Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), the international non-profit, non-partisan, public policy institution, “Out of nearly one million registered voters, the ruling party candidate received about 250,000.” In previous local elections held in 2021, the voter turnout was at 39 percent.

The socio-political backdrop

The municipal election took place amid a year of protests which started in response to the government’s announcement to delay EU integration. In 2024, there was a contested parliamentary election, which both the country’s opposition and independent international observers described as flawed. Despite the ongoing protests, the ruling party has not budged, only raising the pressure bar over citizens and the remaining members of independent civil society. Arrests and prison sentences have continued, even as the government faces growing scrutiny over Georgia's democratic backsliding over the course of the past year.

In the lead-up to the local elections on October 4, opposition and human rights groups had raised concerns that changes to electoral laws — including removing thresholds requiring runoffs, increasing majoritarian seats, and reshaping municipal boundaries and seat allocations — favored the incumbents. This has been accompanied by a year-long crackdown on dissent and civil society, including the jailing of opposition figures, mounting pressure against NGOs, and restrictions on local independent media, all of which have cumulatively tilted the playing field in favor of the government.

As a result, eight major opposition parties — including Freedom Square, European Georgia, United National Movement, Strategy Agmashenebeli, Girchi–More Freedom and others — announced they were boycotting the municipal elections, saying that participating would be tantamount to legitimizing what they call an illegitimate regime. Only a couple of opposition actors (the Lelo-Strong Georgia alliance; ex-Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia’s For Georgia) with one joint candidate contested.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) refused to field an observer mission due to the short notice of their invitation, further eroding confidence in oversight. Other international observer missions and prominent local election observers, including the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, and Transparency International, also did not deploy any missions, citing a repressive environment and inability for fair and free elections to take place.

Protests, clashes, and repression

On the day of the vote, large demonstrations across Tbilisi encountered heavy police intervention. The organizers of the protests described the demonstrations as a “peaceful revolution,” but City Hall denied them permission for most of their requested locations, granting only one out of four areas with a caveat that roads should remain open in order not to block people from accessing polling stations.

Protesters eventually broke through the gates of the presidential residence; police responded with pepper spray, water cannons and tear gas. According to official counts, 21 security personnel and six protesters were injured.

In a tweet, at least one member of parliament described the protesters as a “violent mob” and “radical opposition.” The Ministry of the Interior later advised that an investigation had been launched regarding four separate criminal charges — attempted overthrow of the constitutional order, group violence, seizure or blocking of a strategic facility, and damage or destruction of property. Among the 36 arrested so far are opposition figures and scores of demonstrators.

Domestic and international reaction

On October 7, the European Parliament issued a joint statement on election outcomes in Georgia, describing the environment in which the local elections took place as “restrictive,” expressing concern over violent police response to the protests, and calling on the government “to stop its assault on democracy and respect the fundamental rights of freedom of assembly and expression.”

In a statement on October 7, OSCE/ODIHR Director Maria Telalian called on the authorities to respect citizens’ rights to peaceful assembly. “Peaceful protesters in Georgia continue to be detained, sentenced, and fined for exercising their rights. The authorities have an obligation to implement their OSCE human rights commitments and international obligations, including respect for the right to peaceful assembly,” she said. “I would like to urge once again the Georgian authorities to ensure that civil society and human rights defenders are not targeted and that their voices are heard, as their work is crucial in fostering a vibrant democratic society.”

EU High Representative Kaja Kallas and Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos issued a joint statement urging Georgia to uphold freedom of assembly and expression. “Months of raids on independent media, the passing of laws targeting civil society, the jailing of opponents and activists, or amendments to the electoral code favoring the ruling party, drastically reduced the possibility of having competitive elections,” they explained, adding that “a large part of the opposition boycotted these elections, and the turnout was relatively low.”

Several other international responses echoed the sentiments of the EU officials, holding the ruling government accountable for elections that they said failed to meet democratic election standards, void of transparency and fair vote. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze claimed the protest was an attempt to overthrow democratic order, and accused the EU of foreign involvement.

Too little, too late?

For some observers, Western condemnation is not enough. According to Laura Thornton, the senior director for global democracy programs at the McCain Institute, Western stakeholders must bear the responsibility for not doing enough ahead of what unfolded on October 4. She suggested that the EU and the US had failed to adopt legislation which could have been used to financially sanction and weaken the ruling party, but maintained there was still a possibility to “economically isolate the Georgian regime.”

Despite Georgian Dream claiming a landslide victory in these elections, Hans Gutbrod, a professor in Public Policy and longtime Georgia observer, suggested in an analysis that the party may not be as strong as it appears: “In the end, it comes back to this. The dominance of the Georgian Dream across institutions conceals that they are not that strong. Across the world, those that today are described as post-liberal populists have real grievances that they run on, ranging from immigration to historical humiliation (Trianon, Sèvres, “regional power”, and so forth). The Georgian Dream? It has to make up entirely imaginary enemies,” Gutbrod wrote.

The 2025 municipal elections underscored the growing political polarization and institutional strain in Georgia. Despite the ruling party securing victories across all municipalities, the combination of a historically low turnout, opposition boycotts, and the absence of major observer missions has raised questions about the overall credibility of the vote. The protests and ensuing police response further highlighted the tense environment in which the elections were conducted.

As Georgia faces scrutiny over its democratic trajectory and relations with its Western partners, the aftermath of the elections is likely to shape both the country’s internal political landscape and the future of its engagement with the European Union and broader international community.

Originally published on Global Voices

Image by Gaurav Pokharel via Nepali Times. Used with permission.

This Dart Centre Asia Pacific Report by Arun Karki was originally published in Nepali Times, and an edited version has been republished on Global Voices as part of a content-sharing agreement.

What should a journalist do when young protesters are shot in front of her? Does she do her job and stay neutral? Can you stay neutral?

As Gen Z protests engulfed Kathmandu, Nepal's journalists found themselves reporting a story that was personal. While doing their job, some of them were even targeted by mobs.

Dart Asia Pacific Fellow Arun Karki visited their newsrooms and spoke with his colleagues about their experience of reporting the Gen Z protests that erupted on September 8th. These are the first-hand accounts of journalists who witnessed the turmoil in the city they call home.

Sunita Karki was at a workshop in a hotel on September 8th. She saw the first waves of protests through hotel windows. Curfew alerts flooded her phone, a vehicle belonging to a human rights group sat burning across the road, young boys were taking their wounded friends on motorbikes to local hospitals, and police were beating a teenager with their hands raised.

“I cried a lot,” she said, but the tears were not out of fear — they were because she felt guilt. “I couldn’t write the news. We were witnessing these scenes from a five-star hotel.” By evening, the death toll had reached 19. On September 9th at about 3:35 pm, her outlet, the Annapurna Post's office in Tinkune, Kathmandu, was set on fire. Staff had to leave the building as parts of the newsroom burned down.

Image by Garav Pokharel via Nepali Times. Used with permission.

When she knew her office was burning, she anxiously told her husband that she would resign from the job: “If we have to hide our identification cards in every protest, what kind of journalist am I?” she asked herself.

She filed a story the next day, but her emotions kept bouncing between those of a journalist bound to duty and a civilian in shock. She said that in moments like this, it’s hard to feel truly neutral.

After watching the police beat people, she felt a strong urge to step in, not just stand back and report. The first real calm came later, when people came to the street and lit candles together in honor of those who were killed. “This was a sort of victory procession. I felt some relief after brutal days,” she said.

Angad Dhakal a photojournalist who works at Kantipur National Daily, was standing outside his office building when protesters stormed in and set parts of it on fire. He had already been informed that protesters were planning to torch his office building and rushed to his office hoping to save his hard drives containing ten years of photography work. He failed.

He raised his camera and “forcefully” pressed the shutter — more to document the scene than out of “professional enthusiasm or duty.”

Image by Garav Pokharel via Nepali Times. Used with permission.

“My office was burning. What should I photograph?” he recalled. A few moments later, a protester noticed the “PHOTO” label on his yellow Press jacket. Dhakal deflected it by saying he was an early-career freelancer and YouTuber. He went into a corner and took his jacket off so that protesters wouldn't target him.

When it comes to covering street protests, Angad usually stands near the police because it feels safer. But on September 8th, fire and gunshots made even that area unsafe. A rubber bullet hit his friend Dipendra Dhungana, badly injuring him.

He thought, “Where do we go now? If we stay here, we’ll be hit.” After witnessing two days of protests, violence, and killings, and seeing his own office burning, he couldn't sleep for days.

