Originally published on Global Voices

The Mekong river stretches across six countries: China, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Image from Flickr. CC BY 4.0

This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Find more stories here.

Around 10,000 people dressed in white polo shirts gathered near the Mekong River in Prek Takeo Village in Cambodia’s Kandal province on August 5, 2024. A huge stage with yellow and blue decorations floated above the water, with colorful balloons and Cambodia’s flag swaying here and there. At 9:09 am, the sound of bells, gongs, and drums echoed across Cambodia as Prime Minister Hun Manet took the stage and pressed a symbolic button.  

It was the groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of a new mega project called the Funan Techo Canal, which was attended by many high-profile guests from across the world. 

Cambodians were required to celebrate the groundbreaking ceremony with a one-day national holiday. The ceremony was broadcast by every state and private television station in the country and covered by journalists from national and international media alike.  

“The Funan Techo Canal will link the capital Phnom Penh to the deep water port in Preah Sihanouk province… facilitating the country’s trade exchange with the world,” said Hun Manet in his speech at the groundbreaking event.

The canal will span 180 kilometers, starting from the Mekong River’s Preak Takeo tributary in Kandal province, passing through Takeo and Kampot provinces to the coast in Kep province. It will connect Phnom Penh to the Gulf of Thailand and is projected to enhance Cambodia’s industrial, agricultural, logistics, and real estate sectors by directly connecting with international trade routes. 

But after the grand inauguration, the construction of the canal was halted for several months, reportedly due to “funding issues” with China. The Cambodian government denied the allegation, slamming the media reports as “misinformation.”

In April 2025, a deal was made between Cambodia and China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), the parent company of China Road and Bridge Corporation. Structured under a 51–49 ownership model of the Public Partnership Contract agreement, the budget was revised from an estimated USD 1.7 billion to USD 1.16 billion. 

During his remarks, Wang Tongzhou, Chairman of CCCC, emphasized that the Kingdom is an important strategic market in Southeast Asia.  

“More importantly, it marks a significant milestone in deepening cooperation between the two nations,” he said, as quoted by Khmer Times.

Expected to finish in 2028, this project is not without its controversies. Aimed at boosting Cambodia’s economy, there have been some environmental and human rights concerns related to the project, especially for the Mekong Delta, a vital part of people’s livelihoods in other neighboring Southeast Asian countries. 

The Funan Techo Canal route. Image via Wikimedia Commons. License CC BY-SA 3.0.

What is the Funan Techo Canal? 

Initially announced in 2021, the Funan Techo Canal is a major waterway infrastructure that would be 100 meters wide, 5,4 meters deep, and designed to accommodate vessels of up to 3,000 deadweight tons. Once completed, it will strengthen Cambodia’s position as a regional logistics hub and reduce its dependence on Vietnamese ports for trade access. 

This project reflects the country’s aspiration to become a major logistics hub in Southeast Asia. It is expected to reduce shipping costs by 70 percent and is projected to earn USD 88 million annually from transportation by 2050. The canal will be a shortcut to international trade that will stimulate more foreign investment and create jobs.  

The Cambodian government claimed that 1.6 million people living on both sides of the waterways will benefit from the project. Hailed as a “revolutionary engineering achievement,” this canal is expected to boost the agricultural sectors and enhance flood mitigation and water conservation efforts, especially in the dry season, according to Mey Kaylan, a senior adviser to the Supreme National Economic Council of Cambodia.

“It will open up a new horizon for the development of Cambodia,” said Mey to China Daily. 

During the inauguration ceremony, Hun Manet stated that the canal will be built “no matter what the cost” as it brought “national prestige” to the Cambodian people. Yen Samnang, a research fellow at the Phnom Penh-based Asian Vision Institute think tank, shared optimism that this canal will enhance regional connectivity and economic integration. 

 “The project is truly in line with Cambodia’s values of sustainability, innovation, and global cooperation,” he told the Khmer Times.   

Environmental and human rights concerns

While the Cambodian government has insisted the canal is environmentally sustainable, environmentalists are concerned about the future of the Mekong waterway. 

The Mekong River is a vital resource for millions who live on the banks of the river, from China to Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. It is the world’s largest inland fishery, sustaining at least 40 million people and generating over USD 11 billion annually, according to the World Wildlife Fund. Mekong is also the world’s third most biodiverse river, with at least 1,148 fish species, and an important food zone for the world. 

Vietnam has raised concerns that the Funan Techo Canal would disrupt the ecosystem balance, especially in the Mekong Delta in southern Vietnam. The canal’s high embankments will prevent silt-laden floodwater from flowing downstream to Vietnam, which could cause drought in Vietnam’s agricultural “rice bowl” and Cambodia’s floodplains, according to Brian Eyler, director of the Washington-based Stimson Center’s Southeast Asia Program.  

For Vietnam, this could undermine its agricultural sector, which accounts for 12 percent of its economy. In 2024, Vietnam exported over 9 million tons of rice, generating a value of USD 5.7 billion. This number accounted for 15 percent of global exports, raising global food security concerns, SCMP reported. 

Vietnam accounted for 15 percent of global rice exports. Image from Wikimedia Commons. License CC BY-SA 3.0 

Furthermore, Le Phat Quoi, head of Vietnam’s Institute for Environment and Natural Resources, told Mongabay that digging the canal will disrupt the region’s Holocene soil, “a potential acid sulfate soil” which will oxidize into “actual acid sulfate soil,” producing sulfuric acid. This process could corrode canal infrastructure and release dangerous concentrations of heavy metals into the floodplain, threatening both agriculture and aquatic ecosystems. 

However, Cambodian President Hun Sen debunked these concerns via a post on X, arguing that “this canal has no impact on the flow of the Mekong River, as it does not connect directly to the Mekong but rather to the Bassac River.” 

Locals would also be threatened by the construction of the canal, as many who live along the banks may lose their homes. Dim Mech, a businessman living along the planned canal route since before 2000, told CamboJA News that he has yet to receive any official notice regarding compensation or relocation, even though local authorities have already documented his land, home, and crops.

“I’m afraid to leave. I’ve worked so hard to build this life. If I lose it, I won’t survive,” he said to CamboJA News.   

Strengthening China-Cambodia relations

This canal has also raised questions about the future of Cambodia’s geopolitics. The Chinese ambassador to Cambodia, Wang Wenbin, said this project marks a “new stage” in China-Cambodia cooperation. 

Analysts believe that the Funan Techo Canal could help China to expand its economic and geopolitical influence in Cambodia and in the wider region, but China’s rising dominance would concern the US and Vietnam. 

“Regarding the controversy [with Cambodia] over the canal, environmental protection or other arguments are not substantial reasons,” Zhou Chao, a researcher at Anbound Consulting’s Beijing Research Center, told the South China Morning Post. “Fundamentally, it is the wariness and resistance of the US and Vietnam towards the continuous rise of China’s influence.”

Politically, China has invested heavily in Cambodia to expand its soft power and diplomatic influence. For Cambodia, China is the largest source of its foreign investment, providing an important boost to its infrastructure development and economic growth. While the canal project might increase the risk of government debt, in the short term, it helps to address Cambodia’s unemployment crisis, could boost its economic growth, and expand exports to China. By aligning with China economically, Cambodia also gains geopolitical protection in the region. 

Nguyen Tan Dung, former Prime Minister of Vietnam, and Hun Sen, the President of the Cambodian State. Image from Wikimedia Commons. License CC BY-SA 3.0.

However, this project could have a negative impact on the Cambodia-Vietnam relationship as it will reduce around 10 percent of international trade to and from Cambodia via Vietnamese ports. This could divert substantial trade from Vietnam to the Gulf of Thailand, strengthening China’s economic leverage over Vietnam. China and Vietnam have a fraught history and ongoing territorial disputes.  

While critics believe the canal represents a risk of Cambodia’s overreliance on China, Chinese media commentator Yuan Ye argued that, on the contrary, the Funan Techo Canal is an attempt for Cambodia to even the balance of power in the region. 

Yuan said to Guancha, a Chinese nationalistic media outlet:

与越南不同，柬埔寨并不把中国视为直接的安全威胁，相反，借助中国力量以制衡越南，是柬埔寨历史上的惯常策略。

Unlike Vietnam, Cambodia does not view China as a direct security threat. On the contrary, relying on China’s power to balance Vietnam has been a common strategy in Cambodia's history.

Originally published on Global Voices

Nepal‘s 8.5 MW Butwal Solar PV Project in Rupandehi with Mount Everest in the background. The project came into operation in 2020. Photo from Wikimedia Commons. License CC BY 4.0.

This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Find more stories here.

For the first time, renewables have overtaken coal’s share of the global electricity mix, led by the growth in solar and wind power. According to a report released by energy think tank EMBER in October 2025, solar alone contributed 83 percent of the rise, while fossil fuels saw a slight decline, with generation falling in China and India. 

Nepal has a solar power potential of 432 gigawatts (432,000 megawatts), over ten times higher than that of hydropower, which is 42,000 MW. With over 300 days of sunshine a year, the country could produce 3.6 to 6.2 units of electricity per square meter based on its solar radiation levels.

Such potential, combined with decreasing installation costs (thanks to heavy Chinese investments into solar panels, among other renewables), means a viable and affordable solution to Nepal’s often unreliable energy supply led by hydropower. However, restrictive domestic energy policies and tense geopolitics in the region mean Nepal is failing to harness its tremendous solar energy potential.

500 kW solar system at the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority, in Tangal, Nepal. Image from Wikimedia Commons. License CC BY-SA 4.0.

As one of the biggest hydropower powerhouses in the world, Nepal has long relied on run-of-river projects to power its electricity grid. However, as the climate crisis increases risk in the Himalayas, hydropower is becoming increasingly unstable, largely due to threats such as glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs). 

Is solar the solution?

All of these growing risks and limitations to hydropower should have jump-started investments into solar power generation in Nepal, especially given its exceptional potential. However, that is not the case.  

For one thing, when it comes to Nepal’s energy mix, the government caps solar power at just 10 percent. There is no official explanation, but it is likely due to perceptions that solar technology can’t supply a consistent energy stream, given that there is no generation at night and that Nepal has morning and evening peak loads.

This could be solved by introducing storage technology such as pump solar hydro or even battery storage, but then there is an issue of tariffs, which are much lower for solar at NPR 5 (USD 0.035) per energy unit. This is followed by competitive bidding, where companies are encouraged to lower it even further.

Meanwhile, there is no bidding process for hydropower. The licenses operate on a first-come, first-served basis. There is a fixed rate regardless of the location, which is also higher at NPR 6.5 (USD 0.046) per energy unit. Hydropower is supply-driven, while solar is demand-driven. Under such a discouraging scenario, solar power accounts for only 5 percent of Nepal’s total energy mix, even as the ceiling is 10 percent.

Energy expert Kushal Gurung told Global Voices: “Given the environmental risks to hydropower, investors are now demanding tariffs on hydropower to be increased. So the question to the government is, are you paying more money for hydropower or willing to buy more of the cheaper solar power?”

Farmers in Nepal irrigate their fields using solar water pumps. Photo from Gham Power. Used with permission.

At the same time, entrepreneurs have been asking officials to raise the cap on solar power to 30 percent and expand zoning policies so that solar plants can be built in areas with high potential, such as Dolpo and Mustang in the Tibetan plateau, which are near empty as they are uncultivable but also have some of the highest solar radiation levels.

Perhaps solar power’s biggest advantage is its cost-effectiveness compared to hydropower. Estimates put the operating cost of a hydropower plant at about three to four times that of a solar plant for the same generation capacity. More importantly, investors are no longer assured of a return on investment on hydropower due to the climate crisis, especially as insurance premiums have increased considerably.

“Last year, when the government opened a bidding for 800 MW of solar power, there was bidding for a combined total of over 3,000 MW from the private sector, which is to say that both lenders and developers are convinced with solar technology, but the government, especially the bureaucracy, has to be on the same bandwidth too,” says Gurung, adding that he had spoken with the current Energy Minister Kulman Ghising about increasing the cap on solar, and he agreed, but when he tried to advocate for the bidding process to be removed, he was not too receptive.

Nepal has a solar power potential of 432 GW, over ten times higher than hydropower. Photo by Gham power. Used with permission.

Geopolitics in the mix

In 2018, Dolma Himalayan Climate Fund (DHCF) pitched a proposal to generate 150 MW of solar power and store 20 MW of it in battery systems in Mustang to meet Nepal’s seasonal and daily peaks.

They got approval from the Investment Board and had already invested millions into the project when the Mines Department under the Nepal Government instructed all developers in the region to halt their projects, citing the possibility of uranium mining in the region. But insiders say the real reason was due to pressure from the Chinese government who were unhappy with the plant being set up too close to the Tibetan border, due to security concerns.

Parts of Tibet were annexed by China in October 1951 and converted into the Tibet Autonomous Region under China’s rule. This land and the sovereignty of the Tibetan people are still contested, and the Independence movement continues to this day. Because of this, Beijing keeps a close watch over any possible Tibetan activism or dissident activities that challenge its control over the region and is sensitive to any perceived encroachments on its territory, particularly from Nepal, which is a key transit point for Tibetan refugees and a center for activism that challenges China's sovereignty and control over the region.

Another example of a clean energy project caught up in a geopolitical tangle was Nepal’s biggest solar electricity plant, which was to be developed by the Chinese company Risen Energy for USD 190 million. The Investment Board Nepal (IBN) was itself involved in negotiations with Risen’s subsidiary, Risen Energy Singapore JV, for the grid-connected photovoltaic generation system. The proposal was to install two 125 MW solar generation plants in Banke and Kapilvastu districts near the Indian border. The installations would each store 20 MW of daytime generation to be transmitted during the morning and evening peak hours. But the agreement was not signed because Indian authorities were concerned that the two solar array sites were close to the southern border.