The same afternoon that government buildings burned and media outlet Kantipur was attacked, a message in a protest Discord forum talked openly of “attacking Kantipur.”

Rumors spread to other outlets. Outside OnlineKhabar's office, where Gaurav Pokharel works, the newsroom manager said, “Very suspicious people were walking around.” They lowered blinds, avoided windows, locked the front gate, and dispersed staff to other places across the city. The outlet was threatened and effectively locked down, but not torched.

Pokharel hid his press ID. “ I never showed the ID card. Sometimes I had to enter the crowd shouting slogans, just to blend in among the protesters,” he said. He watched people fall under gunfire, and he helped pull one surrounded journalist out of a hostile crowd.

Image by Garav Pokharel via Nepali Times. Used with permission

Gaurav also contributed articles to international outlets as a freelancer. Later, while transcribing an interview of a young protest organizer, he wrote to his editor at an international outlet: “This was very hard to write. I cried many times while doing it.” He had been working at a stretch for days, battling bouts of exhaustion and low blood pressure.

Protesters vandalized and set fire within the Singha Darbar complex housing Nepal Television and Radio Nepal. They tried to disrupt public broadcasting.

Surendra Paudyal began the day with his press ID hanging on his neck, thinking it would let him move freely. But when he reached Singha Darbar around 3:30 pm, the situation felt dangerous.

He put the ID in his pocket. When asked what mattered most, he answered without pause: life comes first. In that moment, he felt real fear and a strong duty to protect his team.

His focus narrowed to basic things: stay calm, find exits, get everyone out safely. Later, they were able to keep the 8 pm news on air through a regional link. He felt mixed emotions and a sense of relief that the broadcast continued, but also sadness and anger that their own studio had come under attack.

Originally published on Global Voices

Screenshot of the police storming CHP party headquarters is taken from the Financial Express YouTube video “Istanbul Protest: Riot Police Clash With CHP Supporters At Party HQ”. Fair use. 

Turkey’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), is facing an escalating political crisis. On September 2, a ruling of the 45th Civil Court of First Instance annulled the CHP's Istanbul Provincial Congress, held in October 2023. As a result, Özgür Çelik, the party's current provincial chair — along with 196 delegates — was dismissed. In their place, a team of trustees, reportedly aligned with the former party leadership, was appointed.

The CHP's leadership has dismissed the ruling as null and void, even as it faces another court hearing, scheduled for September 15, which revolves around a “mutlak butlan” (absolute nullity) case aiming to annul the party's 38th Ordinary Congress, held in November 2023. This congress led to election of Özgür Özel as the new party leader, ousting long-time chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.

The September 2 court ruling stated there were procedural violations during the vote. A similar argument was made for absolute nullity case, as a lawsuit initiated by a party member reportedly aligned with Kılıçdaroğlu alleged procedural violations and potential “vote buying” during the party congress.

Despite Özel's legal team maintaining the case should be dismissed on the basis of invalidity due to the lawsuit's expired filing period, and because political party conventions fall under electoral board jurisdiction rather than civil courts, the hearing is scheduled to proceed. Should the court conclude that violations did indeed happen, such a ruling would nullify all decisions taken by the party's current leadership since the congress.

In response, some 900 party delegates called for an extraordinary congress against the possibility of a similar court ruling. Özel said if the court were to deliver a ruling that affects the party's leadership and a trustee is appointed to replace him, “that trustee would last no more than six days.” The party's extraordinary congress is scheduled to take place on September 24.

Others have been questioning whether such an outcome would be possible. According to journalist Barış Terkoğlu, assuming Kılıçdaroğlu secures his seat as party leader following the court decision on September 15, his first move would be to cancel the upcoming congress.

Academic Berk Esen, however, disagreed. Writing on X, Essen opined that he does not think Kılıçdaroğlu “will act as harshly,” given that he “is a passive politician” who will try to prolong the process by delaying holding the congress. “This way,” Esen explained, “he will attempt to undermine the Özel-İmamoğlu team. Instead of expulsion, he will prefer the path of resignation and pushing toward a separate party.”

On the heels of the September 2 court decision, the crisis reached a new peak when police escorted court-appointed trustee Gürsel Tekin into the CHP’s Istanbul provincial headquarters on September 8, amid widespread protests and internet restrictions that throttled access to YouTube, X, Instagram and WhatsApp.

The night before, police surrounded and barricaded party headquarters to prevent any demonstrations by supporters. The Istanbul Governor’s Office, meanwhile, announced a ban on rallies, press statements, marches, setting up tents, opening stands, sit-ins, signature campaigns, and commemorative events in the districts of Beşiktaş, Beyoğlu, Eyüpsultan, Kağıthane, Sarıyer, and Şişli between September 7 and 10.

Journalist Gonca Tokyol summed up the situation on X:

Another tense night in Turkey: CHP’s Istanbul HQ is under heavy police blockade. Roads sealed after the youth wing urged supporters to “defend” the building from the appointed trustee board set to arrive tomorrow. Inside, party members stage a sit-in, calling for support. https://t.co/4YO4S4U1ti

— Gonca Tokyol (@goncatokyol) September 7, 2025

The bans and barricades did not stop people from showing up, but those who did were violently dispersed by riot police on September 8. On September 9, the party's 102nd anniversary, ousted provincial leader Çelik posted on X: “Good morning Istanbul. No blockade or attack can stop the Republican People's Party's march to power.”

In an interview with The Financial Times, Özel said the ruling government was staging “a coup against the future ruling party.” For almost a year now, the ruling Justice and Development Party government has been on the offensive against the main opposition party, culminating with the arrest of popular Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu on March 19, 2025 on various charges, including corruption. Both prior to and after the mayor's arrest, multiple CHP members were also detained on similar grounds.

Speaking to the digital news outlet Fayn about the recent court ruling, constitutional law expert and faculty member at Galatasaray University’s Faculty of Law Professor Şule Özsoy Boyunsuz said, “Democratic political life in Turkey, as we know it, has come to an end.” She elaborated:

The national will is expressed from the bottom up through political parties. Therefore, in democratic states governed by the rule of law, parties cannot and must not be appointed by the state. Once you break the chain that runs freely from party grassroots to members, from members to delegates, and from delegates to leadership, and instead begin appointing administrators, it means the state is intervening.

Who is the state in Turkey? A single person. The president and the public officials appointed by him.

Others voices soon chimed in. In April, political scientist Şebnem Gümüşçü noted that the government has taken hold over the public sphere through its control over the media, the judiciary, and other key institutions. As such, she argued, “Turkey is at a crossroads: it will either democratize or move toward full authoritarianism, where elections have no meaning.”

A group of academics signed a petition in which they expressed support for the opposition and its leadership. “As academics concerned about the future of this country, we support the CHP and the leadership of Özgür Özel in their struggle for democracy and dignity, and we call on all civil initiatives to strongly expand this struggle,” read the statement.

Responding to the blocking of the party building on September 7, political scientist Kemal Büyükyükse noted on X:

THREAD – What is happening in Turkey right now and why it should matter to the world

Today in Istanbul, police barricaded the main opposition CHP’s HQ after a court annulled its 2023 congress. This is not routine repression. It is a soft coup against the opposition. ++ pic.twitter.com/uTEx47AErG

— Kemal Büyükyüksel (@KBuyukyuksel) September 8, 2025

Büyükyükse continued, “The next step is clear, trusteeship for CHP nationally, paving the way for liquidation. This is historic. For 75 years, multiparty politics survived even through coups. Never before has the principal opposition been dismantled while governing major cities and leading polls. What is happening is not simply the erosion of democracy, it is blatant shameless demolition.”

Between now and September 15, all eyes are on the opposition party and its leadership. In the aftermath, all eyes will be on Turkey and the future of its citizens.

Originally published on Global Voices

Post-election protests in Maputo, Mozambique, in 2025. Photo: Wilson Tholee, used with permission

Editor’s note: The author of this text is also a contributor to the new edition of the book by interviewee Domingos da Cruz. 

In June 2015, Domingos da Cruz, a journalist and human rights defender, and other activists were detained under suspicion of “planning a coup d'état” after attending a conference discussing his book on peaceful methods of protest and civil resistance. The conference was led by Da Cruz, and the group of 17 activists became known as the “15+2” group.

Ten years later, Da Cruz has released a new edition of “Tools to Destroy the Dictator and Avoid a New Dictatorship – A Political Philosophy of Liberation for Angola,” which includes analyses from several academics and discusses tools of civil resistance. The work, according to a 2015 Deutsch Welle report “is an adaptation of the 168 techniques presented by the American philosopher Gene Sharp in the book From Dictatorship to Democracy.”

The title summarizes the purpose of the work, which aims to provide civil resistance methods for authoritarian contexts, such as those of Angola and Mozambique. In these, “academia should promote human dignity and that means confronting the dictatorship with practical solutions,” said Da Cruz in an interview with Global Voices.

In 2015, Da Cruz was remanded in custody for six months, he was “let go” to house arrest for about three months, and was then convicted along with other activists. He was released in June 2016. Since then, he has been living between Portugal, Sweden, and Canada where he was a visiting researcher at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Society and Culture, at the University of Concordia, and has been coordinating the Media Observatory (Observatório da Imprensa), a civil society organization that aims to monitor and evaluate the performance of Angolan media.

At that time, Angola’s president was José Eduardo dos Santos, who stayed in power for nearly four decades (1979–2017) and died in 2022. He was succeeded by the current president, João Lourenço, from the same party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

In the Human Rights Watch’s 2025 report, the organization listed problems Angola currently faces, such as police brutality and chronic malnutrition among children, highlighting:

O presidente João Lourenço assinou leis que não atendem aos padrões internacionais de direitos humanos e que restringem severamente as liberdades de imprensa, de expressão e de associação. As prisões angolanas continuaram a sofrer com a superlotação.

President João Lourenço has signed off on laws that do not meet international human rights standards and that severely restrict freedoms of the press, expression, and association. Angolan prisons continued to suffer from overcrowding.

The new version of Da Cruz’s work revisits ideas discussed in the first edition, published in 2015, now expanded with contributions from Brazil (Susan De Oliveira and Fernanda Cris Franco), Mozambique (Nelson Domingos António, Tirso Sitoe, and Edgar Barroso) and Angola (Raul Tati), in a collective effort to refine strategies of action against political oppression.

In May this year, as French outlet RFI reported, the book was censored in Angola, which led the author to make it available for free online.

The transition of power

Da Cruz starts from the observation that “the reality of Angola’s authoritarianism requires concrete answers, and that relying on elections organized by authoritarian regimes would be falling into a trap.” According to him, in such contexts, there is no possibility for a transition of power as would typically be expected in democracies.

No caso de Angola, colocaria todos os partidos de lado pois eles não representam uma solução revolucionária. Agora, dentro da sociedade civil, talvez seja necessário que haja unidade da sociedade civil para que possa elaborar dois ou três grandes planos estratégicos, que seriam um conjunto de táticas para desencadear uma revolução popular. Especificamente, educação informal da sociedade em que é preciso vigilância para preservação da liberdade, mas também educação para a confrontação de um regime autoritário.

In Angola’s case, I would not count on any of the current parties because they do not represent a revolutionary solution. Now, within civil society, maybe there needs to be unity among the civil society [organizations] so that they can develop two or three major strategic plans [of action], which would be a set of tactics to bring about a popular revolution. Specifically, informal education about a society in which vigilance is needed to preserve freedom, but also education for confronting an authoritarian regime.

Da Cruz points to the example of Mozambican rapper and activist Azagaia, who passed away in 2023, and whose music made social commentary that inspired demonstrations, which were met with police repression. He makes a comparison with the Angolan context, where he perceives the artists as being focused on the symptoms of the dictatorship, by talking about arbitrary arrests, high levels of poverty, corruption, manipulation of the media, and a general lack of basic services:

É preciso que se produzam músicas que digam claramente ao povo que, para que nos possamos livrar, é necessário desencadear uma revolução popular. Logo, isso seria um projeto coletivo em que as pessoas juntam a sua força para o alcance da democracia e derrubar a ditadura. O que há em Angola não são eleições, são simulações para legitimar o poder. Muitos acreditam que estão numa democracia, mas vivem numa ilusão.

We need to make songs that clearly tell the people that, to free ourselves, it’s necessary to start a popular revolution. So, this would be a collective project in which people join their strengths to achieve democracy and overthrow the dictatorship. What there is in Angola is not elections, it’s rehearsals to legitimize the power [in place]. Many believe they are in a democracy, but they live in an illusion.

In the country’s last elections in 2022, the civil society movement Mudei carried out an initiative — “Citizen Electoral Monitoring Project” — and incorporated activists and citizens from various parts of Angola who contributed to the unofficial counting of the election results. These results highlighted a disparity with the official results, which showed the MPLA winning with more than 80 percent of the vote against UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), and which the opposition contested.

Just like Mozambique’s FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front), both the MPLA and UNITA have their roots in movements dating back to the struggle for independence from Portugal, which later evolved into political parties.

Mudei also assessed press coverage at the time of the elections. In its report, they said there was unequal treatment and that the press gave more attention to the party in power, the MPLA. Da Cruz said:

Em Angola não é possível falar de eleições livres, justas e transparentes.

In Angola it’s not possible to talk about free, fair, and transparent elections.

He also observed that tools of civil resistance, such as protests, boycotts, and holding vigils, have been used in government transitions, such as in Tunisia, during the Arab Spring, and could be adapted and employed in other contexts.

In Mozambique, for example, Da Cruz sees similarities with Angola and has been sharing the book with Mozambican activists and academics, as they too are faced with an authoritarian-inclined government formed by the party FRELIMO. In the run-up to elections in 2019, Mozambican journalists and activists were the target of threats.

More exchanges and raising awareness

Da Cruz believes it is urgent to promote deeper political and philosophical exchanges between Portuguese-speaking countries. Although still limited, he has noticed a deepening of the links between civil societies, as seen during the protests in Mozambique after the 2024 elections, which inspired protests against the socio-economic crisis in Angola.

He also cites examples such as Turkey, where the president, Recep Erdoğan, in power for over 20 years, adding his time as prime minister and president, has become more authoritarian over time, to highlight that no democracy is invulnerable:

A liberdade não é definitiva. As democracias também caem. É preciso educar as novas gerações sobre isso e manter uma sociedade civil vigilante e ativa.

Freedom is not guaranteed. Democracies can also fall. It is necessary to educate new generations about this and maintain a vigilant and active civil society.

In order to achieve this, the writer highlights the role of accessible media, such as content published on social media, where citizen art or sharing articles can be used to raise awareness around issues.

Returning to his work a decade later, in the current context of Lusophone Africa, he says he hopes readers will not only read, but also adopt the tools and put them into practice.

Não basta conhecer a receita. É preciso pôr a mão na massa. Só assim a liberdade será conquistada e defendida.

It is not enough to know the recipe. We need to get to work. Only this way will freedom be won and defended.

Originally published on Global Voices

Image by Arzu Geybullayeva. Created using Canva Pro.

Thousands of Georgians have gathered on Rustaveli Avenue in Tbilisi every night since November 2024 without any single organization coordinating them. The pro-EU protests represent something new in Georgian civic life — a leaderless, self-organized movement, driven largely by young people using social media.

Political parties and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) share information and organize events, but they cannot claim ownership of the demonstrations. Yet, polls show that while most Georgians support European Union integration, protesters are mainly young, educated Tbilisi residents.

This gap reveals a deeper puzzle about Georgian society: why do people who show remarkable informal civic engagement remain largely absent from formal democratic organizing?

The civic engagement puzzle

Recent research reveals surprising patterns in Georgian civic behavior. Seventy-four percent of Georgians have helped friends with household chores, 69 percent have assisted strangers in roadside emergencies, and 52 percent have donated to charity.

Most remarkably, 74 percent express willingness to participate in campaigns about unemployment or healthcare. Yet, only eight percent have ever had contact with the NGOs that organize such campaigns.

This disconnect reflects an institutional mismatch. Georgians possess strong social capital — networks of trust and cooperation that enable collective action. But formal civil society organizations have struggled to connect with how Georgians traditionally cooperate — through informal networks and neighborhood support.

For instance, people provide mutual assistance during illness or financial problems, or organize community responses to local challenges like environmental issues and elderly care during emergencies. Such relationships are reciprocal, voluntary, and based on personal trust rather than formal structures. The problem stems partly from Georgia's historical trajectory and how civil society developed after independence.

From grassroots to professional advocacy

Early Georgian civic life looked different. Writer Ilia Chavchavadze helped establish the Society for the Spreading of Literacy among Georgians in 1879. The organization built schools, bookshops and libraries across the country. Many consider this Georgia's first civic organization.

This grassroots approach enabled mass participation. The Georgian Democratic Republic (1918-1921) saw the Social Democratic Party of Georgia win 81.5 percent of the popular vote. Parliament included multiple parties representing different constituencies — Socialist-Federalists focused on peasant issues, nationalist groups and regional movements. Historian Ronald sung noted there was real “support among all classes of Georgian people.”