Relations between India and China have been deteriorating in recent years, and Delhi has attempted to use its influence in South Asia to block Chinese development and cooperation in the region.

But not every Chinese-backed project has been blocked. In 2024, China handed over two solar-powered livelihood projects to a local community in Lalitpur, within Nepal’s Kathmandu Valley — a community solar bathhouse and a rooftop photovoltaic power system. Funded by the Yunnan People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and implemented by its commercial representative office in Nepal, the projects aim to improve daily living conditions amid frequent power cuts and water shortages. The initiative forms part of the Chinese embassy’s “Happy Community” program  (幸福社区, Xìngfú Shèqū) under the China–South Asia Poverty Reduction and Development Cooperation Center, and exemplifies China’s continued efforts to make inroads in the region and combat India’s influence.

“Hydropower is a geopolitical mess, but it has well and truly started in solar power too. It now all comes down to how we handle it, and we need deft diplomacy to make sure our projects are not indefinitely delayed as has happened in the past,” says Gurung. 

Solar panels next to a satellite dish in Pheriche in the Khumbu region below Mount Everest. Photo from Wikimedia Commons. License CC BY-SA 4.0.

Low-hanging fruit

While geopolitics and restrictive domestic policies limit Nepal’s solar power potential, there are still small-scale opportunities for solar energy entrepreneurs to cash in, such as net metering.

Most established industries in Nepal have enough rooftop space to generate 500 KW to 1 MW of solar energy, and combined, they would generate a substantial amount of energy. Moreover, these industries are often bankable and trusted by financial institutions. The same applies to commercial complexes such as supermarkets and chain stores spread all over Nepal.

On the other hand, China could also take advantage of Nepal’s high solar power potential. Given that the United States has only imposed a 10 percent tariff on Nepal, China could set up PV manufacturing plants in Nepal. However, this requires government-to-government talks, which are hindered by tensions between India and China.

The same applies for the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism which is a carbon tariff on carbon intensive products, such as steel, cement and some electricity, imported to the European Union. Chinese products have suffered under this mechanism but Chinese products made in Nepal can be competitive in the European market given lower carbon tax for the country. 

Clean energy has long been an area where Nepal hopes to attract Chinese investment — not only in hydropower, but also in solar and wind energy. However, due to geopolitical sensitivities, China has not yet established any large-scale solar power plants in Nepal. Instead, cooperation has so far been limited to a few small-scale aid projects.

Originally published on Global Voices

A man prays with a set of worn Bodhi beads in Nepal. Image CC BY-SA 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons

This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Find more stories here.

It had been a few years since Singha Bahadur Lama returned from a six-year stint in Malaysia, where he worked first in a kitchen and later as a building supervisor. Back home in Kanpur in Kavre, some 56 kilometers from Kathmandu, Nepal, Lama found himself between jobs for several years before a relative asked him to join his Buddha Chitta mala business. Buddha Chitta mala (also referred to as Bodhichitta mala) is a type of prayer bead necklace revered in Tibetan Buddhism.

The necklace beads come from the Buddha Chitta plant (Ziziphus budhensis), native to the Temal region of central Nepal. The seeds of this plant are used to make Buddha Chitta mala.

Singha Bahadur Lama is measuring the size of Buddhachitta beads. Image from Sonia Awale. Used with permission.

According to research conducted by the Forest Research and Training Center and published by the Ministry of Forest and Environment in Nepal, Buddha Chitta used to be traded for just NPR 2–5 in the early days. But the price increased when the Dalai Lama claimed that Buddha Chitta found in Nepal is of high quality.

“Twelve years ago, people from Temal gave Dalai Lama a Buddha Chitta mala when he was in Bodhgaya, they told him about its importance, and not long after that, Dalai Lama, while speaking in Taiwan, told his followers that Buddha Chitta has special powers, and that is how the demand including from the Chinese started,” claims Singha Bahadur Lama.

The seeds are classified by the number of faces and their size: One-faced beads are the rarest and most valuable, as are 7–8 mm beads. The smaller the beads, the higher the price they fetch. According to local middlemen, a 108-bead mala would easily cost NPR 1.5 million (over USD 10,630).

“We cannot say if our trees will give smaller beads or even how many faces or clear eyes, it’s all natural,” says Lama, who now works as a consultant,  advising people all over Nepal about planting the tree, and has since spread it across the country.

३-४ वर्ष आगाडी एक जना Chinese साथिले cover बनाएर ल्याएछ प्लास्टिकको ८म्म, ९म्म को, त्यो cover  राख्यो तर सबै झर्यो , fail  भयो। प्राकृतिक कुरा मा पनि मिल्छ र।

Three of four years ago, a Chinese middleman once made a 7 mm plastic cover for the seeds, hoping that it would lead to the tree to produce smaller beads, but it didn't work; the plant died.

Such is the demand for high-quality Buddha Chitta beads that a group of 20 men allegedly employed by a Chinese middleman cut down a tree in Rosi last year that supposedly earned NPR 30 million (USD 212,600) the year before. They stormed the village at 1 am and planted socket bombs on the owners’ door and courtyard. Four of the men were arrested but later released on hefty bail.

Singha Bahadur Lama measuring the size of Buddhachitta beads. Image from Sonia Awale. Used with permission.

Lama himself used to make NPR 10 million (USD 70,880) for each tree he sold. With this money, he built new houses and sent his daughter to Japan, all with Buddha Chitta income. But he says the market changes in unpredictable ways, unlike in the past when Chinese middlemen bought anything regardless of size or quality as long as they were Buddha Chitta. Lama recalls:

१० वर्ष अगाडी Chinaले सबै सामान उठाएको, बुद्धचित्ताको नाम भए पुग्ने, जस्तो खालको पनि, २०७२ सालमा नसोचेको भन्दा बढी पैसा आयो. त्यो हिसाबले २०७३मा मैले २०७२ सालको rateले मैले गाउँमा खरिद गरे तर Chinaका साथीले rate धेरै झरे त्यो साल। मैले एक कारोड लगानी गरेकोमा मात्र १७-१८ लाख मात्र उठेको थियो।

Exactly 10 years ago, we sold everything we had at very high prices, even the stock that had been collecting dust for years. And so, I invested nearly NPR 10 million the year later, planting and buying everything I could find, only to lose 70 percent of that money.

He adds:

६ वर्ष सम्म तेस्तै rangeमा लगिरहेहो थियो, २०७९ देखि फेरि रेट आउन थाल्यो, ब्यापारी बढ्न थाल्यो… आहिले भुटानीहरुले sound नआउने खोजिरहेका छन्।

That year onwards, there was demand for specific kinds of beads, they had to be smaller. The market for Buddha Chitta was down for the next 5–6 years before it started rising again three years ago. But now buyers are looking for beads that make no sound when you shake them.

A bodhi seed mala. Image from Wikimedia Commons. License CC BY-SA 4.0

Ecology of Budha Chitta

Now, almost every household in the Tamang community of Temal and nearby areas, including Kanpur, has planted Budha Chitta, and on average, they have 50 trees. The plant thrives in gravel and sandy soil and needs to be protected from excess water. The tree can grow between 8–10 meters high and starts bearing fruit in the third year and every year after maturity. One tree can fruit for up to 90 years, according to the Forest Research and Training Center.

The fruits are handpicked every June and July, and then have to be processed. The seeds’ hard outer coating is removed either using a Dhiki (a traditional mill) or by boiling, then the beads are washed and dried in the sun for a few days. Dev Lama, 55, also of Kanpur, shares:

उत्पादन तेमालमा भएको ६०-७० वर्ष भयो। First first मा अलिअलि चलेको थियो, आइलेको जति बोट पनि नहुने, अइले त घरै पिछे छ। २०७०-७१ साल तिर चै धेरै चलेको, Chinaमा चलेको १२-१३ वर्ष भयो।… मकैको ठाउँ मा पनि रोपछन्।

… यसको गुण भनेको एकचोटी रोपेपछि फेरि केहि गर्न नपर्ने, सजिलो। अब मकई भेने पछि हरेक वर्ष गर्न पर्यो। एक चोटी हुर्के पछि आली अलि सफा सुघर गर्यो, अलि अलि गोद मेल गर्यो, त्यति हो। पानी धेरै पर्यो, आसिन पर्यो भने damage हुन्छ भित्र। बिषालु औसधी छर्यो भने रोग लाग्छ, कालो दाग लाग्छ।

Our families have been growing Buddha Chitta for generations, at least 60–70 years, but it started becoming hugely profitable only about 10–12 years ago, so much so that it is also replacing traditional crops such as maize.

… What really helps is that Buddha Chitta is not a high-maintenance crop, just some weeding and watering, you have to protect it from hailstorms, and too many chemicals can cause harm. Once it grows up to become a tree, it doesn’t need much care, not even fertilizer. You don’t have to work on it every year like maize, which needs to be planted year after year.

Dev Lama of Kanpur near Temal in Kavre district, Nepal, showing his Buddhachitta trees. Image from Sonia Awale. Used with permission.

While larger plantations of Buddha Chitta favor monoculture, which can be harmful to the environment, for the most part, smallholder families are aware of the dangers of monoculture farming and cultivate it alongside other agricultural crops. They say intercropping is important for soil health and production. 

Dev Lama’s neighbor, Shova Shrestha, 33, adds: “We also continue to grow other plants like maize, chilis, legumes, beans, vegetables like cauliflower and cabbage, and spices, all of which help to keep soil nutrients high.”

Between middlemen

Generally, local farmers do not sell directly to Chinese traders; instead, they deal with local middlemen who take a modest (or sizeable) cut before they take it to Chinese traders. However, even middlemen fetch only a portion of the price that Chinese traders eventually get from customers in China.

And now with the proliferation of the plant, with nearly every family growing several trees, farmers sometimes struggle to find buyers and are often severely short-charged was the case with Maiya Tamang’s family who live in a village outside Temal.

 “I wasn’t home that day, but my sons later told me that my husband sold an entire tree for just NPR 1,500 [USD 10.60],” recalls Tamang of an incident two years ago. “We asked him why he undersold it, for a price that wouldn’t even get us a sack of rice. He said it was because they weren't selling it anyway, and at least we were getting some amount.” 

Maiya Tamang’s husband sold a Buddhachitta tree full of beads two years ago for just NPR 1,500. Image from Sonia Awale. Used with permission.

A few weeks later, another middleman came looking for Buddha Chitta trees and came across one of the Tamang families. The person asked them to save it for him, gave them NPR 55,000 (USD 388) on the spot, and came back to collect the beads once they were ripe to pluck a few months later. 

Tamang’s family was introduced to Buddha Chitta only six years ago by a relative who had given them some seeds to plant, but only four survived. Maiya’s sons tried to expand by planting more Buddha Chitta, but they cut down the trees in the subsequent years when they saw no immediate return. 

Indeed, while Maiya Tamang, 60, made some profit two years ago, last year there were no buyers because of a hailstorm that destroyed the fruits, but they managed to sell the seeds to families who also wanted to plant Buddha Chitta. Nevertheless, the bead business has augmented the family income, the rest of which is dependent on livestock and agriculture.   

“To be honest, we don’t yet know how to properly care for this plant. In the beginning, we used fertilizers and chemicals, hoping that would help. The plants died instead,” says Sonam Singh Tamang, a neighbor and a relative of Maile who had had a few Buddha Chitta trees in his backyard. “Last year, I bought a new kind of sapling that cost NPR 1,000 [USD 7] from a nursery that assured me it would give better quality beads, which would get me up to NPR 1 million [USD 7,070]. Two more years, let’s see if I’m lucky.”

Saplings for Buddha Chitta usually cost about NPR 500 but some nurseries charged NPR 1,000 or more for those that grow beads with faces or mukhi as higher the number of faces, more money they fetch.

When asked if they ever deal directly with the Chinese, local farmers here say they just don’t have the contact, and even if they did, the language barrier means they would still need a middleman.

“The middlemen aren’t allowed to directly contact the Chinese because then they will lose their profit. They tell us our beads aren’t good, they can only fetch NPR 15,000, even though it is worth 50,000 or more. We also don’t know how to speak with them, even if they did come here,” adds Sonam Singh.

Hikmat Bahadur Mainali in Kanpur agreed: “Chinese are barred from entering the village… I’m sure these beads fetch a much higher price in China than they do here.”

Hikmat Mainali next to saplings of Buddhachitta trees ready to be sold to farmers. Image from Sonia Awale. Used with permission.

Meanwhile, Singha Bahadur Lama who is a farmer himself but also works as a middleman and sells saplings, says having a new Chinese buyer in the market always helps, as that means more competition to get the beads.

“Otherwise, older Chinese buyers know the situation here and have a setting among themselves, and we do not make much profit,” he says. “Some of my fellow Nepalis have also tried selling it directly in China, but they told me they could fetch much more than they did in Nepal, and on top of that, they incurred lodging and fooding expenses in China.”

Originally published on Global Voices

Adlunfiqri Sigoro protests in front of Walshin Lihwa Corporation in Taiwan. Image courtesy of Adlunfiqri Segoro. Used with permission.

This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Find more stories here. 

Indonesian activist Adlunfiqri Sigoro, alongside community residents, workers, Indigenous people, and representatives from other Indonesian environmental organizations, protested in front of Walsin Lihwa Corporation’s (華新麗華股份有限公司) headquarters, a Taiwanese nickel-processing giant, on August 5.

They were protesting Walsin’s nickel mines in Indonesia, which community residents say harm the environment and threaten locals’ livelihoods, culture, and land. They called for improved labor conditions, transparency of sustainability reports, the establishment of human rights and environmental due diligence policies, phasing out coal, and an effective and proactive stakeholder engagement mechanism.  

Taiwanese news outlets covered their protest, highlighting the activists’ journey from Indonesia to Taiwan to protest against the environmental and human rights issues of Walsin Lihwa’s nickel factory. 