After independence in 1991, Western donors channeled resources through professional NGOs rather than mass organizations. Georgia's NGO sector grew rapidly, from zero in 1992 to thousands of organizations within a decade. While some organizations addressed citizens’ immediate needs, democracy and human rights work was more visible, and NGOs were soon associated in the public mind with these abstract concepts rather than everyday concerns like healthcare access, employment or local infrastructure needs. Critics called this “genetically engineered civil society” — professionally effective, but detached from broader social networks.

Successful bridge-building

Some movements have connected formal organizing with Georgian social patterns. The 2003 Rose Revolution succeeded because it linked elite political opposition with popular anger about corruption and electoral fraud. When people perceived fundamental unfairness, they extended trust beyond their immediate circles.

The Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA) demonstrates how professional organizations can reach ordinary citizens. For more than 30 years, the GYLA has provided over 1.3 million instances of free legal aid. The organization currently serves about 50,000 people annually, through offices in Tbilisi and seven other towns. Its success is built on addressing concrete problems affecting Georgians, across class and regional divides.

A digital platform called Daitove recently mobilized 250,000 people to provide food, funds and transportation for protesters. The platform worked through peer-to-peer networks rather than centralized coordination.

Persistent obstacles

Two key structural factors, based on the evidence above, prevent informal civic energy from becoming sustained democratic participation.

First, donor requirements often favor formal organizational structures over the informal networks where Georgians cooperate effectively. Organizations need boards, strategic plans and reporting systems, all of which can undermine natural collaboration patterns by forcing people into rigid hierarchies that don't match how they actually work together.

Second, political polarization hardens group boundaries, making it difficult for organizations to maintain the cross-cutting relationships that enable broader coalitions.

What's at stake

Georgia's drift toward authoritarianism makes understanding these dynamics urgent. The current government restricts organizing space through laws like the controversial “foreign agents” legislation, but bridging informal civic energy with formal democratic institutions will remain crucial for any future democratic opening. This means that finding ways to create organizations that work with Georgia's natural patterns of cooperation — rather than against them — might be needed for any democratic opening.

The Georgian experience offers lessons for democracies worldwide: the challenge isn't as much about creating more professional NGOs as it is about building institutions that align with how people develop trust and solve problems together.

The protesters on Rustaveli Avenue oppose specific legislation, but they also express a deeper desire for authentic political participation. Whether Georgia's institutions can respond to this call may determine the country's democratic future — because the question isn't whether Georgians care about democracy — it's whether democratic institutions can learn to work the way Georgians do.

Originally published on Global Voices

Screenshot from news report by TV Pirveli of Mzia Amaglobeli's trial.

A prominent investigative journalist in Georgia was sentenced to two years in prison for slapping a police chief during anti-government protests. The verdict that has sparked widespread condemnation from both domestic civil society and international diplomats.

Mzia Amaghlobeli, founder of the independent news outlet Batumelebi, was convicted by Batumi City Court on August 6, for allegedly resisting and using violence against law enforcement during mass protests in January. Footage from the scene, circulated in Georgian media, shows Amaghlobeli slapping Irakli Dgebuadze, the local police chief, during a demonstration.

In court during her defense, Amaghlobeli said that she acted in an emotional state after witnessing the violent detention of colleagues and being trampled in a stampede. She also accused Dgebuadze of spitting on her and attempting to physically assault her while she was in custody. The courtroom was packed with journalists and supporters, many of them holding signs demanding press freedom and accusing the government of silencing dissent.

She had initially faced charges of inflicting bodily harm — a crime punishable by up to seven years in prison — but was ultimately convicted on lesser charges. Her defense team criticised the trial as politically biased, and argued that Amaghlobeli had not received due process.

“Disproportionate and politically motivated”

In the hours after the verdict, 24 diplomatic missions – including the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada, and Ukraine – issued a joint statement condemning the sentence as “disproportionate and politically motivated,” and demanding Amaghlobeli’s immediate release.

“We are deeply concerned by the sentencing of Mzia Amaghlobeli,” the statement read, warning that her detention and the broader crackdown on independent media represent “a troubling erosion of press freedom in Georgia.”

The diplomats also pointed to Amaghlobeli’s prolonged pre-trial detention — she was arrested in Batumi on January 11, 2025 — which they said had significantly worsened her health and eyesight.

The statement, issued on behalf of the Media Freedom Coalition (MFC), a partnership of over 50 countries across six continents committed to defending press freedom worldwide, highlighted the mounting pressure on Amaghlobeli’s media organisations. She is the founder of two papers — Batumelebi and Netgazeti — both of which are considered Georgia’s leading investigative news outlets. MFC regards her arrest as part of a broader campaign of intimidation against journalists and civil society in Georgia.

Wider crackdowns

Amaghlobeli is widely respected for her reporting on issues of corruption, abuse of power, and human rights violations in Georgia’s politically turbulent region of Adjara, a semi-autonomous region on Georgia’s Black Sea coast.

Partly due to its strategic location, there is a history of power struggles between local and central authorities. Amid recurring allegations of corruption, the ruling party has recently made moves to sideline the opposition and tighten control over regional governance.

Since early 2024, Georgia has seen repeated mass protests against the ruling Georgian Dream party, which critics have accused of drifting away from the EU and towards Russia. Despite strong public support for EU membership, the Georgian government halted accession efforts last year, sparking further unrest. In addition, the country’s 2024 parliamentary elections were marred by allegations of voter intimidation, irregularities, and media suppression.

In this climate, journalists, opposition figures, and activists have faced growing repression – from surveillance and smear campaigns to criminal charges and imprisonment.

Amaghlobeli’s case is now being seen as a symbol of that repression, and a stark warning of the shrinking democratic space in a country once regarded as a regional frontrunner for European integration.

Originally published on Global Voices

Cameroon's opposition candidate Cabral Libii votes in Efoulan school, Yaounde third district, 2018. Image from Wikipedia. Public domain. 

During election campaigns, young people are often used by political parties because of their large numbers and their potential to influence the votes of their relatives. In Cameroon, over 60 percent of the population is under the age of 35, and the median age is just 18.7. These young people no longer want to play the role of mere extras during election campaigns, but yearn to be agents of change.

Nchang Cho Clinton, a civil society youth actor, said:

Stop seeing youth as a demographic to be used during campaigns and ignored afterward.

Cameroon’s long-serving president, Paul Biya, who has been in power since 1982, has announced October 12, 2025, as the date for the country’s next presidential election. With this announcement, the political landscape in the Central African nation is beginning to take shape ahead of the polls.

Aspirants have submitted their candidacies, party endorsements are pouring in, and alliances are forming. But outside elite circles, in university halls, social media groups, and on street corners, many young Cameroonians interviewed by Global Voices have a common question: “Are we finally the ‘leaders of tomorrow,’ or just props in yet another campaign spectacle?”

Between the stage and the streets

A rally organized on June 13, 2025, by the Association of Young Patriots for Paul Biya (JAPABI) saw over 150 young people gathered at Omnisport Stadium in Yaounde esplanade under the banner of “Youth Engagement for Peace.” There were speeches in praise of President Biya’s leadership. Many hailed him as a father figure and champion of unity.

However, a controversy around young people's participation in the upcoming presidential election emerged when some young Cameroonians were reported to have raised FCFA 40 million (over USD 65,000) for President Paul Biya‘s deposit and campaign expenses. Paul Biya is but a shadow of his former self, and his speeches are no longer unifying.

The donation collected by the young people was officially received at the Unity Palace on July 14, 2025, by the Minister of State and Secretary-General at the Presidency, Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh, on behalf of the Head of State. The figure and gesture immediately stirred disbelief across the country due to the high unemployment rate among young people, who would find it difficult to raise this amount. Many young people took to social media to question the legitimacy of the donation, both because most young people have little extra to give and because Biya is notoriously unpopular with young voters. Reports from the Cameroon Radio Television say the youth representatives came from across the country. In 2025, the minimum monthly wage in Cameroon will be FCFA 43,969 (USD 78.11).

Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh noted that the youth representatives during the donation ceremony were from the country's Northwest and Southwest regions — areas that have long been affected by violent conflict in Cameroon. These two English-speaking regions have been gripped by a separatist conflict since 2016, stemming from long-standing grievances over perceived marginalization by the predominantly French-speaking central government, leading to an armed struggle between government forces and separatist groups.

As satire and memes flooded traditional social media platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, TikTok, and X, many young people questioned the motive and sources of those finances. “That sounded so wrong,” a student who chose to be anonymous told Global Voices, adding that:

Youths are battling real issues and need that money more than he does. And frankly, the people giving the money looked over 35. In Cameroon, youth is apparently a flexible age.

On paper, Cameroon’s youth should be a major political force with an estimated general population of nearly 30 million people. But the reality is that young people remain underrepresented in politics. According to a World Bank report, the country’s youth face unemployment rates exceeding 30 percent, and over 70 percent of employed youth are underemployed, working in informal or unstable conditions.

A youth civil society actor, Nchange Cho Clinton, who heads the African Caribbean Pacific Diaspora Youth Support Services, said in an interview with Global Voices:

Unemployment and political exclusion are youths biggest challenges. Even with skills, many can’t find opportunities or platforms to be heard. It’s disheartening.

These frustrations fuel a growing disinterest in electoral politics, but not a total rejection. Clinton continues:

It’s one of the few rights we have left. Even if the system feels rigged, not voting ensures we’re excluded. We must vote, and demand accountability beyond the polls.

Still, skepticism runs deep. The FCFA 40 million contribution seemed to confirm what many fear: that youth are seen more as cheerleaders than changemakers.

Thirteen candidates, one nation on edge

Between July 12 and 21, 2025, Cameroon’s electoral body recorded over 80 candidature files for the presidency. The highest number in the country’s and the world’s history. This record far exceeds the 28 candidates registered in the 2018 election, and happened despite stricter legal and procedural requirements set in 2012.

On July 26, 2025, Elections Cameroon (ELECAM) announced the provisional approval of 13 candidates out of 83 applicants for the upcoming presidential election scheduled for October 12. The announcement was made in Yaounde by Enow Abrams Egbe, chairperson of Elecam's Electoral Board. Among those approved are incumbent President Paul Biya, opposition leader Joshua Osih, and former ministers Issa Tchiroma Bakary and Bello Bouba Maigari, both former allies of Biya. Hermine Patricia Tomaino Ndam Njoya stands out as the only female candidate on the list. Notably, the application of prominent opposition figure Maurice Kamto was rejected. According to the electoral code, disqualified candidates have 48 hours to appeal to the Constitutional Council.

A promising 37-year-old engineer, Hiram Iyodi, running under the Front des Démocrates Camerounais (FDC), is equally gaining ground in the presidential race as he leverages the power of his TikTok and X accounts to rally fellow young Cameroonians to vote.

Each candidate brings a different vision, but the stakes remain the same: leadership over a fractured, youthful, and impatient nation. Cameroon enters this election burdened by unresolved crises, most notably the Anglophone conflict, persistent economic strain, deepening poverty, and mounting public demands for accountability.

Corruption remains pervasive. Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index scores Cameroon at 26 out of 100, placing it 140th out of 180 countries, a drop of one point from the previous year. Yet few young people feel that the current political class truly understands their challenges. A young medical student in Yaounde told Global Voices:

I am very much interested and hopeful. There’s a wind blowing across Africa. I hope Cameroon finally breathes it.

In this environment, youth-led NGOs such as Local Youth Corner (LOYOC) and Actions for Development and Empowerment (ADE) are stepping up, not just to campaign, but to inform. Workshops on civic education, employment rights, and political participation have multiplied, from Douala to Maroua. While JAPABI rallies for Biya, other networks push for a broader awakening: a politics of issues, not just loyalty.

Will the youth vote count?

At present, Cameroon has over eight million registered voters, and young people make up a significant number of the electorate; one might assume they hold the key to this election. However, voter turnout has historically been low among youth, and trust in political institutions remains shaky.

Still, there's a sense that something may shift. Social media is amplifying youth voices in real time. WhatsApp groups are doubling as civic forums. Influencers are talking policy. Students are discussing reforms over street food. And slowly, a generation that has long been dubbed “apathetic” is discovering its leverage. One student activist says:

 If our leaders keep viewing us as campaign tools instead of active citizens, then the change we need won’t come from them, it must come from us.

As October approaches, one thing is certain: Whether by vote or silence, Cameroon’s youth will shape this nation’s future. The challenge now is ensuring they’re not just present at rallies, but centered in the country’s long-overdue political renewal.

Originally published on Global Voices

From left to right: Charles Blé Goudé, Laurent Gbagbo, Guillaume Soro, and Tidjane Thiam, the four candidates excluded from the October 2025 elections. Screenshot from the video “Côte d’Ivoire: The Final Electoral List” on the Tv5monde Afrique YouTube Channel

By Jeslyn Lemke

Côte d’Ivoire is preparing to hold its presidential elections in October 2025. With four candidates excluded, President Alassane Ouattara, who has been in office since 2011, is expected to run for re-election.

On June 4, 2025, the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) excluded several high-profile candidates from the electoral list on legal technicalities. These included Guillaume Soro, (independent candidate and former president of the National Assembly from 2012–2019); Laurent Gbagbo (former president of the country from 2000–2011 and candidate for the African People’s Party – Côte d'Ivoire (PPA-CI)); Tidjane Thiam (member of the Democratic Party of Ivory Coast -African Democratic Rally (PDCI-RDA)), and Charles Blé Goudé (former minister under Laurent Gbagbo and leader of the Pan-African Congress for Justice and People’s Equality (COJE).

In addition to the exclusion of these four candidates, French and Russian disinformation campaigns mean Côte d’Ivoire’s October elections are set to take place amid considerable tension.

An opposition party alliance

On June 19, two opposition parties with excluded candidates, the PDCI and PPA-CI, formed an alliance, showing a united front against the governing party, the Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP).

After amending the Constitution in 2016 to allow himself to run for a third term, President Alassane Ouattara, 83, has led the country for 15 years. For the October 2025 elections, the RHDP selected Ouattara as its candidate. However, thus far, he has been reluctant to disclose publicly whether he will seek reelection.

Simone Ehivet Gbagbo, President of the Capable Generations Movement (MGC), and Pascal Affi Nguessan, President of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), are the two opposition candidates facing Ouattara at the polls.

According to David Youant, an Ivorian journalist and director of the Alerte Info press agency, opposition parties excluded from the electoral process still receive considerable support from the civilian population, including military personnel. In an interview with Global Voices, he explained:

La jeunesse est frustrée, les soldats démobilisés lors de la dernière guerre civile de 2010 et les chômeurs constituent un solide soutien des militaires au PDCI et au PPA-CI, qui cherchent à apaiser leur colère contre le régime Ouattara. On n'aura pas besoin d'être un marabout pour savoir que, forcément, il y aura des bagarres.

The frustrated youth, unemployed, and demobilized troops from the civil war in 2010 are a solid support base for PDCI and PPA–CI members seeking to ease the discontent over the Ouattara regime. You don’t need to be a psychic to know there will be public disorder.

Youant describes the current climate on the streets of Abidjan (the de facto capital of Côte d’Ivoire) as calm. People are going about their daily business, going on vacation, shopping, and students are attending classes as normal. He added:

Pour le moment, dans les actes, dans les comportements, on ne sent pas la panique. Les gens ne font pas de provisions. Il n’y a pas de tensions réelles. Mais il y a des craintes de la crise sur une possible crise post-électorale, la majorité des Ivoiriens ne veut pas revivre ce qui s'est passé en 2010-2011.

At the moment, there’s no sign of panic in people’s actions or behavior. They aren’t stocking up. Although there’s no real tension, there are fears of a potential post-electoral crisis. Most Ivorians don’t want to relive what happened in 2010–2011.

Following the 2010 presidential elections, the Independent Electoral Commission(CEI) declared Alassane Ouattara the winner, while the Constitutional Council proclaimed Laurent Gbagbo as such. This contradictory result divided the Ivorian population, causing a post-electoral crisis that led to Laurent Gbagbo’s arrest and imprisonment at the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Read more: Cameroonian journalist revisits the 2010–2011 Ivorian political crisis in a documentary

In April, PDCI and PPA-CI withdrew from the Electoral Commission, arguing the CEI is no longer objective and operates under the control of Ouattara’s government.

Online, tensions are mounting among cyber activists, disinformation campaigns are proliferating, and political commentaries indicate widespread concern about a potential coup d'état. On X, the Mel Essis Kouadio account shared a video of Ibrahima Cissé Bacongo, the Governor of the Autonomous District of Abidjan, and questioned the motivations behind his remarks.