Walsin Lihwa Corporation has three companies that operate in the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park (IMIP) in Central Sulawesi and the Indonesia Weda Bay Industrial Park (IWIP) in North Maluku. Walsin produces nickel pig iron, a key component for electric vehicles, with a capacity that reaches 300,000 tons each year. Walsin sells its production to several Chinese companies, namely, Shanghai Decent Investment, Guangxi CNGR Energy Science and Technology, and Hunan Zoomwe Zhengyuan Advanced Material Trade.

After the protest in Taipei, Adlun and other Indonesian community representatives were invited to an in-person meeting with Walsin’s management. However, as stated in a press release by Indonesia’s Aski Ekologi and Emansipasi Rakyat (AEER) and Taiwan’s Environmental Rights Foundation (ERF), Walsin has failed to provide substantive responses or commitments to activists’ key demands.

Adlunfiqri Sigoro and other activists protesting in front of Walsin Lihwa Corporation in Taiwan. Image courtesy of Adlunfiqri Segoro. Used with permission.

According to Taiwan Public Television Service, Walsin said in a written statement that some of the information provided by the foundation did not match the facts. The company vows to continue to engage with the foundation, emphasizing that it complies with local regulations in Indonesia. The statement did not directly address specific questions from the public regarding workplace accident liability and pollution data.

A Taiwanese legislator and Indonesian workers of Walsin held a press conference later in the month, calling on Taipei to expedite the enactment of corporate human rights and environmental due diligence legislation. During the press conference, worker representatives revealed the harsh workplace conditions that employees face, according to a report by Taiwan’s Central News Agency. A factory accommodating 1,000 people has only one toilet with no water supply. The manufacturing process produces toxic air and coal dust, but workers are only provided ordinary masks without ample protection, and their rest area lacks an air circulation system.

In Indonesia, nickel mining and processing environmental and human rights concerns have been in the spotlight for several years after the government’s ambitious plan to expand industrialization. Known as home to the world’s largest nickel reserve, equivalent to 42 percent of the world’s nickel reserves, these resources are scattered mostly in Sulawesi and North Maluku, in the eastern part of Indonesia.

Save Sagea Coalition (source: Save Sagea Instagram)

However, this industrialization came with high environmental and human rights costs to the community, one of which is in Adlun’s hometown, Sagea, in North Weda, Central Halmahera, North Maluku. Sagea is one of the hotspots for nickel mining and industrialization in Indonesia.  

Ever since the early stage of nickel exploration, Adlun and his collective, Save Sagea, have taken to the streets countless times to fight for environmental justice for the local community affected by nickel mining and industrialization.  

Global Voices talked to Adlun about how his collective fought back against the nickel mining concession and the industrial plant in their village for the last decade. 

Save Sagea: Preserving the environment and ancestors’ sacred areas

In 2014, Adlun, alongside several other local youth, founded Save Sagea, a local collective that aims to protect the village from the extractive industry that could destroy their environment and biodiversity.  

Save Sagea was formed at the initial stage of nickel exploration by PT First Pacific Mining, a Hong Kong-based investment company. The company planned to build the mining concession above the Bokimoruru karst area, while the planned factory site is located between the Sageyan River and Lake Legaelol. This location is very close to residential areas. Adlun explains the importance of this location for the Sagean community:

Saya perlu menekankan bahwa tiga lokasi ini merupakan tempat-tempat keramat untuk masyarakat kami, merupakan destinasi wisata, dan juga  merupakan bagian dari ekosistem karst Halmahera yang membutuhkan perlindungan.

I need to stress that these three locations are sacred locations for our society, prominent tourist attractions, and also part of the karst ecosystem in Halmahera, which deserves protection.

Ecologically, the karst area serves as a water catchment and storage area. Economically, the karst tourism of Bokimoruru Cave and Legaelol Lake has benefited the communities of Sagea and Kiya Villages. If the location transforms into nickel mines, residents will lose food independence, such as farming, processing sago, and fishing. 

Adlun emphasized the importance of bringing the issue closer to the local communities to create a collective understanding of why they have to oppose the project. In Sagea, traditional and spiritual values are still substantial among locals.   

In this case, organizers localized the issue, emphasizing that the planned mine would destroy their sacred Legaelol lake and Bokimoruru cave — exalted locations where the villagers connect with their ancestors. Locals also conduct cultural rituals, such as pilgrimages, to these locations, and many say they couldn’t bear to have them desecrated by mining. Adlun said: 

Isu yang kami bawa adalah tentang menyelamatkan danau dan goa keramat yang sudah diturunkan turun temurun oleh leluhur kami di Sagea. Kami hanya melanjutkan pesan yang disampaikan oleh leluhur kami yang menitipkan tanah ini untuk dijaga kepada kami. 

The issue we are bringing is to save the sacred lake and cave, which have been preserved for generations by the Sagea residents. We are only passing on the message from our ancestors who asked us to protect and maintain this land well.

Residents opposed nickel mining operations in Sagea. Image courtesy of Adlunfiqri Segoro. Used with permission.

Aside from that, Adlun says that local youth from Sagea opposed the idea of opening nickel mining exploration because the company didn’t consult with or involve the local community in planning the exploration processes. The coalition also demanded that the company conduct a transparent environmental impact analysis, which the company failed to fulfill.  

Against this backdrop, the coalition launched several protests to oppose the establishment of the mining concession and the factory. After several demonstrations, Save Sagea’s representatives were invited to the Deputy Regent of Halmahera’s office to discuss the matter. The project currently remains unoperational. 

A Save Sagea flag during the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday celebration in Sagea. Image courtesy of Adlunfiqri Segoro. Used with permission.

Since then, Save Sagea has gained more public attention and publicity as it continues fighting to preserve its environment. 

There’s no exact strategy in campaigning for this, says Adlun. Social media and press publications are important; through their campaign on social media, they expanded their network and received much support overseas. But, protests on the street, lobbying, and community organizing are just as essential to strengthen the movement.

For example, during the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday celebration, a national holiday in Indonesia, residents held a traditional parade, and some of them brought a “Save Sagea” flag to raise awareness against nickel mining, which damages the environment. This is why local youth are a vital part of mobilizing and campaigning. 

Weda Bay Nickel Mining site in Halmahera Island. Image from Wikimedia Commons CC BY 2.0

However, Sagea is still facing a threat from nickel mining and industrialization. There are currently five mining licenses seeking to operate in the Sagea karst ecosystem. One of them is Weda Bay Mining, a joint venture between Tsingshan Holding Group Company Limited (青山控股集团有限公司), a leading stainless steel company based in China, Eramet, a mining and metallurgy company based in France, and PT Antam Tbk, an Indonesian state-owned company.  

Weda Bay Mining is part of the Indonesia Weda Bay Industrial Park (IWIP), which has started mining operations in the upstream area of ​​the Sagea River. Mining activities near the river have polluted the water and turned the river a brownish, muddy color. 

The Save Sagea coalition will continue pushing the government to designate Sagea’s karst ecosystem as a national geopark and request that mining permits of companies around the river be revoked.  Adlun says

Kami hanyalah zona yang dikorbankan untuk kepentingan ekstraktif kapitalis, tapi kami akan terus berjuang untuk menyelamatkan Sagea, tanah kami, dan juga lingkungan di sekitar kami.  

We are just zones sacrificed to capitalist extractive interests, but we will continue to fight to save Sagea, our land, and preserve our environment.

Originally published on Global Voices

A landfill in Uzbekistan. Screenshot from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s YouTube channel. Fair use.

This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Find more stories here.

In a significant step toward sustainable waste management, Uzbekistan launched construction of its first waste-to-energy (WTE) plant in cooperation with China International CAMCE in the eastern Andijan province on July 7, 2025. Upon its completion, the plant will generate 240 million kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity by burning 1,500 tons of waste daily. CAMCE will invest USD 140 million, bearing all the expenses. Operators will gain revenue through waste disposal fees and electricity sales.  

The construction of Uzbekistan’s second WTE plant started on July 18 in the central Samarkand province, in cooperation with the Chinese waste management group Shanghai SUS Environment. The plant will also burn 1,500 tons of waste daily and generate 240 million kWh of electricity. It will cost SUS Environment USD 150 million to build the plant.

Speaking at the inauguration event in Samarkand, the Director of the Waste Management Agency, Sharifbek Khasanov, noted that WTE projects:

… данные проекты служат целям охраны окружающей среды, сокращения объёмов размещения отходов на полигонах, использования возобновляемых источников энергии и обеспечения экологической устойчивости.

… serve the goals of environmental protection, reducing the volume of waste disposal in landfills, using renewable energy sources, and ensuring environmental sustainability.

On the surface, the project looks like a win-win all around. Uzbekistan gets new WTE plants to solve its mounting waste problem, reduce pollution, and generate additional electricity. At the same time, Chinese companies get to expand their businesses abroad amid overcapacity in the domestic market. However, behind this seemingly idyllic success story, there is a lack of transparency around the deals signed by the Uzbek government and Chinese investors and silence around the potential environmental and health hazards, which have not been acknowledged.    

Burning the problem away

The two aforementioned plants are just a start of the grandiose plans drawn up by China and Uzbekistan to transform the country’s waste management industry. The Uzbek government has inked deals with three Chinese companies to build at least seven WTE plants in six provinces and the capital, Tashkent, by 2027. CAMCE will build two more plants in Tashkent and Tashkent province, SUS Environment will build one more plant in Qashadaryo, and China Everbright International will build two plants in the Namangan and Fergana provinces. 

These projects have the highest political backing in Uzbekistan. In October 2024, when these and other WTE projects were presented to President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, he highlighted:

Это не просто заводы, а один из судьбоносных вопросов. От этой сферы зависят и пригодность наших земель и вод, и здоровье населения, и чистота воздуха, и стабильность энергетики.

These are not just factories; they're crucial issues. The suitability of our lands and waters, the health of the population, the cleanliness of the air, and the stability of energy depend on this area.

Clearly, the president is placing high hopes on these projects. It is also clear that the waste problem has become unmanageable and must be addressed. Uzbekistan produces 14 million tons of waste every year, but only 4 percent of it is recycled. For decades, waste in Uzbekistan was dumped in traditional open-air landfills — many of which are operated less than 750–900 meters away from human settlements. As a result, over 7 million tons of greenhouse gases and 43,000 tons of toxic leachates pollute the atmosphere, soil, and water every year, which harms local communities and creates adverse health impacts.   

Mark Fodor, Defenders in Development campaign coordinator at the Coalition for Human Rights in Development, who participated in a Bankwatch investigation into the effect of landfills on Uzbek communities, spoke about the atmosphere of censorship that prevents many in Uzbek society from speaking out about such issues.

“I was actually stunned at how reprisals manifest themselves in Uzbekistan. It was one thing to run into an individual here and there who had faced reprisals for speaking out. And it was a whole different thing to see the chilling effect that these same reprisals had on Uzbek society as a whole. To see how whole communities wouldn't dare
to speak out about landfills that were making their lives miserable.”

A trash truck in Uzbekistan. Officials hope building WTE plants will reduce the amount of waste being sent to landfills. Screenshot from EBRD’s YouTube channel. Fair use.

In an attempt to address this waste crisis, Uzbekistan set up the Agency for Waste Management and Circular Economy Development in September 2024. Its main bet thus far has been on incineration plants. In addition to the seven Chinese WTE plants, Uzbekistan plans to launch a large WTE plant with investments from the Emirati Tadweer Group and two other plants that will generate electricity from burning landfill gases, financed by Korean companies.  

Together, these ventures will burn more than 4.7 million tons of waste annually, which would have otherwise gone to landfills. They will generate 2.1 billion kWh of electricity worth USD 97 million. This will also save 152 million cubic meters of natural gas and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2.4 million tons. 

Transparency concerns

The most immediate concern regarding the WTEs is the transparency of the deals. Thus far, there is not much information about the conditions each side agreed to. The only detail that has been made public is that in exchange for building the WTE plants in Uzbekistan, the three Chinese companies received guarantees from the state to buy electricity from them for the next 30 years. The lack of transparency raises a myriad of concerns and questions. 

Why didn’t the government organize an open tender and select the most competitive offers transparently? What other concessions did the authorities make? And at what price will the government buy electricity from these WTE plants, market price or above? 

These questions haven’t emerged out of nowhere. Uzbekistan’s neighbor, Kyrgyzstan, has signed a contract with a Chinese company called Junxin to build a WTE plant in Kyrgyzstan’s capital, Bishkek. Investigations show that such deals can heavily favor Chinese investors. For example, in addition to buying electricity from Junxin, the Kyrgyz government will pay USD 17 for every ton of incinerated waste, amounting to USD 6.2 million annually. Moreover, Kyrgyzstan will not even bear ownership over the plant upon the expiration of the 30-year contract.  

Additionally, some human rights observers have raised concerns that officials have not implemented any mechanisms to receive public feedback, complaints, or input about this and other burgeoning infrastructure projects that could impact community health and comfort. This is a common problem in Uzbekistan, where the state’s tight control over civil society and strict censorship policies have somewhat frozen public discourse or criticism.

Another major concern is related to potential environmental and public health impacts. Despite the Uzbek government’s best efforts to convince the public of WTE plants’ positive contribution to the environment, there is evidence suggesting they can also cause harm. There have been numerous studies linking old and poorly maintained incinerators to neoplasia, birth defects, infant mortality, and miscarriages. Although modern WTEs provide better emission control, it is too early to declare them safe, since many illnesses take years to manifest.

Plastics make up a significant share of solid waste (more than 10 percent) in Uzbekistan. Incinerating plastic is reported to release dioxins, furans, microplastics, and other persistent and hazardous chemical emissions that can evade filters and re-enter ecosystems and food chains. WTE can cause chemical pollution and create public health problems. Thus, people in China have protested the polluting effects of WTE plants, which can release airborne particles and impact local water supplies.

This pushback prompted the Chinese government to impose strict regulations around WTE plants domestically, including requirements around pollution monitoring and publishing, emission caps, generous “protection zones” around plants, and harsh penalties for companies that fail to comply.

Overcapacity in China

For China, the reason behind the budding waste incineration cooperation with Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states is fairly simple: overcapacity.

Generally, in state-affiliated media and discourse, this is not addressed directly. Instead, the three companies involved in WTE projects in Uzbekistan largely frame their expansion into Central Asia in line with the aims of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s global connectivity, trade, and transportation project. An article in the Chinese state-affiliated Sina Finance explains how the projects dovetail with the state’s BRI expansion plans.

本次对外投资事项是公司深入践行共建‘一带一路’倡议…推动海外环保领域‘投建营’一体化项目落地落实的重要举措。

This overseas investment is an important measure for the company to deeply implement the Belt and Road Initiative and promote the implementation of integrated ‘investment, construction and operation’ projects in the overseas environmental protection field.

Within Chinese media, Uzbekistan is framed as an especially attractive option for Chinese WTE projects. This article in the state-affiliated outlet People’s Daily states:

乌兹别克斯坦拥有地理位置和人才优势，近年来政局稳定、经济平稳发展，政府又采取了一系列吸引外资的措施。

Uzbekistan boasts advantages in geographical location and talent, and has enjoyed political stability and steady economic development in recent years. The government has also taken a series of measures to attract foreign investment.

They term Uzbekistan as having an industrial spirit but also being “willing to learn from the experiences of other countries,” such as regarding China’s “advanced” expertise in WTE projects and the “maturity” of its domestic industries. 

Hanyang Guodingshan Waste to Energy Plant, Wuhan, China. Image from Wikimedia Commons. CC BY-SA 3.0

Hidden behind all this vague corporate jargon, which helps these companies appear as noble entities assisting in uplifting Uzbekistan, is the simple overcapacity issue the Chinese WTE industry faces at home. Over the last 20 years, the industry has developed so rapidly that it ran out of waste to burn, forcing WTE companies to seek expansion opportunities abroad. 

Data from China’s Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development shows that the number of waste incineration plants grew from 67 in 2005 to 1,010 in 2023. This, in turn, increased the proportion of solid waste subjected to incineration from 9.8 percent to 82.5 percent. WTE plants’ load rate in China currently stands at around 60 percent. In short, there is not enough solid waste for WTE plants to operate at full capacity, and the domestic competition is fierce.    

For Chinese WTE companies, Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries represent a new and, more importantly, plentiful frontier, where competition is absent and the local authorities welcome them with open arms, offering favorable conditions. Additionally, China’s privileged status as Uzbekistan’s largest trade partner, investor, and the second-largest export market is a major boost for these companies. 

Originally published on Global Voices

A road in Casablanca, Morocco. Morocco could play a leading role in Africa’s electric vehicle transition. Image from Wikimedia Commons. License CC BY 3.0.

This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Find more stories here.

Over the last decade, Chinese automakers like BYD, Xpeng, Chery, Wuling, and others have expanded aggressively into the United States and Europe, partly because oversaturation in the domestic market and ongoing price war have made it challenging for automakers to stay profitable. In light of this, Beijing has encouraged Chinese enterprises to go abroad and enter overseas markets through innovation and attractively low prices — especially through green products such as electric vehicles (EVs).

However, these markets may no longer be ideal for Chinese automakers looking for foreign buyers. In September 2024, then-US President Joe Biden imposed 100 percent tariffs on Chinese EVs, with current President Donald Trump bumping this to 154 percent in June 2025. Meanwhile, the European Union has launched investigations into whether Beijing’s national strategy has driven the industry to utilize unfair subsidies. From Washington to Brussels, Chinese automakers face accusations of dumping EVs at unfair prices and damaging the global market. The EU implemented trade barriers in October 2024 to combat this. 

Facing strong resistance in established automotive markets, many Chinese EV companies are turning to the Global South and shifting their market strategy toward low- and middle-income countries.

Africa as the next EV frontier

In the new global trade landscape, Africa is no longer just a source of raw materials such as cobalt, lithium, and rare earths — the coveted minerals that feed global battery production. It is an attractive consumer market for automakers looking for new customers and is emerging as a site for production and assembly in China’s electric vehicle supply chain.

China's leading automobile maker, BYD, has announced plans to nearly triple its dealership network in South Africa by 2026. Analysts called this a swift move to consolidate market share while competitors hesitate. Another Chinese automobile giant, Chery, is also expanding rapidly across South Africa and Kenya, targeting middle-class buyers with relatively affordable models.

According to RFI, Chery South Africa CEO Tony Liu said:

南非是通往非洲大陆的重要门户。南非有非常成熟的汽车金融体系，也有成熟的消费者，他们对售后服务有很高的期望。因此，我们实际上认为南非对我们来说是一个非常具有战略意义的国家和市场。

South Africa is an important gateway to the African continent. South Africa has a very mature auto finance system and also mature consumers who have high expectations for after-sales service. Therefore, we actually consider South Africa to be a very strategic country and market for us.

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa tours the Headquarters of BYD and Huawei in Guangdong Province during a visit to China in September 2024 and poses with a BYD model car. Image from South Africa’s GovernmentZA official Flickr account. CC BY-ND 2.0

To facilitate continental battery production, Chinese company Gotion High Tech is building Africa’s first EV gigafactory in Kenitra, Morocco. Moroccan authorities celebrated this project as a positive development that could help the country pivot from industries focused on raw extraction to higher-value production. The government press release read:

Cet investissement stratégique majeur, qui porte sur la réalisation d'un écosystème industriel complet de fabrication de batteries électriques à Kenitra, est non seulement la première « gigafactory » qui sera réalisée au Maroc, mais également la première du genre de toute la région Middle East & Africa, consolidant ainsi la position de leader régional du Royaume dans l’industrie automobile et la transition énergétique.

This major strategic investment, which involves the creation of a complete industrial ecosystem for the manufacturing of electric batteries in Kenitra, is not only the first ‘gigafactory’ to be built in Morocco, but also the first of its kind in the entire Middle East and Africa region, thus consolidating the Kingdom’s position as a regional leader in the automotive industry and the energy transition.

The Gotion High Tech gigafactory is set to open in June 2026, and its location could make it a significant export base for European and African markets.

In countries that have traditionally enjoyed warm relations with China, such as Ghana and Kenya, Chinese ministries and state-linked associations are busy holding automotive summits with African governments. New investments in assembly plants and charging infrastructure are packaged as part of “green mobility partnerships.”

Together, these moves show a deliberate attempt to weave Africa into China’s global EV map — not just as a supplier, but as a distribution hub and consumer base.

Africa’s own EV momentum

To understand the depth of this shift, it’s important to note that African states are not merely passive recipients of Chinese capital. Many countries are proactively embracing the EV transition.

According to regional analysis from WowAfrica, a Chinese-language news site about investment in Africa, African countries can be sorted into two categories regarding their approach to EVs:

First, established auto producers such as South Africa, Morocco, and Egypt see EVs as a natural extension of their automotive sectors. These narratives align well with China’s goal to create a stronghold in the African market. Secondly, there are the automotive newcomers, such as Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda. These countries lack legacy industries but view EVs as a chance to leapfrog into cleaner, high-tech manufacturing. 

While each government has its own agenda, all are trying to leverage the EV transition and tie it into their national economic development plans.

For example, Kenya has become one of Africa’s most dynamic EV hubs, boosted by tax incentives, a rapid deployment of charging stations, and governmental support in integrating EV development into the national energy strategy. The capital city, Nairobi, has launched a fleet of electric buses to make its public transportation system greener.

An electric bus charging in Nairobi, Kenya. Screenshot from YouTube video. Fair use.

A star startup company, Roam Motors in Kenya, has secured financing from the US government’s development finance institution (DFC) to scale electric buses and motorcycles, while German development agency GIZ is working with the government to upgrade transport efficiency.

Another example is Uganda’s introduction of a National Electric Mobility Policy in 2018. The policy offers favorable exemptions from VAT, import duties, and tax cuts for EVs, batteries, and charging equipment. EV24.Africa, a group promoting EV adoption on the continent, explained the government's long-term plans: “The government aims to encourage EV adoption despite higher costs, targeting full electrification of public transport by 2030 and passenger vehicles by 2040.”

Meanwhile, Morocco is in an especially unique position on the continent, as a potential gateway into African, European, and US markets. An estimated 80–90 percent of Morocco’s vehicle output is currently exported to Europe, second only to China. The Moroccan government has announced plans to leverage its robust manufacturing network to ensure up to 60 percent of its exported cars are electric by 2030. Moroccan officials have highlighted the country’s position as a free-trade partner with raw-material suppliers and European buyers, making it a logical hub for battery gigafactories.

China has strongly welcomed such policies. For years, Morocco has been painted as one of the most essential parts of China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI), its global infrastructure, transportation, and energy connectivity project. The EU’s latest tariff controls on Chinese EVs have made Morocco a highly discussed and enticing new hub for Chinese companies. Global Exhibition, a Shanghai-based group facilitating business expansion into Western Asia and North Africa, explained the strategy behind the shift to Morocco:

对中国而言，摩洛哥不仅是其电动汽车行业离岸外包的重要选择，更是其全球战略棋局中的一枚关键棋子。通过布局摩洛哥，中国不仅能够避开欧美的保护主义政策，继续将产品销往西方市场，还能够进一步拓展其在非洲和全球的影响力。

For China, Morocco is not only an important offshore outsourcing option for its electric vehicle industry but also a strategic pawn in its global game plan. By establishing a strong presence in Morocco, China can sidestep US and European protectionist policies to keep selling into Western markets, while at the same time expanding its influence across Africa and the broader global stage.

A large number of Chinese media and state-related research institutes are similarly praising Morocco for its essential role in boosting China’s global EV strategy.  

But it’s not the only player trying to get into the EV production game. The South African government announced in March 2025 that it would commit ZAR 1 billion (USD 54.27 million) to boost its electric vehicle (EV) production by 2035. This investment aims to transform the country’s automotive industry by focusing on EVs, batteries, and supporting infrastructure. The local government believes “the plan aligns with global sustainability goals and aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions while maintaining South Africa’s position as a leading automotive hub in sub-Saharan Africa.”

Based on this momentum, it’s fair to say that Africa is not just being “plugged into” China’s supply chain, but is also trying to set its own terms in the global EV race.

A BYD outlet. Screenshot from YouTube.

The promise and the trap

Chinese state narratives, its companies, and national policymakers all believe China’s EV market integration with Africa is a “win-win” — Africa gets jobs, infrastructure, and rapid clean mobility integration, while China maintains production volumes and global reach. But the reality is more complex.

Many analysts have warned that Africa risks being locked into the lower ladder of the EV value chain. Assembly plants and dealerships rarely transition into advanced manufacturing or technology transfer, according to a report by Africa Confidential.

Another risk is the uneven benefits. Even Morocco’s gigafactory, though ambitious, is deeply tied to Chinese-controlled networks, raising questions about sovereignty and bargaining power.

A long-term risk is the so-called Green Paradox — EVs are undeniably more climate-friendly than gas cars in the long term, but the initial extraction of cobalt, lithium, and rare earths needed to manufacture them often brings environmental and social damage if the mining is unregulated, careless, and exploitative. Without stronger governance, Africa risks replicating old extractive patterns under a “green” banner.

The result may be dependency hidden in language of sustainability: Africa as a peripheral supplier and low-cost consumer market in a Chinese-led system. To combat this, green advocates insist that local voices must be heard and included in decision-making processes. If the green transition is to be just and equitable, African people must be included and have an equal stake.

Originally published on Global Voices

A woman works in a field in the Ivory Coast. Image from Wikimedia Commons. CC-BY-SA-4.0

This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Find more stories here.

In order to increase its international soft power and gain access to the booming markets emerging throughout Africa, China is looking to significantly increase its presence on the continent and strengthen cooperation with African governments. In November 2021, the African Development Bank (AfDB) signed a partnership agreement with China to promote agricultural development in African countries.

While the partnership agreement is relatively new, some African countries have been working with China to improve their agricultural outputs for decades. Since 1995, China has been assisting the Ivory Coast in refining its rice production methods. Speaking at the closing ceremony of the “Aid to Côte d'Ivoire Rice Technology Training Course,” on July 28, 2017, Tang Weibin, Ambassador to the Ivory Coast, said:

唐卫斌, 驻科特迪瓦大使. “中科都是农业大国，两国农业合作历史悠久。中国政府于1995年援助科方建设了占地432公顷的格格杜垦区，双方就此项目进行了长达近20年的农业技术合作。通过引进中国水稻品种，垦区内每公顷水稻产量提高了1.5吨，稻农直接增收10%以上。

Both China and the Ivory Coast are major agricultural countries, and the two countries have a long history of agricultural cooperation. In 1995, the Chinese government assisted the Ivory Coast in building the 432-hectare Guiguido Reclamation Area. The two sides have engaged in agricultural technology cooperation on this project for nearly 20 years. By introducing Chinese rice varieties, rice yields per hectare in the reclamation area have increased by 1.5 tons, directly increasing rice farmers’ income by over 10 percent.

The Guiguido Reclamation Area refers to a hydro-agricultural project for rice in Divo, a town in the southwestern Ivory Coast. Since the project was founded, China has been assisting local farmers in managing rice production, repairing and maintaining water conservation facilities, and training workers in the rice industry. Through the partnership, rice production has increased from an average of 2.5 tons per hectare to 4 tons per hectare, and farmers can earn an average of CFA francs 1.578 million (USD 2,800) per year.