HANN
CISSÉ BACONGO :

« TIDJANE THIAM et LAURENT GBAGBO disent qu'ils veulent faire un COUP D'ÉTAT . Mais on les attend »

Attendez ! vous êtes sûrs qu'il se porte bien? #CIV225 pic.twitter.com/KRsCWDgIYp

— Mel Essis Kouadio (@MelEssisKouadio) June 9, 2025

HANN
CISSÉ BACONGO:

“TIDJANE THIAM and LAURENT GBAGBO say they want to conduct a COUP D'ÉTAT. Yet, we’re still waiting.”

Hold on! Are you sure he’s alright? #CIV225 pic.twitter.com/KRsCWDgIYp

Intense disinformation on social media

In May, rumors of a coup d'état in Abidjan spread on social media, raising concerns among the international community. This followed the arrest of well-known cyber activist Souleymane Gbagbo Koné in France in March 2025, who, according to fake news, was allegedly sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for speaking out against Ouattara’s government.

According to a 2024 report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, there were 189 disinformation campaigns in Africa between 2022 and 2024. Historically unstable countries are often targets of such campaigns, 60 percent of which have foreign state sponsors like Russia and China. The report states:

La Russie demeure le principal vecteur de désinformation en Afrique, parrainant 80 campagnes documentées ciblant plus de 22 pays. Cela représente près de 40 % de toutes les campagnes de désinformation en Afrique.

Russia remains the primary driver of disinformation in Africa, sponsoring 80 documented campaigns targeting more than 22 countries. This accounts for almost 40 percent of all disinformation campaigns in Africa.

From January to June 2025, Ivoirecheck, an Ivorian fact-checking organization combating disinformation on social networks, debunked several election-related disinformation posts. For example, on May 16, 2025, the Le Liptako Gourma account on X posted an image falsely claiming to show French Foreign Legion soldiers training in Côte d'Ivoire:

Alerteurgentsignalée :
c'est des légionnaires français en trainés dans la forêt ivoirienne et prêts à lancer l'assaut sur le Burkina Faso.
Il faut élever le niveau d'alerte.
Ils travailleront sur deux fronts en même temps. La frontière ivoirienne et la frontière béninoise pic.twitter.com/XdDJx4V7TY

— Le Liptako Gourma (@LiptakoGourma3) May 16, 2025

Urgent Alert:
These are French Foreign Legion soldiers training in the Ivorian forest and ready to attack Burkina Faso.
We must raise the alert level.
They’ll be working on two fronts simultaneously: the Ivorian and Beninese borders. pic.twitter.com/XdDJx4V7TY

IvoireCheck‘s fact-checking work made it possible to refute this information, which sparked a host of online reactions. In an article, Ivoirecheck wrote:

Une publication partagée sur X, par la page dénommée  Le Liptako de Gouma, a généré plus de 80 000 vues, 290 likes, et 110 retweets déclenchant un débat animé sur une supposée formation des Légionnaires Français en Côte d’Ivoire dans le but d’attaquer le Burkina Faso. Sur l’image de piètre qualité qui accompagne la publication, on peut observer des individus  armés, vêtus de tenues militaires, de gilets et casques dans une zone arborée.

On X, Le Liptako de Gouma shared a post that received 80,000 views, 290 likes, and 110 retweets, sparking a heated debate on French legionnaires allegedly training in Côte d’Ivoire for an attack on Burkina Faso. The poor-quality image accompanying this post shows armed individuals in a wooded area, dressed in military attire, vests, and helmets.

Code for Africa, the continent’s largest network of civic technology and data journalism laboratories with teams in 21 countries, has also allocated resources to disinformation monitoring in Côte d'Ivoire ahead of this year’s elections.

In an interview with BBC Afrique, Mohamed Kébé, an Ivorian fact-checker and journalist, confirms the spread of fake news in the lead-up to the Ivorian elections. He stated:

le contexte électoral semble donner du grain à moudre aux personnes qui diffusent les fake news. (…) on sent une montée fulgurante des fausses informations à l'approche de la présidentielle ivoirienne. Il y a des personnes qui sont intéressées par la manipulation de l'information en lien avec la présidentielle.

Electoral campaigns seem to give people who spread fake news something to sink their teeth into. False information has risen dramatically in the lead-up to the Ivorian presidential elections. Some people love the idea of manipulating information online.

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Originally published on Global Voices

KMT lawmaker Hung Mong-kai's billboard against the recall campaign. The billboard says: “Support those who do solid work.” Screenshot from BBC News’ YouTube channel.

Taiwan’s move to oust pro-Beijing Kuomintang (KMT) lawmakers failed in the first round as all 24 targets survived the recall motions in public voting on July 26, 2025. Another round of recall elections involving seven KMT lawmakers will take place on August 23, 2025.

The results are disappointing for the thousands of campaign volunteers who spent months collecting signatures to push the recall motions forward in over 30 districts. The campaign was initially launched due to a political standoff between the administration led by William Lai Ching-Te of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan's top legislative body), which is dominated by a pro-Beijing coalition of KMT and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) members. Since Lai’s presidential inauguration in May 2024, the oppositional lawmakers have passed a bill to expand the power of the legislature and cut significant government expenses, including the military defense budget. Such acts were perceived as a betrayal of Taiwan's national interest amid China’s escalating military threats and Chinese President Xi Jinping's goal of “restoring One China” by annexing Taiwan.

Taiwan has been a de facto independent state since 1949, after the KMT of the Republic of China (ROC) was defeated by the Communist Party of China (CPC or CCP) in the Chinese Civil War and established the exiled government on the outlying island. China claims sovereignty over Taiwan under the One China Principle, which the KMT accepts in the 1992 Consensus.

Although the result of the recall campaign cannot be generalized as the ruling DPP losing its popular support, as the polls only took place across 24 pan-blue constituencies where the KMT has strong grassroots support, the relatively weak turnout of opposition voters, however, marks the failure of the campaign in mobilizing DPP supporters and swing voters.

The result came as a surprise to many onlookers, as the organizers had seemingly mobilized large amounts of support throughout Taiwan. Many have attempted to explain the shocking result on social media in the past few days.

Strategic failure

Social media influencer Lai Cheng-Wai, who successfully predicted the result of the recall campaign, pointed out that the recall mechanism is a bottom-up process for residents of a constituency to revoke their representatives when the lawmakers betray local interests. Although citizens initiate the mass recall campaign, its political agenda is unappealing to conservatives and apolitical people, who are more concerned about the economy and their livelihood. 

Clarence Wu, a political news commentator, also highlighted the recall campaign’s strategic failure. Since it only takes six seats for the DPP to become a majority party in the parliament, instead of a mass recall targeting more than 30 KMT lawmakers, Wu argued that the campaign should have spent the resources to bring down the least popular lawmakers. Moreover, while the citizen-initiated campaign had successfully collected enough signatures to pass the recall motions, when entering the final voting stage, it took an election-campaign machine to mobilize voters, and the DDP failed to take up such a role. 

Even within the DPP, many criticized the ruling party’s leadership. Lin Cho-shui, a longtime DPP member, slammed the party in a Facebook post addressing the campaign volunteers:

民進黨因為傲慢、背離民主初衷、私心，以致於不只連側翼都沒有當好，而且不斷因爲令社會側目的言行而削弱了你們創造出來的動能。

The DPP has become arrogant, strayed from the original spirit of democracy, and acted out of self-interest, to the point where it has not only failed to perform a supporting role, but has also continuously weakened the campaign momentum you created through its actions and statements that have drawn public scrutiny.

DPP’s Secretary General Lin Yu-chang submitted his resignation in response to the criticism. However, most critics pointed their fingers at Ker Chien-ming, DPP's chief commissioner in the Legislative Yuan, who had actively coordinated with the citizen campaign in mobilizing his party's supporters. During the recall campaign, his antagonizing statements, such as labelling those who refuse to vote for the recall as “non-Taiwanese,” triggered backlash, divided supporters, and cast doubt among swing voters. 

Claire Wang, chairwoman of the New Power Party, urged Ker’s resignation and a shift in the ruling party's political strategy to resolve the conflict between the Legislature and William Lai’s administration. 

Antagonistic political rhetoric

In addition to political tactics, many also criticized the extreme political rhetoric spread online amid the recall campaign.

At the initial stage of the campaign, its objective was primarily to restore order in the Legislative Yuan and protect the democratic institution. However, by the end, the messaging had become more inflammatory, with slogans such as “resisting China to protect Taiwan” (抗中保台).

The anti-China slogan was used as a weapon for fear and hatred rather than hope, as pointed out by Clarence Wu, resulting in a widely spread antagonistic sentiment that divided Taiwanese society, as described in a viral post written by a video game developer on Facebook: 

大家回想一下過去一年，氣氛是多麼恐怖，那些極端支持者整天貼人標籤──「不反共就是舔共、你不分藍綠就是賣台」「不關心政治就是不愛台灣」[⋯⋯]「講交通、講民生，那肯定是中共同路人」「去中國旅遊？100%大外宣」

這些人跟小粉紅有什麼差別？整天寫嘲諷文，嘴同樣生活在這塊土地上的人，努力把淺綠、中間選民推走.

Let us reflect on how intimidating the atmosphere was in the past year, with those extreme supporters constantly shaming others. ‘If you don't oppose the Chinese Communist Party, you're a CCP flatterer. If you don't see the line between the Blue and Green camps, you're a traitor.’ ‘If you don't care about politics, you don't love Taiwan.’ […] ‘If you talk about transportation or livelihood issues, you're definitely a collaborator with the Communist Party.’ ‘Traveling to China? You’re definitely a pro-China influencer.’

What’s the difference between these people and the Little Pinks [mainland Chinese online nationalists]. They spend all day writing political satire, mocking and insulting those who live on the same land, [as a result] pushing away the light green and political moderates.

Worse still, like Ker Chien-ming, President William Lai has somehow fueled such antagonism in his political speeches. In one speech near the end of June, he stressed that Taiwan should “eliminate the impurities” through elections and recalls.

The DDP leaders’ rhetoric flamed the pro-China conspiracy theory coined “Green Terror,” which claims that the recall campaign was a means to consolidate the ruling party's power and suppress political dissent. 

A political moderate, Susan Yeh, hence, argued that the most important lesson from the failure of the recall campaign is to caution Taiwan against politics of fear and hatred. The blogger urged political action based on mutual understanding:

反對罷免的人不一定是護航者，而是另一種制度焦慮者。他們在意的，不是那幾個立委的面子，而是「罷免制度是否變成鬥爭工具」的可能性。他們不想失控，他們害怕我們會變成互相獵巫的社會。這不是敵人，而是我們應該認真傾聽、對話的對象。[⋯⋯]

我們要的不是嘴贏，而是真正把人找回來。找到那些還相信制度的人、那些希望台灣更好的中間力量⋯⋯

Those who oppose recall are not necessarily [the KMT] defenders, but rather another group of people anxious about the system. What concerns them is not the reputation of a few legislators, but the possibility that the recall mechanism could become a tool for political struggle. They do not want things to spiral out of control; they are fearful of [Taiwan] being turned into a witch-hunting society. These are not enemies, but people we should listen to and engage in dialogue with. […]

What we want is not just a rhetorical victory, but to truly bring people back. We need to find those who still believe in the system, those middle-of-the-road forces who want a better Taiwan…

When it became clear the recall campaign failed, William Lai attempted to amend the social divide by urging Taiwanese to respect the result and remain faithful to the democratic system: 

選舉和罷免都會有結果，但台灣的民主，只會因為一次次的公民參與，而更加堅韌。

Elections and recalls will always have results, but Taiwan's democracy will only become more resilient with each successive act of civic participation. 

Yet, damage has been done. There are more angry and sarcastic remarks under the President’s statement. Lai made a public apology on behalf of the DPP on July 30.

But for organizers, some hope remains. Although the recall campaign cannot help the ruling DPP gain majority seats in the Legislature, a new group of activists consisting of women, freelancers, and retirees has emerged. They are the ones engaging in grassroots activism who collected more than a million signatures to pass the recall motions.

As the conflict between Lai’s administration and the KMT-dominated parliament is expected to persist until the next General Election in 2028, the recall campaign volunteers who have stepped out of their comfort zone driven by their love of Taiwan will likely be the key actors in finding the political moderates and silent majority and fixing the political social divide.

Originally published on Global Voices

Feature image created using Canva Pro elements.

The latest conviction of Istanbul’s mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu, marks a critical escalation in Turkey's ongoing erosion of judicial independence and democratic norms. As one of the most prominent opposition figures in the country, İmamoğlu’s legal troubles highlight what rights groups call a pattern of political persecution ahead of the 2028 general elections.

On January 20, an investigation was launched against İmamoğlu for allegedly “threatening” Istanbul's Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek and his family. The charges relate to a comment İmamoğlu made during a panel on law and politicization of the judiciary in Turkey.

In a sweeping crackdown framed around alleged corruption and terror links on March 19 — just as İmamoğlu was poised to be nominated as the CHP’s presidential candidate for the 2028 elections — he was detained and then arrested. Since then, a systematic campaign of arrests and investigations targeting the CHP and other civic actors has continued unabated, putting both Turkey's democratic path and its rule of law under the spotlight.

On July 16, the court convicted İmamoğlu of insulting and threatening Gürlek, but acquitted him of the charge of publicly identifying him with the intent of making him a target. The popular mayor was sentenced to a year and seven months in prison. Having denied the charges, İmamoğlu is expected to appeal the verdict.

Gürlek has presided over high profile political trials including that of Selahattin Demirtaş, the former co-chair of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP); Sırrı Süreyya Önder, the now-deceased HDP deputy; and Canan Kaftancıoğlu, the İstanbul chair of the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) who was sentenced to nine years and eight months in prison over her social media posts.

The prosecutor also issued an order to confiscate the properties of journalist Can Dündar, whom he declared a “fugitive,” and sentenced Sebnem Korur-Fincancı, the head of the Turkish Medical Association, to two years and six months in prison on charges of alleged “terrorist organization propaganda.”

On July 21, the CHP filed a complaint with the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK) against Gürlek and two other prosecutors involved in the investigation into the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İBB), suggesting that some of the presiding judge's past rulings were political and not in keeping with the transparency of the judicial process. In its statement, the CHP emphasized that the investigations into the charges leveled against İmamoğlu and other party members have become systematic in nature, violating not only individual rights and freedoms but also the core principles of a democratic state governed by the rule of law.

As of July 21, at least 16 mayors representing the CHP have been suspended from office due to alleged corruption charges.  According to reporting by Bianet, the charges include “establishing a criminal organization,” “bribery,” “extortion,” and “bid rigging.” The charges mirror those used during the March crackdown that targeted the opposition in general, and the mayor of Istanbul in particular. Dozens of municipality staff have also been arrested or detained, most recently on July 18 and 21. Among the allegations leveled against them are bribery and manipulation of public tenders.

Meanwhile, the CHP faces a mutlak butlan (absolute nullity) lawsuit initiated by a party member reportedly aligned with its former chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who was replaced by Özgür Özel at the party's 38th Ordinary Congress in November 2023. The lawsuit alleges procedural violations and potential vote-buying during the congress, raising questions about the legitimacy of Özel's leadership.

Özel's legal team argues the case should be dismissed, citing the expiration of the filing deadline and the fact that party conventions fall under electoral board jurisdiction, not civil courts. Should the courts rule the 2023 congress legally void, it could trigger a leadership crisis, potentially paving the way for Kılıçdaroğlu's return. Such a ruling would also nullify all decisions taken by the party's current leadership since the congress.

On June 19, all 81 provincial chairpersons of the CHP met in Ankara, and issued a joint statement refusing to recognize any such court order. Supporters of Özel view the lawsuit as an act of political revenge aimed at regaining control of the party and ultimately purging internal rivals such as İmamoğlu. Under Kılıçdaroğlu's 13-year of leadership, the party lost every nationwide election, including the 2023 general election.

İmamoğlu’s sentencing, coupled with a broader crackdown on opposition mayors and civil society, reflects an alarming trend in Turkey’s democratic backsliding. As the country moves toward the 2028 elections, the judiciary appears increasingly instrumentalized, not just sidelining political rivals but also weakening the guardrails of accountability and dissent. Whether the opposition can regroup amid legal turmoil and internal fractures remains to be seen — but the stakes for Turkey’s democratic future could not be higher.

Originally published on Global Voices

The Cameroonian flag with “likes” signifying social media engagement next to it. Image from Canva.

In 2025, the internet is more than just a business tool. In Africa, young people are also using it to amplify their voices and get involved in politics. Such is the case in Cameroon.

Access to the internet in Cameroon has increased over time due to technological advancements in the country. According to DataReportal, the country had 12.4 million internet users as of January 2025 — making the internet penetration rate about 41.9 percent. This is an 18 percent improvement since 2015. High costs remain a significant barrier, as most data bundles are expensive and have short validity periods.