To help farmers keep up with new pressures brought on by the climate crisis, China will be donating CFA francs 120 million (about USD 216,500) to buy modern equipment for the Guiguidou rice-growing area. This investment isn’t isolated. China has also invested in the Ivory Coast’s rubber farming and cocoa industries. In September 2020, China provided CFA francs 216 billion in financing (nearly USD 390 million) for the construction of the Abidjan cocoa processing plant in Akoupé-Zeudji, on the outskirts of Abidjan, Ivory Coast. The factory was inaugurated on June 27, 2025, and is primarily owned by the Ivorian government.

Lu Huaheng, a technical director at the Abidjan cocoa processing plant, told the Chinese-state-affiliated People’s Daily:

科特迪瓦是全球最大可可出口国，出口收入占全国出口总额的40%，但此前近20家大型加工厂全被外资垄断。如今，科方拥有了首家大型可可加工厂与仓储中心，增强了在全球可可市场的话语权。”承建方留驻阿比让可可加工厂负责运维保障的技术总监陆华恒向本报记者介绍。

The Ivory Coast is the world’s largest cocoa exporter, with export revenue accounting for 40 percent of the country's total exports. However, nearly 20 large-scale processing plants were previously monopolized by foreign investors. Now, the Ivory Coast has its first large-scale cocoa processing plant and storage center, strengthening its voice in the global cocoa market.

While this major upheaval in the Ivorian agricultural sector is contributing to the fight against rural poverty, some environmentalists are asking how the country can balance its economic development with climate justice as it struggles to navigate the severe effects of climate change.

Vulnerability of Ivorian agriculture

Women at work in a field in the Ivory Coast. Image from Wikimedia Commons. CC-BY-SA-4.0

Agriculture is one of the pillars of the Ivorian economy. It accounts for 25 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) and employs over 60 percent of its population of over 32 million. The country has a strong agricultural sector and is the world’s top producer of cocoa and cashews. It is also a leader in the production of natural rubber and palm oil.

However, Ivorian agriculture is not immune to the devastating effects of climate change: rising temperatures, irregular rainfall, increasingly frequent droughts and floods, soil degradation, and deforestation caused by intensive pesticide use and logging are disrupting crop growth and leaving citizens vulnerable — particularly those who live in under-resourced, rural areas.

While the major sectors mentioned above have significant resources to mitigate the effects of climate change at their disposal, rural smallholder farmers, who are on the front line of local food production, are powerless to mitigate yield instability, which directly threatens food security and market supply.

Yao Kouassi, a rice farmer in Agboville (a town in the southeast of the country), told Global Voices:

Le changement climatique, nous le vivons déjà. La pluie ne respecte plus les saisons, nos récoltes périssent et c’est un signal fort qui devrait normalement nous alerter et nous amener à prendre des mesures fortes pour sauver nos cultures.

We are already experiencing climate change. Rainfall no longer follows the seasons, our crops are dying, and this is a strong signal that should normally alert us and prompt us to take strong measures to save our crops.

While cooperation with China has largely benefited the Ivory Coast, those benefits sometimes don’t trickle down to those on the outskirts of society. As CGAP, a think tank focusing on global financial inclusivity, wrote in a 2017 working paper, “Smallholder farmers are the lifeblood of Côte d'Ivoire, but they are largely neglected by formal financial institutions, which are concentrated in urban areas.” Without access to financing for optimized seeds, equipment, and training, many rural farmers risk being left behind.

Strong Chinese support

The Guiguido rice hydro-agricultural project in Divo is a model of adaptation that can provide long-term solutions for Ivorian agriculture. China’s involvement in the Ivorian rice sector is aimed at providing modern agricultural equipment and improved rice varieties, as well as training local producers and technicians with the help of Chinese experts. At the launch of this project, Yacouba Dembélé, Director General of the Agency for the Development of the Rice Sector in Côte d'Ivoire, said:

… la Chine est l'un des pays qui a fait le plus d'efforts en envoyant le plus d'aide à la Côte d'Ivoire. Elle nous envoie régulièrement du matériel et envoie nos paysans en Chine pour les former, et il y a aussi des experts chinois qui viennent ici. Chaque année, ce sont au moins 50 personnes qui sont formées.

… China is one of the countries that has made the most effort by sending the most aid to the Ivory Coast. It regularly sends us equipment and sends our farmers to China for training, and there are also Chinese experts who come here. Every year, at least 50 people are trained.

Dembélé explains: 

… la Côte d'Ivoire s'efforce d'atteindre d'ici 2025 l'autosuffisance en riz et d'augmenter sa production de riz blanchi à plus de 2,6 millions de tonnes, ce qui implique de nombreux facteurs, notamment la maîtrise de l'eau, la disponibilité des semences, la construction d'usines de transformation, un système de distribution de riz sur le territoire national et la mécanisation.

… the Ivory Coast is striving to achieve self-sufficiency in rice by 2025 and to increase its production of milled rice to more than 2.6 million tons, which involves many factors, including water management, seed availability, the construction of processing plants, a rice distribution system throughout the country, and mechanization.

Guo Changyou, head of the Chinese Agricultural Technical Assistance Mission (MATAC) in Côte d'Ivoire, adds:

Cette fois, nous avons fourni un lot de machines agricoles à la Côte d'Ivoire, notamment des sélecteurs de riz, des moissonneuses-batteuses, des fraiseuses à riz et dix tonnes de semences de riz. Nous utilisons ces mesures les plus pratiques pour aider au développement de l'industrie du riz en Côte d'Ivoire et espérons que l'industrie du riz en Côte d'Ivoire pourra atteindre l'autosuffisance le plus rapidement possible à travers notre contribution.

This time, we have provided the Ivory Coast with a batch of agricultural machinery, including rice sorters, combine harvesters, rice milling machines, and ten tons of rice seeds. We are using the most practical measures to help develop the rice industry in the Ivory Coast and hope that the rice industry in the Ivory Coast will be able to achieve self-sufficiency as quickly as possible through our contribution.

The project’s success will be measurable through indicators such as reduced post-harvest losses through mechanization and modern storage, improved yields, and increased income for certain families. While hoping for better results, a rice farmer named Amoin (a pseudonym) is optimistic. She told Global Voices:

Nous espérons une nette amélioration de nos rendements ainsi que nos revenus d’ici quelques mois ou au fil des années. Mais quel sera le prix à payer?  Nous ne devons pas trop s’intéresser à nos profits et ignorer les conséquences climatiques que peuvent engendrer cette innovation.

We hope to see a significant improvement in our yields and income within a few months or over the coming years. But what will be the price to pay? We must not focus too much on our profits and ignore the climate consequences that this innovation may have.

Some are concerned that this project will make Ivorian rice farming dependent on external parties, limiting the Ivory Coast’s food and agricultural sovereignty. Because the machines come from China, spare parts must also come from China in the event of a breakdown, creating technical dependence. Modernized, large-scale irrigation also poses the risk of overexploiting water resources. Small farmers are also concerned about being edged out of the market, as they typically do not have enough resources to afford ultra-sophisticated machines in their rice fields.

Women selling yams in a village near Comoé National Park in the Ivory Coast. Image from Wikimedia Commons. CC-BY-SA-4.0 

Climate justice issue

While China’s support in the Ivory Coast’s agricultural sector has yielded undeniable fruits, it also comes with complications. Chinese investments in the modernization of the rice sector and the construction of the cocoa processing plant represent a real climate justice issue for the country. As the Ivory Coast’s leading bilateral trading partner, China is intensifying initiatives to accelerate better yields for Ivorian cocoa. With increased yields and demand also comes the risk of accelerating deforestation, biodiversity loss, and the overuse of water resources.

Some environmentalists say this will lead to the overexploitation of land that is supposed to contribute to the country's reforestation. In 2022, an investigation by the NGO Mighty Earth revealed how protected forests are being exploited to produce cocoa for export. According to the investigation report, nearly 40 percent of Ivorian cocoa comes from illegally deforested areas. The report cites individuals who acknowledge their involvement in this illegal cocoa trade chain:

… les propriétaires des entrepôts de cacao installées dans ces campements illégaux ont expliqué ouvertement qu’ils s’approvisionnaient en cacao cultivé dans les aires protégées autour d’eux. Les négociants de cacao tout comme les chocolatiers nous ont aussi confié qu’ils étaient conscients qu’une part importante des fèves de Côte d’Ivoire qu’ils achetaient avaient probablement été cultivées dans des aires protégées.

… the owners of cocoa warehouses set up in these illegal camps openly explained that they sourced their cocoa from protected areas around them. Cocoa traders and chocolate makers also told us that they were aware that a significant proportion of the beans they purchased from the Ivory Coast had probably been grown in protected areas.

With Chinese funding in the agricultural sector, this new industrialization risks exacerbating or accelerating deforestation by once again violating these protected areas. While additional investment and support could be a boon for the Ivory Coast, innovation must be measured and weighed against social and environmental concerns. 

Originally published on Global Voices

PT Vale, a nickel mining company in Indonesia, set up a tree nursery in South Sulawesi to prepare for the reforestation of former mines. Image by Mamansukirman06. CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Find more stories here.

Southeast Asia is rapidly becoming a key player in the electric car (EV) industry. Other than rapid growth in EV sales and high projected market value, the region has also attracted major investments in battery and component manufacturing, turning it into a crucial hub in the global supply chain. Governments in the region have introduced supportive policies to clear the way for electric cars, to help fulfill their climate goals. However, the EV revolution has also prompted public debates about the complex trade-offs involving environmental, social, and economic consequences. 

EVs have clear positive impacts on the environment, public health, and energy security. Compared to traditional gas vehicles, EVs produce less noise pollution when driving, which is particularly relevant to the populated megacities in the region. Additionally, EVs have zero tailpipe emissions, significantly reducing air pollutants, such as nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide and other harmful particulate matter from exhaust that cause smog and respiratory illnesses. 

EVs also do not emit carbon dioxide (CO₂) while driving, and the lifetime carbon emissions of electric cars (including those created during their manufacturing and recycling processes) are nearly four times less than those of gasoline cars. As transportation accounts for 20–25 percent of global CO₂ emissions, the adoption of EVs can significantly reduce carbon footprint and help countries reach their goals on climate change. 

A steady transition to EVs also provides more energy security and increases resilience to fuel supply disruptions, which is highly relevant to Southeast Asia, as many countries in the region heavily depend on imported oil. 

Bangkok witnesses heavy smog on a March day in 2019. By Chainwit., CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

China has emerged as the most important partner for Southeast Asia’s EV adoption, as Chinese EV brands have quickly gained dominance in the markets and started to produce cars or auto parts in local plants. For the Chinese carmakers, Southeast Asia is strategically important, given its abundance of natural resources, policy incentives, and massive growth potential in domestic markets. At the same time, Chinese EVs facilitate Southeast Asia’s green transportation transition by offering relatively affordable cars, creating job opportunities in the sector, and integrating the region into the global EV supply chain. 

Zhang Yongwei, Vice Chairman of the China EV100, a Chinese think tank aimed at boosting the development of the EV industry, said:

世界各国都制定了交通转型目标，向绿色清洁的新能源转型迫在眉睫。没有任何一个国家、一个企业在新能源领域能‘包打天下’，国际合作是大势所趋，新能源汽车的研发、制造、使用、服务全生态链都需要开放与合作，因此推动国与国之间政策、标准等方面的协同与统一十分重要。

Countries around the world have set goals for transportation transition, and the shift to green and clean new energy has become an urgent priority. No single country or company can dominate the entire EV sector. International cooperation is the prevailing trend. The entire ecosystem of electric vehicles — from research and development (R&D) and manufacturing to usage and services — requires openness and collaboration. Therefore, advancing coordination and harmonization of policies and standards among nations is of great importance.

A NIO car is displayed at an auto show in Shanghai. Image by JustAnotherCarDesigner. CC BY-SA 4.0 via Wikimedia Commons

Cost of the nickel rush 

While EVs will undoubtedly play a crucial role in decarbonizing transport, there are trade-offs regarding the production process. The extraction of nickel, an essential component of EV batteries, is often at the center of debates and concerns. 

Indonesia’s nickel sector is a prime example. The country is home to the world’s largest nickel reserve, totaling 5.2 billion tons of ore and 57 million tons of metal, equivalent to 42 percent of the world’s nickel reserves. As global demand for nickel ramps up, the International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that Indonesia will supply almost two-thirds of the world’s metal needs by 2030, but increased mining activities have raised ecological and social concerns within the country.  

In recent years, there have been allegations of human rights and land rights abuses, as well as deforestation and water contamination linked to nickel mining in Indonesia. Footage captured by the environmental organization Global Witness seemingly shows how nickel mining has destroyed forests and polluted the water in the Raja Ampat archipelago, a group of small islands located in West Papua, Indonesia. 

By 2024, mining resulted in 174 ha (roughly 450 acres) of deforestation across the cluster of islands, according to analysis of satellite imagery by environmental NGO Auriga Nusantara. 

Raja Ampat, part of the Coral Triangle that makes up the “Amazon of the Seas,” is known for its untouched natural beauty and has one of the richest coral reefs on Earth. The Indigenous community that lives there is worried that the nickel rush will have devastating impacts on the vulnerable ecosystem, as well as their traditional livelihoods and unique culture. 

Raja Ampat is known for its untouched beaches, colorful coral reefs, and diverse marine life. By Irma Ade, CC BY-SA 4.0 via Wikimedia Commons

“I really, really hope that mining doesn’t come,” said Mary Mambrasar, a local villager told Global Voices. “The ocean, the coral will be destroyed, I can’t imagine how we will live… And the water? It comes from the mountains, and the mountains will be the first to go.”

“If the [nickel] company comes, then these sacred sites will be lost. It will be just memories.” Lindert Mambrasar, a local fisherman, told Global Witness, referring to a beach that is considered a sacred place by the locals.

After public pressure, the Indonesian government revoked licences for four of the five mining companies operating in Raja Ampat this June. However, local campaigners say illegal mining activities persist in small islands across the country.

Another NGO, the Business and Human Rights Resource Center, has highlighted public health and environmental risks in the nickel supply chains in Indonesia and the Philippines. Fishermen find it increasingly difficult to make a living as many of the local fish populations have been reduced due to pollution and habitat destruction. Local residents experience respiratory issues and eye irritation because of air pollution. Industrial wastewater pollutes the villages’ waterways, which they rely on to irrigate crops. 

Complaints about pollution, waste management, and workplace risks have also piled up in the largest nickel-processing center in Southeast Asia, the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park (IMIP). Labor abuses and work safety scandals have long loomed over the plant, while in the surrounding villages, the old livelihoods are replaced, as polluted water has damaged the fishing industry and forced many young villagers to switch from fishing to mining. 

Lestari, a local elementary school teacher, told local media:

Anak-anak di sini banyak yang tak lagi ingin bertani seperti orang tuanya. Tapi belum semua siap kerja di pabrik. Ada yang putus sekolah karena ingin cepat cari uang

Many children here no longer want to farm like their parents. But not all of them are ready to work in factories. Some have dropped out of school because they want to make money quickly.

Experts note that while foreign investment in the nickel sector creates economic opportunities, the benefits are distributed unevenly, favoring only those with certain qualifications. “The local communities may not benefit from the nickel industry because of a lack of skills,” Bhima Yudhistira, researcher at the Center of Economic and Law Studies in Jakarta, told Asia Democracy Chronicles. 

Battle for the driver’s seat 

IMIP is just one of many Chinese-backed projects in Indonesia’s nickel sector. Chinese firms now control about 75 percent of Indonesia's nickel refining capacity, according to global security NGO C4ADS. 

The dominance of Chinese companies in Indonesia’s nickel industry and the region’s EV market has prompted concerns about supply chain control and industrial overdependence. Some ask whether Indonesia is in the driver’s seat of its own EV revolution, or merely a passenger. 

Picture of Chinese EV leader BYD's first electric car, BYD-001, showcased at the BYD Museum in Shenzhen, China. By iMoD Official, CC BY 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Critics warn that though the Southeast Asian country is viewed as a booming EV market and a source of raw materials, it is not reaping the benefits as an equal partner. 

“If there is no technology transfer between the two countries, and Indonesia only receives manufacturing without understanding electric vehicle design, battery technology, and so on, then we will always be a market country, not a strategic partner,” Tauhid Ahmad, a senior economist at the Institute for Development of Economics and Finance, told Indonesian media outlet Kompas. 

As Chinese EV brands dominate the Southeast Asian markets, concerns are growing that they could stifle the region’s own EV industry, which largely remains in its early stage of development. Evvy Kartini, a battery technology expert from Indonesia’s National Battery Research Institute, said:

Kalau semua teknologinya dari luar, kita hanya jadi buruh di rumah sendiri

If all the technology comes from abroad, we will only be laborers at home.

In contrast, some argue that the tech transfer will happen over time. Xu Haidong, Deputy Secretary-General of the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers, tells Chinese state-owned media Xinhua that as China’s well-developed EV ecosystem incorporates Southeast Asia, it will help local automotive industries adopt new technologies at a lower cost, thereby enhancing their competitiveness.

Originally published on Global Voices

A Himalayan glacial lake. Image from Pexels.

This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Find more stories here.

The Hindu Kush-Himalaya (HKH) region, a mountain range spanning Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, China, Nepal, and India, is considered the “water tower” of Asia, though much of this water is trapped in glaciers that cap the range’s jagged peaks. As the planet warms due to climate change, many of these glaciers are melting at alarming rates, causing massive lakes to bloom between the mountaintops.

While it's unknown exactly how many glacial lakes have sprung up, some studies report upwards of 8,900 lakes across the region. However, these natural wonders have a downside. Glacier lake outburst floods (GLOFs), a phenomenon where a natural dam bursts and a lake’s worth of water suddenly flows downstream in something of an “inland tsunami,” are becoming more and more common and pose a deadly threat to nearby communities. These natural disasters are especially common in India, Pakistan, Nepal, and China, and can cause widespread death, infrastructure destruction, and displacement.

While these phenomena are extremely difficult to predict, comprehensive glacial lake inventories and integrated space-air-ground observation systems have the potential to give scientists early warning on GLOFs that may help save lives.

Data politics

The sharing of data has long been a contentious issue. In the HKH region — one of the world’s most geopolitically sensitive areas — data sharing, especially related to water, remains deeply controversial. “Water is a very sensitive issue,” notes Arun Bhakta Shrestha, a climate and risk reduction expert from the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), in an interview with Global Voices. In many countries across the region, water-related information is treated as highly classified. This includes not only long-term hydrological data but also time-sensitive disaster alerts, such as those related to GLOFs.

This culture of restricted information has real-world consequences. As Shrestha pointed out, disaster information is also humanitarian information. When a glacial lake bursts its banks, the resulting flood doesn’t respect borders. It travels downstream rapidly, threatening lives and infrastructure. “If that information could be shared downstream, people could be evacuated,” he said. “Otherwise, people die.”

Yet even early warning signals that could save lives are rarely shared. According to him, this isn’t just about sensitivity — it’s also about political inertia. “Those bureaucrats… they just sit on the data to avoid complications,” he explained. The problem isn’t a lack of technological alternatives — much of the data could be gathered via remote sensing. However, unwillingness to change leads to policy rigidity, which in turn fuels mistrust among neighboring states.

This mistrust creates a vicious cycle. Geopolitical tensions cause countries to withhold information. That withholding fuels suspicion. Misunderstandings flourish — myths emerge, such as assumptions that one country is mismanaging or weaponizing upstream water. These myths hinder cooperation. “You cannot look at a problem in isolation,” Shrestha stressed. “A river basin is a shared environment.”

Partial understanding and incomplete strategies can prove deadly. To break this “vicious circle of mistrust,” experts argue for stronger scientific collaboration. While political agreements may take years or decades, science can offer a neutral ground.

Institutions like ICIMOD are working to build such transboundary scientific cooperation. “We need more joint research, more shared knowledge,” Xu Baiqing, a leading expert at the Institute of Tibetan Plateau Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, said in an interview with Global Voices, emphasizing that collaboration can help fill data gaps, build trust, and reduce tensions over time.

China’s role in the regional data ecosystem

Among the eight countries in the HKH region, China holds a comparative advantage in terms of technological capabilities, financial resources, and infrastructure. According to official Chinese sources, the country has developed a comprehensive Earth observation system, including land, meteorological, and ocean satellites, with both the quantity and quality of data collection reaching world-class levels.

In terms of academic research output, a search of major academic portals shows that the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland lead the field in studies related to glacial lakes and GLOFs, forming the backbone of global publication and research activity in this area. India has also been catching up in data collection and risk management, especially after the multiple fatal disasters. 

HIMANSH, India’s high-altitude research station, which studies Himalayan glaciers and their impact on water resources. Image from YouTube. Fair use.

However, while countries like China possess a wealth of scientific insights, their contributions are often locked behind language barriers, incompatible platforms, or political mistrust. Many Chinese glacier studies are published in domestic journals or government databases, which are inaccessible to the broader international community. “It’s not that China refuses to share data,” said a glaciologist who preferred to remain anonymous. “But we lack the platforms, the trust, and the interface.”

When it comes to glacial lake inventories and GLOF risk assessments, even Chinese scientists rely heavily on satellite data from US agencies like NASA and the United States Geological Survey (USGS). For example, a 2020 paper by Chinese scientists mapping glacial lakes in High Mountain Asia is primarily based on Landsat imagery, which is freely available through NASA and the US Geological Survey.

Global North domination: Open access isn’t equal access

Open access to US satellite data has enabled global research, but accessibility is not equal. Countries like Nepal and Bhutan struggle with limited internet infrastructure, lack of technical expertise, and few trained personnel. These barriers complicate efforts in transboundary monitoring and early warning — especially frustrating given these countries’ high vulnerability and low contribution to global glacier melt.

Also, as Xu Baiqing points out, satellite data cannot provide real-time alerts. “Satellites like [NASA’s] Landsat help us analyze past events and assess trends,” he says, “but they cannot provide real-time warnings.” For that, geostationary or disaster-monitoring satellites are needed. And even they aren’t enough. Fieldwork remains essential for understanding and mitigating glacial hazards. Xu advocates for a more integrated Earth systems approach: merging big data infrastructure, scientific modeling, and field networks. AI-driven modeling, he notes, can help scientists better understand causes — not just symptoms — of glacial disasters.

Yet even China — with its technological, financial, and human advantages — faces challenges in setting up field observation networks. When the Jinwuco lake burst in June 2020, Zhang Qianggong, head of the climate and environmental risks unit at the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), told Global Voices that transporting a single bag of cement to the site took one person three full days. Equipment transport alone can cost over CNY 300,000 (about USD 41,000).

Amid such high risk and challenging conditions, Chinese authorities are investigating ways to prepare for future lake bursts in the region. Researchers noted in a Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) journal article:

青藏高原须高度警惕冰湖溃决风险。其中，喜马拉雅山、念青唐古拉山中东段冰湖溃决概率是其他区域的3倍。

The Qinghai-Tibet Plateau must be highly vigilant against the risk of glacial lake outbursts. The probability of glacial lake outbursts in the Himalayas and the central and eastern sections of the Nyainqentanglha Mountains is three times higher than in other regions.

Sustainability gaps and structural injustice

In Nepal and elsewhere, even when ground-based early warning systems are installed, often with donor support, their long-term sustainability is in question. “The donor might pay for installation,” says Zhang, “but who replaces the batteries? Who trains the staff?” Without continued funding and capacity-building, these systems often fail within a few years, leaving communities exposed once again.

This unequal access to tools, knowledge, and infrastructure means many high-risk glacial lakes remain unmonitored. Even when data exists, the questions of who controls it, who can interpret it, and who gets to act on it remain central. If scientific resources and early-warning systems stay concentrated in the Global North, while those most vulnerable in the Global South remain underequipped, the injustice at the heart of the climate crisis only deepens.

The Hindu Kush-Himalaya (HKH) region is a mountain range spanning Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, China, Nepal, and India. Image from GRID-Arendal, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

This concern has intensified under US President Donald Trump’s administration, as key US climate science initiatives, such as NASA’s Surface Geology and Biology Mission, have faced significant funding cuts. The proposed end of the Landsat program, the world's largest and longest-running satellite-based record of Earth’s land, also sent shockwaves across the global research community — not just for its implications in the US, but for how dependent the world had become on US satellite data.

Organizations like ICIMOD offer some hope. Through programs like the Hindu Kush Himalaya Monitoring and Assessment Programme (HIMAP), they facilitate regional assessments and cross-border data exchange. Still, such efforts remain limited in scale and funding. Experts argue that Europe, with its Alpine glacier expertise, could do more to promote cooperation and support scientific development in the Himalayas.

Ultimately, to build real resilience, regional collaboration must go beyond diplomatic gestures. It must involve shared infrastructure, multilingual data portals, joint simulations, and sustained training programs. As glaciers recede, the window for meaningful collaboration is narrowing.

The next GLOF disaster is not a question of “if,” but “when.” The data can help — but only if it is shared, understood, and acted upon in time.

Originally published on Global Voices

BYD vehicles showcased at BYD headquarters in Shenzhen, China. iMoD Official. CC BY 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Find more stories here.

Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) have made significant inroads into Southeast Asia in recent years. If you hop into a new electric vehicle in Southeast Asia, chances are it’s a BYD, Xpeng, Chery, Wuling, or another Chinese brand. In Thailand, the largest EV market in Southeast Asia, 85 percent of electric car sales in 2024 were Chinese-made. In Malaysia, Chinese EV maker BYD was the bestselling EV brand in 2024. In Indonesia, Chinese EV imports accounted for two-thirds of the country’s total EV sales last year. 

Southeast Asia is emerging as a powerhouse for EV consumption, fueled by a burgeoning middle class, an appetite for new tech, and a rising desire for sustainable transport. EV sales in Vietnam and Indonesia grew exponentially in 2024, respectively nearly doubling and tripling their sales numbers from the previous year. The EV sales shares in the two countries are now comparable to high-income economies such as Spain or Canada. 

“Public acceptance of EVs is steadily increasing [in Indonesia],” said Muhammad Nur Yuniarto, executive director of the Automotive Control System Center at the Sepuluh Nopember Institute of Technology in Surabaya, Indonesia. “Initially, there were concerns about battery durability and reliability, but these have been dispelled as EVs have proven reliable and safe for daily use,” he told BenarNews, a South and Southeast Asian regional news outlet.

Generally speaking, Chinese EVs enjoy a good reputation in the region and represent a high level of tech innovation. An Indonesian autoshow visitor told CNN Indonesia:

Bagusan mobil-mobil produk China (material). Selain itu, produk China high technology

Chinese-made cars are better (in terms of materials). Furthermore, Chinese products are high-tech.

Analysts say that favorable local policies and relatively affordable prices play an instrumental role in the boom of Chinese EVs in middle- and low-income countries. Last year, across all emerging economies outside of China, Chinese EVs made up 75 percent of the increase in electric car sales. 

When EV demand in Southeast Asia meets Chinese overcapacity 

The stunning growth of Chinese EVs in Southeast Asia is driven by a mix of “push and pull” factors.

In Southeast Asia, many countries have made ambitious pledges to increase the market share of electric vehicles and, therefore, implemented various policies to facilitate EV adoption. For example, in Malaysia, EV owners are exempt from paying road taxes until the end of this year. The government also provides subsidies for charging stations and various incentives for manufacturers. 