Some young Cameroonians are using the internet to inform others on the need to participate in the electoral process, as the country prepares to vote for its next president on October 12, 2025:

2025 Presidential election :
a decree of the President of the Republic has convened the electors to the polls for the upcoming presidential election#ÉlectionPrésidentielle#ElectionsCameroon#Elecam #Cameroun #election #Elections #Cameroon pic.twitter.com/u9U2JRQKSi

— ELECAM Elections Cameroon (@elecamofficiel) July 11, 2025

With less than three months to the 2025 Presidential election in Cameroon, citizens are eagerly preparing to vote, especially as a list of 14 eligible candidates vying to lead the nation for the next seven years has already been made public, as indicated by Elections Cameroun (ELECAM), the institution in charge of organizing the country's elections.

Présidentielle2025 : #2025PresidentialElection#Présidentielle2025#ElectionsCameroon#Elecam #Cameroun #Elections #Cameroon pic.twitter.com/6ERtRjE1tb

— ELECAM Elections Cameroon (@elecamofficiel) July 18, 2025

Young people are captivated by their screens, actively engaging with the latest social media campaigns. Photo from Sandra Tuombouh. Used with permission.

Among these citizens are young people who are utilizing social networks such as Facebook, Twitter (X), TikTok, LinkedIn, and Instagram to inform and educate their audiences about the importance of obtaining a voter card and participating in the electoral process. Through videos and written content, these young individuals are urging all eligible voters to be the change they wish to see, especially with 92-year-old Paul Biya, who has ruled for the past four decades, announcing his intention to run for an eighth term.

It is nearly impossible to scroll through these social media platforms without encountering the hashtag “#2025PresidentialElection.” This massive online mobilization has resulted in 373,588 new voters being registered between January and June of this year, as indicated on this X account:

ELECAM says over 8.2 million Cameroonians have registered on the electoral roll ahead of the 2025 presidential election in October. According to Dr. Enow Abrams Egbe, Chairperson of the Electoral Board, 373,588 new voters were enrolled between January 2 and June 26, 2025.
What… pic.twitter.com/2VBO1bJQDY

— Mimi Mefo Info (@MimiMefoInfo) June 30, 2025

During the last presidential election in 2018, over 6,667,700 Cameroonians were registered to vote according to the electoral body, ELECAM. In total, 8.2 million out of 27 million Cameroonians are eligible voters for the upcoming presidential election.

In Cameroon, various election-related initiatives are taking place online to enhance civic engagement and transparency. These initiatives include the use of social media platforms for voter education campaigns, where both individuals and organizations share information about the electoral process, candidate profiles, and voting rights. These initiatives through online platforms facilitate voter registration while promoting an informed electorate, ultimately contributing to a more democratic process.

One such young Cameroonian, Hanson Miysh, a youth and Civic engagement advocate, provides timely updates on his Facebook page, calling on his peers to join the movement. His online efforts have encouraged approximately 500 youths to register. Similarly, a civil society organization, the Network for Solidarity Empowerment and Transformation for All (NEWSETA), is gaining traction online with their “Vote First Campaign.”

Now in its 12th week, this initiative has proven effective, boasting thousands of views and engagements across Instagram, Facebook, and LinkedIn. Their goal is to foster an informed society and increase voter turnout. Derick Ndzi, Executive Director of NEWSETA, emphasizes:

Information shapes the choices and actions we take. If you are not informed, you cannot participate in decision making. So, the more informed you are, the more meaningful your contributions will be.

Their animated videos and flyers feature a character named “Ballot Buddy,” a fictional Lion that educates the public on the electoral process. It addresses crucial questions related to pre-electoral and post-electoral processes in English, French, and Fulfulde, a West African language, to suit a diverse audience. They say their outreach extends beyond the internet, as they employ individuals to ensure that information reaches as many people as possible across all ten regions of Cameroon.

While many view this online mobilization as a positive initiative to increase voter turnout, others remain skeptical about its effectiveness. One observer told Global Voices:

Many youths are indifferent. They will just scroll past the posts.

Another youth said:

Given the dominance of the ruling party, the Cameroon People's Democratic Union (CPDM), I cannot envision anyone else winning.

Despite differing opinions, many agree that without action, nothing will ever change. And now, it is time for young people to decide who their next leader will be.

Originally published on Global Voices

Visual depicting the junta-sponsored peace forum and planned election amid continuing airstrikes and escalating resistance in Myanmar. Source: The Irrawaddy, content partner of Global Voices.

This article by Myo Pyae was originally published on July 7, 2025, on The Irrawaddy, an independent news website in Myanmar that has been exiled in Thailand since the military coup in 2021. An edited version is republished on Global Voices as part of a content-sharing agreement.

While Myanmar’s military regime busies itself with hosting peace talks and preparations for elections slated for the end of this year, many across the country remain deeply distrustful, believing that neither genuine peace nor a free and fair election is possible under the junta’s rule.

The junta’s latest “Peace Forum” concluded in Naypyitaw on June 27. The three-day event was attended by political parties that have registered for the junta’s poll; selected ethnic representatives; invited diplomats and international guests from countries including China, India, Thailand, and Russia; army officers; and representatives of local and international NGOs.

Notably absent were representatives of the resistance forces and ethnic armed organizations that have been fighting the regime. Behind closed doors, junta officials and attendees discussed peace, federalism, and challenges around the regime’s planned election.

“The junta says they are going to bring peace. But is it okay to leave out ethnic [armed groups fighting the junta]? I don’t think so,” said an internally displaced person (IDP) in her 40s from Karen State.

She believed genuine peace was a long way off, given the continued armed conflict and the tensions on both sides. She had to flee her home due to fighting that erupted after the 2021 coup, and is now living in an IDP camp in the border town of Myawaddy, Karen State.

Myanmar's Peace Forum 2025 pic.twitter.com/tzvzlmMJ8w

— The Irrawaddy (Eng) (@IrrawaddyNews) July 3, 2025

Even as the peace forum was taking place, the regime continued military offensives and airstrikes across the country, particularly targeting towns controlled by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), including the ruby hub of Mogoke, as well as Kyaukme and Nawnghkio in northern Shan State. It also attacked areas controlled by other resistance groups.

While hosting the peace forum, the junta accelerated its preparations for the election that it has announced will be held in December 2025 or January 2026. Its preparations have included amending the Union Election Commission Law to allow government staff to chair all election bodies.

“The people don’t accept their election,” said a former teacher from Sagaing Region who left his job to join the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) following the 2021 military coup.

He said he believed the election organized by the junta would be fraudulent and likely limited to selected cities under the regime’s control.

The military regime now controls only 107 of Myanmar’s 330 townships — just 32 percent — according to a report by the civilian National Unity Government (NUG).

The junta’s election body, however, said voting will be held in 267 townships, assuming security can be guaranteed.

The CDM teacher expected that the junta’s proxy party would win the election, allowing it to form a purportedly “legitimate” government and prolong its rule.

Of the 77 parties registered with the junta’s election body, 54 have been approved to contest the poll. The military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party and eight others will contest nationwide, with the remaining 45 others taking part in local elections.

The country’s most popular party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), was dissolved by the junta, and its leaders, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, have been jailed. The election has been condemned as a sham by UN Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews, Western governments, the NUG, and pro-democracy parties. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) told the junta that an election should not be its priority amid the ongoing civil war.

“It could be the last option for the junta… No matter what, the result can’t be trusted,” said a young man who fled to Thailand to dodge the junta’s mandatory military conscription.

He said he suspected that if he boycotts the vote, the junta will count his vote fraudulently. Therefore, he said if he gets the chance to vote in Thailand, he will mark his ballot with an X in protest.

A factory worker from Yangon said that since the election will not be free or fair, she would not vote.

She added that the junta, which staged the 2021 coup and has subsequently waged a brutal crackdown on its own people, could not be trusted to facilitate a peace process.

“If we want peace, we need to fight for it. Peace will not be brought by the junta,” she added.

According to a June 27 report from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Myanmar, an estimated 3.5 million people remain internally displaced across the country due to armed conflicts.

As of July 4, since the 2021 coup, at least 6,863 people who opposed the junta have been killed and 29,367 detained, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.

The military regime is also working on a special law to shield the planned election from possible disruptions.

The aim of the law is to suppress people with different perspectives, people who don’t want to vote, and those who oppose the junta’s election, a civilian former election observer said.

Even as the junta prepares for an uncertain election, people from most parts of the country, including Sagaing, Magwe, and Tanintharyi, oppose the vote, calling it a sham.

“I can’t go back home until there is peace,” the displaced woman in Karen State said.