In Indonesia, some Chinese automakers have enjoyed an import tax waiver to incentivize foreign car companies to establish local assembly plants. As a result, the sales of Chinese EVs increased by a startling 18-fold in 2024 compared to the previous year.

Bangkok traffic jam during rush hour. By Christopher J. Fynn, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

In congested and polluted megacities in Southeast Asia, such as Jakarta, Bangkok, and Manila, there are traffic restrictions applied to conventional gas cars. To curb congestion and emissions, cars are only allowed on the streets on specific days or times based on their licence plate numbers. However, EVs are currently not subject to such driving restrictions, contributing to higher demand for EVs.

On the other hand, in China, after years of heavy investment and supply chain development, EV companies face market saturation and overcapacity, prompting them to expand abroad. As domestic demand is outpaced by rising supply, Chinese car manufacturers find themselves locked in a volatile price war in China and must look outside the country if they want to keep growing. 

While Europe has been the largest export market for Chinese-made electric cars, the EU’s high import taxes and the reluctance of European consumers to buy Chinese brands have cast a shadow on the automakers’ overseas expansion plans. The value share of Chinese EV exports to Europe has fallen from over 70 percent in 2021 to roughly 40 percent in 2024. Instead, Chinese EV makers are making headway in Latin America and Southeast Asia, where there are fewer regulatory hurdles and soaring demand for EVs.

Industry analysts state that Southeast Asia can be a lucrative market for Chinese EV companies, given the region’s abundance of resources, neutral geopolitical position, close trade relationships with China, and massive growth potential in domestic markets. 

Additionally, fierce competition among Chinese brands and swift technological advancements have driven down battery prices, improving the affordability of Chinese EVs and making them more attractive for price-sensitive consumers in Global South countries. In 2024, in most emerging economies, Chinese EVs were by far the most affordable option. In Thailand, the average price of a Chinese EV was lower than that of a conventional gas car, with the lowest priced EV models starting at only TBH 250,000 (USD 7,668) and going up to TBH 1.2 million (approximately USD 35,000), while the average price of gasoline cars remains around TBH 815,000 (USD 23,600).

From exporting to local manufacturing 

In addition to exporting cars to Southeast Asia, Chinese automakers are also investing in local production and assembly, which will help preempt future trade tariffs and enhance their price competitiveness and brand recognition in the local markets. Currently, overseas plants operated by Chinese manufacturers account for only 5 percent of electric car sales in emerging markets, a share that is expected to increase.

BYD Auto (Thailand) Co., Ltd., manufacturing plant in Rayong, Thailand. iMoD Official. CC BY 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

BYD is an example of an overseas manufacturing success story. Having established four overseas factories in Thailand, Uzbekistan, Brazil, and Hungary, the Chinese automaker, which surpassed Tesla as global top selling EV brand last year, is investing in a USD 1 billion plant in West Java, Indonesia. 

“Every single progression of our local manufacturing is quite smooth and also on track. We will keep our commitment, which is that by the end of 2025, we will complete the construction work,” according to Eagle Zhao, president director of BYD Indonesia. The automaker is simultaneously building a new factory in Sihanoukville, Cambodia, further enhancing its regional manufacturing capacity. 

Indonesia's Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Airlangga Hartarto commented that BYD’s symbolic investment in the Indonesian factory “can strengthen the era of electric vehicles.”

This mega facility signals the Chinese company's long-term commitment to Indonesia. The plant has a planned annual capacity of 150,000 units, more than three times the country’s total EV sales last year. With this investment, BYD secured a temporary waiver of import duties, further boosting its sales in Indonesia.  

Indonesia is the largest automobile market in Southeast Asia. With its population of 283.5 million and fast-growing middle class, it is considered a “strategic battleground” for Chinese EV companies going overseas, forcing BYD and other Chinese automakers, such as Wuling, Chery, FAW, Neta, Great Wall, and GAC Aion, to compete to invest in the archipelago. 

A car by Chinese automaker Xpeng is displayed in a showroom in Bangkok, Thailand. By Chanokchon, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

However, there are some concerns that the ongoing price war in China could ultimately backfire on manufacturers and consumers both domestically and abroad.

The volatile market and razor-thin margins mean many Chinese EV companies are struggling to stay afloat amid unsustainably low prices and being forced out of business, leaving their consumers in a lurch. Others are expanding abroad too quickly before they have the supply chain capacity for servicing and manufacturing. Industry experts warn that this could hurt the reputation of Chinese EV brands in the long term. Li Yunfei, general manager of brand and public relations at BYD, said at a June 6 industry forum:

如果企业在本土市场发展不顺，强行拓展海外市场可能并非明智之举，甚至可能对中国品牌的整体形象造成潜在损害。

If a company is not doing well in the domestic market, forcibly expanding into overseas markets may not be a wise move and may even cause potential damage to the overall image of Chinese brands.

The government has stepped in to try to curb the ongoing price wars, with the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (中汽协) releasing an official statement on May 31, titled “关于维护公平竞争秩序 促进行业健康发展的倡议” (Initiative on Maintaining Fair Competition Order and Promoting Healthy Industry Development), urging companies to “strictly abide by the principles of fair competition” (严格遵从公平竞争原则), and not monopolize the market or undercut competitors.

As one official from the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers said to Xinhua, a state-affiliated news outlet:

可以说，“价格战”没有赢家，更没有未来。

It can be said that there are no winners and no future in the ‘price war’.

Emerging local competition

Though Chinese EVs are making headway in Southeast Asia, they are facing challenges not only from renowned international auto giants, such as Toyota and Hyundai, but also from emerging local brands. 

Vietnamese carmaker VinFast is gaining traction in both domestic and international markets, with rising exports to Indonesia, Malaysia, and the US. The company is currently planning to double its production in Vietnam and is building overseas production facilities in India.

VinFast also has a near monopoly on the charging stations in Vietnam, which makes the country a tough market to crack for Chinese auto companies. Cars from some Chinese brands can only charge at limited third-party charging facilities. 

“Additionally, the long-standing anti-China sentiment in Vietnam could pose a significant hurdle for BYD, potentially affecting consumer perception and acceptance,” Abhik Mukherjee, an auto analyst at Counterpoint Research, told Rest of World.

Except in Vietnam, Chinese EV companies currently have a leading position in Southeast Asia. With their affordable models, sizable investment, and political support from the local governments, they are poised to deepen their foothold in this key EV battleground. 

Originally published on Global Voices

Through innovative co-writing partnerships that bridge linguistic and political divides, our fellows explore the complex realities of how China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure projects, energy investments, and development policies create vastly different environmental impacts across communities in Latin America. Our panelists will discuss their collaborative reporting methodology, reveal key insights about China's nuanced position as a green innovator and potentially problematic presence in the Global South, and explore how cross-border journalism can illuminate complex stories of climate justice that transcend borders. This conversation highlights how collaborative storytelling is essential for understanding the true scope of Latin America's interconnected climate challenges and opportunities.

Learn more about the Climate Justice Fellowship here and watch the conversation on YouTube here.

Panelists:

Laís Martins: Laís Martins is a Brazilian journalist currently based in São Paulo, from where she reports for Brazilian and international news outlets on politics, human rights and technology. She has a Masters degree in Political Communication from the University of Amsterdam and is a Pulitzer Center fellow. She was a 2024 Climate Justice Fellow with Global Voices.

Gabriela Mesones Rojo: Bilingual journalist, writer, and translator. Social Media Team Lead at Global Voices and 2024 Climate Justice Fellow. Co-founder of Red de Periodistas Venezolanas, a community of gender diverse journalists in Venezuela. She specializes in covering gender, humanitarian emergencies, LGBTQ+ communities, migration, and sexual and reproductive rights.

Alicia Chen: Alicia Chen is an independent journalist and documentary producer based in Taiwan. Her focuses are migration, human rights and climate justice. She worked for The Washington Post in 2021, covering China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Languages she uses for work are English, Spanish, and Taiwanese Mandarin. Her work also appeared in The New York Times, The Guardian, The Reporter, among others. She was IWMF’s 2025 Elizabeth Neuffer Fellow and a 2024 Climate Justice Fellow with Global Voices.

Mengyu: Mengyu is a freelance journalist based in North America. Through writing and photography, she tells stories about how migration, technology, and social movements shape human lives. She was a 2024 Climate Justice Fellow with Global Voices.

Moderated by Ameya Nagarajan: Ameya is the Managing Editor for the Global Voices newsroom and the editor for Advox. She lives and works in Bengaluru, India.

Originally published on Global Voices

Gangapurna glacier and lake is one of the top attractions of Manang Valley, Nepal. Image from Wikimedia Commons. License CC BY-SA 4.0.

This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Find more stories here.

In the towering Hindu Kush-Himalaya region — often referred to as the “Third Pole” — glaciers are melting at an alarming rate, threatening the lives and livelihoods of millions. Scientists estimate that up to 75 percent of the region’s glacier volume could vanish by the end of the century.

The Hindu Kush Himalaya stretches over 3,500 kilometers across eight countries, including Nepal and China. Image from Flickr. License CC BY-NC-SA 2.0.

As glaciers retreat, they often reveal deep hollows where ice once sat. These depressions begin to fill with meltwater, forming new glacial lakes. In other cases, small meltwater ponds emerge on the surface of debris-covered glaciers and gradually merge into larger lakes. These water bodies are not just passive byproducts of melting — they can also actively accelerate ice loss. As the lakes grow, they cause the glacier edges to break and melt more quickly, which in turn leads to even more lake expansion. Since 1990, glacial lakes around the world have expanded significantly in number, surface area, and volume — by approximately 53 percent, 51 percent, and 48 percent, respectively — and the trend is likely to continue throughout the 21st century.

While these glacial lakes are a vital part of regional hydrology in high mountain areas and contribute significantly to the flow of essential rivers such as the Indus and the Brahmaputra, which support life, agriculture, the economy, and essential ecosystem services in both their source regions and the areas downstream, they can also be extremely dangerous.

If the natural dams that hold them — often made of loose rock or ice — fail, they can unleash sudden and devastating Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOFs), causing significant damage to property, infrastructure, and agricultural land, and resulting in extensive loss of life. However, the impact varies significantly across the world. For example, only 393 fatalities have been attributed to glacial lake outburst floods in the European Alps over the past millennium, while 5,745 deaths occurred in South America, and 6,300 in Central Asia.

The Thulagi glacier, located south-west of Mount Manaslu, in the Manang mountain range in the Himalayas, is slowly melting, transforming from ice into a lake. Image from Flickr. CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

HKH: A region of extreme vulnerability

The Hindu Kush-Karakoram-Himalaya (HKH) range is one of the most vulnerable mountain systems globally to GLOF events. This vulnerability stems not only from the frequency and scale of the glacial lakes, but also from the large populations living downstream in high-risk zones.

According to recent studies, High Mountain Asia (HMA), which includes the HKH region, has the world’s highest GLOF exposure, with approximately 9.3 million people at risk — about 62 percent of the globally exposed population. 

Of the four highly populous countries accounting for more than half of this population, three are based in the HKH region: India, Pakistan, and China. India and Pakistan are rated as having the highest GLOF danger globally, not only due to the number and size of glacial lakes, but also because of their large and exposed populations.

Across the HKH region, researchers have recorded over 500 GLOF events in recent decades, many of them devastating. In 2020, a GLOF event in Jinwuco, China, unleashed an estimated 10 million cubic meters of water downriver. This destroyed villages, infrastructure, and an estimated 382.43 mu (25.5 hectares) of farmland. Wang Shijin, a researcher at the Northwest Institute of Eco-Environment and Resources, Chinese Academy of Sciences, explained to ScienceNet.com.cn, a Chinese-language science journal:

针对目前青藏高原冰湖溃决灾害增加的现象，随着气候变暖加剧、极端事件增加，雪/冰崩、冰川跃动、冰川洪水等冰冻圈失稳事件频发，进而激发了冰湖溃决事件的发生。在一定外因作用下，青藏高原极有可能再次发生溃决洪水灾害。

Regarding the current increase in glacial lake outburst disasters on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau … with intensified climate warming and an increase in extreme events, cryosphere instability events such as snow/ice avalanches, glacier surges, and glacial floods are becoming more frequent, triggering the occurrence of glacial lake outburst disasters.

Other floods, like the 2013 Chorabari flood in India and the 2023 South Lhonak outburst in Sikkim, have caused extensive damage to infrastructure and communities.

The 2023 incident was a cascade of disasters, beginning with 14.7 million cubic meters of permafrost sliding into the South Lhonak Lake, which is located at 5,200 meters above sea level in Sikkim, India. According to researchers, the landslide generated a “20-meter tsunami-like impact wave,” which breached the natural dam and sent 50 million cubic meters of water cascading downriver. The ensuing flood picked up an estimated 270 million cubic meters of sediment and debris and carved a path of destruction 385 kilometers along the Teesta River, until it eventually reached Bangladesh. The disaster caused 55 deaths, displaced thousands, and destroyed millions of dollars’ worth of roads, buildings, and infrastructure, including the Teesta III hydropower dam and several other dams along the Teesta River. 

Given the extensive use of dams and hydropower in the region, the risk to hydropower stations is a real threat — and an expensive one. In 1985, a glacier lake flood destroyed the nearly-completed Namche Small Hydropower Plant, costing the Nepal government an estimated USD 1.5 million and delaying residents’ access to the expected energy output.

A ticking time bomb

GLOF risks are only increasing as warming global temperatures make glacial regions more unstable. According to experts, disasters in high mountain terrain are often chain reactions. Zhang Qianggong, head of the climate and environmental risks unit at the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), explains in an interview with Global Voices:

Maybe upstream, because of melting glaciers, a piece of ice fell into the glacial lake, causing waves, which eventually damaged the dam, triggering a GLOF. Then, along the way down, it triggers landslides, so it affects all areas within 10 kilometers. Mountain areas are very sensitive.

“It’s very hard to predict a GLOF,” says Zhang. The triggers are complex. A flood can start when landslides or ice chunks fall into the lake and create large waves; when heavy rainfall or rapid snow and glaciers melt overfill the lake; or when the natural dam — made of ice or loose rock — begins to weaken. However, because these events depend heavily on local conditions, it is very difficult to predict exactly when and where a GLOF might occur without detailed, on-the-ground research.

Yet the consequences are transboundary, not the result of a single-country problem. Xu Baiqing, a leading expert at the Institute of Tibetan Plateau Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, warns:

Whether in terms of water resource management or scientific and technological efforts, international cooperation is essential. It’s extremely difficult to carry out this kind of work unilaterally.

To tackle the growing risks of glacial lake outburst floods, research institutes like the Institute of Tibetan Plateau Research have adopted a multilayered approach. “The first step,” says Dr. Xu Baiqing, deputy director of the institute, “is to compile a comprehensive glacier lake inventory.”

This was achieved with support from European scientists, using integrated space-air-ground observation systems that now cover nearly the entire Himalayan region. Once the catalog was established, the next phase was risk identification. Whether a lake poses danger depends on multiple factors: the water volume, the structural stability of the moraine dam, and the potential downstream damage in case of a breach.

“This means that careful, multi-dimensional risk assessments are necessary,” he notes. For high-risk areas, it is essential to selectively build out a complete chain of systems: observation, early warning, and preventative infrastructure. All of this requires access to one essential currency in the information age: data.

Originally published on Global Voices

A BYD showroom in the Tashkent City Mall in Uzbekistan. Central Asia is fast becoming a hotspot for imported Chinese-brand EVs. Image from Global Voices’ Climate Justice Fellow Zhaoyin Feng. Used with permission.

This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Find more stories here.

China has emerged as the key partner for Tajikistan’s green transportation transition and is quickly becoming the country's main supplier of electric vehicles (EVs). With increased commitments to helping produce EVs locally, it could also boost the local car manufacturing industry and help imorove air quality in polluted areas. 

Of the five Central Asian states, Tajikistan has taken the most dramatic measures to accelerate its transition to EVs. It has made it mandatory for all taxi companies in the capital, Dushanbe, to switch to EVs, and set a target of 20–30 percent of all cars to be electric by 2030. These measures are accompanied by tax and customs duty breaks for EVs until 2032. 

Officials hope to leverage this momentum and become a leader in the global green transition. The President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon, noted in a June 2024 speech at the International Water for Sustainable Development Conference:

Еще одной нашей целью является превращение Таджикистана в «зелёную страну» к 2037 году.

Another of our goals is to transform Tajikistan into a ‘green country’ by 2037.

This urgency stems from Tajikistan’s air pollution issues, where cars with internal combustion engines are blamed for being one of the primary pollution drivers. 

Tajikistan’s EV transition perfectly aligns with China’s rise as the global leader in the manufacturing and export of EVs and the growing bilateral cooperation between the two countries. The budding EV cooperation, however, puts Tajikistan on a trajectory to increase its dependence on China even further. This worries some observers who note that China has already used its significant economic footprint to encroach upon Tajikistan’s political autonomy on several occasions. 

Air pollution and the EV transition 

Smoggy city views in Tajikistan's capital, Dushanbe. Screenshot from YouTube.

For the last several years, Tajikistan has remained on the list of countries with the highest levels of air pollution in the world. In 2023, the country was ranked fourth on IQAir’s list of most polluted countries. In 2024, it was ranked sixth on the same list. The problem is acute in Dushanbe as well, where, between 1998 and 2021, the annual PM2.5 concentrations increased from 17.8 μg/m3 to 32.7 μg/m3. 

The most direct impact of air pollution falls on the shoulders of regular people, whose health deteriorates over time. In Tajikistan, the air pollution-induced mortality rate stands at 78 deaths per 100,000 people per year, the second worst in Central Asia after Uzbekistan. This adds up to more than 4,800 premature deaths annually due to air pollution. The Statistics Agency reports that about 28 percent of all diseases are related to the respiratory system, further highlighting the scale of air pollution’s impact. 

To improve the situation, Tajikistan has sought to clean up it's roadways and transition to EVs, especially in Dushanbe, where cars pollution is heightened, according to the authorities. Thus, in June 2024, the mayor’s office issued a decree ordering the 12 taxi companies in Dushanbe to switch all 4,350 cars to electric by September 1, 2025. In addition, the mayor’s office plans to switch to electric buses by 2028. 

A busy road in Dushanbe. Screenshot from YouTube.

This was carried out in line with the Program for the Development of Electric Transport for 2023–2028. It set several ambitious goals, including the local production of EVs and their components, construction of infrastructure for power supply and maintenance, development of battery recycling technology, and the provision of benefits to EV drivers. In 2022, the authorities also exempted EVs from all taxes and import customs duties for the next 10 years. 

These measures certainly helped increase the number of EVs. In 2022, the Ministry of Transport reported that out of some 445,000 passenger cars, only 120 units were EVs, or 0.03 percent. Fast forward to 2025, and the number of electric transport, the absolute majority of which are passenger EVs, reached 34,354 units and made up around 5 percent of all vehicles in the country.     

An all-encompassing partner 

As is often the case in Tajikistan, when it comes to relying on partners to address its domestic challenges, the country turned to China, whose role in Tajikistan’s economy is hard to overestimate. It is simultaneously the country’s biggest investor and lender, as well as the second-largest trade partner after Russia. Between 2007 and 2023, Chinese investments totaled USD 3.845 billion, according to Tajikistan’s State Committee for Investments and State Property Management. The bilateral cooperation covers a wide range of fields, including energy, transport, mining, agriculture, construction, and more. 

Tajikistan’s EV scene is dominated by China, whose exports constituted close to 83 percent of EV imports into Tajikistan in the first half of 2024, at a time when imports from Japan and Germany were down by 75 percent and 90 percent. According to the Chinese state-run media CGTN, Chinese EVs constitute more than 90 percent of Tajikistan’s EV imports. It is forecasted that sanctions against Russia and US tariffs on Chinese goods may further increase this share. 

In 2024, Dushanbe’s mayor’s office launched a fleet of electric microbuses with plans to increase their number in the future. The CGTN news reportage hailed the project for providing drivers with modern and efficient vehicles that were good for the environment and reduced Tajikistan’s dependence on fuel imports. 

When talking about EVs in the country, it is easy to talk about non-Chinese actors rather than listing various Chinese projects. The only non-Chinese EV actor in the country is a joint Turkish-Tajik bus factory that produced its first 30 electric buses in May of 2025. 

According to experts on China and Central Asia relations, Temur Umarov and Roman Vakulchuk, Chinese companies used diplomacy and lobbying to expand into the Tajik market instead of using traditional market-oriented expansion models. In their article on the Chinese takeover of the car market in Central Asia, they discuss how, in 2023, the two sides agreed to establish a factory to manufacture 1,500 EVs locally, and the import of Chinese EVs increased dramatically afterwards. 

‘Green Silk Road’ or growing dependency 

Chinese state-run media usually frames China’s EV push in Central Asia as part of broader efforts aimed at establishing a “Green Silk Road.” That is, EVs are situated alongside Chinese development of energy infrastructure in Central Asia, as another ecological initiative that China provides for in Central Asia. 

Chinese EV brands are increasingly seen as high-quality products by local industry experts, while also being affordable and reliable. To this extent, Chinese state-run media touts stories of local entrepreneurs who have benefited from the EV trade and express pride in seeing Chinese brands going global, such as this excerpt from an interview in the state-funded CCTV.

过去十年，我国新能源汽车年产销量从万辆级跨越到千万辆级，产品出口到70多个国家和地区，占世界比重超六成，成为中国制造的一张‘亮丽名片。

Over the past decade, my country's annual production and sales of new energy vehicles have leapt from tens of thousands to tens of millions, with products exported to more than 70 countries and regions, accounting for more than 60 percent of the world's total, becoming a ‘bright business card’ of Made in China.

A parking lot filled with Dushanbe's new electric taxis (green and white), purchased from China. Screenshot from the Chinese state-funded CGTN's YouTube video.

As more Dushanbe taxi drivers adopt Chinese EVs, company spokespeople are reporting positive results. For example, in an interview with Chinese state-funded Xinhua, a representative from Tajikistan's 3333 taxi service noted that “Local drivers are very welcoming of Chinese EVs due to their superior quality.” Ruslan Sarbozzoda (Русланом Сарбоззода), head of the ECO-City taxi project at Yak Taxi, told Asia Plus:

Более половины привезенных автомобилей уже приобрели счастливые водители “ЯК Такси”, которые экономят деньги на бензине и получают восторженные комментарии от пассажиров о комфорте и бесшумном передвижении.

More than half of the imported vehicles have already been purchased by happy Yak Taxi drivers, who are saving money on gas and receiving enthusiastic comments from passengers about the comfort and quiet ride.

EVs are also cited positively alongside efforts by China to assist in combating climate change and tackling environmental issues. 

Together with EVs, over time, Tajikistan will adopt Chinese technologies related to the maintenance, charging, and disposal of EVs. In this regard, experts warn that such a large share of one actor is not optimal. Umarov and Vakulchuk note that China’s dominance will eventually rise “to the level of managing first the urban infrastructure, and then the transport system of the entire country, leaving no room for competitors.” 

While convenient and efficient, Tajikistan’s growing reliance on China for the EV transition is also concerning from a political autonomy perspective. Previously, China has taken advantage of Tajikistan’s inability to repay debt to secure lucrative mining rights and even claim 1,100 square kilometers of land. Effectively controlling Tajikistan’s EV market will equip China with another tool for political influence, and who is to say it won’t use it for leverage?   

Originally published on Global Voices

Floods hit Hue city, Vietnam, in 2020. Via Wikimedia Commons By Lê Minh Đức CC BY-SA 4.0

This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Find more stories here.

In March 2025, torrential rains inundated the streets of Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia. The heavy rainfall caused severe deluge in the city and its nearby areas, killing at least nine people and displacing 90,000. It also reminded residents of painful memories from 2020, when intense flooding in the metropolitan city killed at least 60 people. 

Social media was soon flooded with videos of the disaster, the ensuing evacuation missions, and first responders’ mitigation efforts. One such video shows emergency personnel rescuing people in boats and trying to clear flooded roads by shooting the excess water into the river with firetrucks.

@tawabb_

Inalillahi, turut berduka atas musibah Hari ini, Selasa 4 Maret 2025 Banjir di sejumlah Wilayah Jabodetabek .. Kali Ciliwung, Jatinegara, Jakarta Timur

♬ suara asli – Tawabb – tawabb_

Inalillahi, turut berduka atas musibah Hari ini, Selasa 4 Maret 2025 Banjir di sejumlah Wilayah Jabodetabek .. Kali Ciliwung, Jatinegara, Jakarta Timur

To Allah we belong and to Him we return, condolences for the disaster today, Tuesday, March 4, 2025 Floods in a number of areas of Jabodetabek .. Ciliwung River, Jatinegara, East Jakarta

Other major cities in Southeast Asia have also been devastated by severe floods caused by extreme weather. 

Parts of metropolitan Manila, the capital of the Philippines, experienced flooding from phenomenal rainfall at unprecedented intensity this August. According to expert analysis, the downpour in the city was equivalent to about five days of rain, dumped in just one hour. In Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, after heavy thunderstorms this September, streets were submerged by over a meter of water, triggering widespread traffic gridlock. Residents had to abandon their vehicles and wade through flooded roads during rush hour.

Extreme weather events linked to climate change are occurring at a higher frequency and intensity in Southeast Asia. This exacerbates urban flooding, a chronic problem in many sprawling megacities in the region due to outdated urban planning, low-lying coastal positions, and oversaturated land. 

Heavy rain caused flash floods in Quezon City, the Philippines, in 2023. via Wikimedia Commons. CC-BY-SA-4.0 

Urban flooding is also common in China, as 641 of the country's 654 largest cities are affected by regular flooding, especially megacities on its eastern and southern coast.

In order to resolve the problem of urban flooding, China incorporated the concept of “sponge cities” (海绵城市) into its national policy in 2013, and pilot projects featuring this concept have subsequently launched in scores of cities across the country.

What is a sponge city?

One of China's most prominent urban architects, Yu Kongjian (俞孔坚), proposed the sponge city method for managing floods. 

Yu uses a sponge as a metaphor for cities’ rainwater storage capacity. While conventional flood water management focuses on draining water away as quickly as possible through engineered drainage infrastructure, such as pipes and water channels, sponge cities emphasize the opposite — absorbing water and slowly releasing it, like a sponge. 

“Floods are not enemies,” Yu explains. “We can make friends with floods. We can make friends with water.”

Tianjin Qiaoyuan Park in Tianjin, China, is one of the early sponge city projects. Image via Wikimedia Commons by Mydogistiaotiaohu CC BY-SA 4.0

As cities expand, natural ground is replaced by impermeable surfaces, such as concrete and asphalt, that prevent water from being absorbed. Yu believes that the destruction of many natural water systems, such as rivers, lakes, and wetlands, due to rapid urbanization, is one of the key reasons why flooding disasters occur so frequently in Chinese megacities today. The sponge city model focuses on restoring natural water systems, enabling the land to absorb rainwater, thereby mitigating flooding disasters and reusing the rainwater locally. In an interview with the Chinese state-funded People's Daily, Yu explained his belief that overreliance on “grey” infrastructure (such as concrete dams and pipelines) can be limiting:

工业化大家相信人类的技术、人类的机械工程、钢筋水泥工程能够征服自然。因为它有科学的模型，它能计算出水流，能计算出运动的轨迹，能计算出河道。越直、越硬、越光，它的过水越快，它的防洪效果越好。就是这种工程机械的，这种机械的工程思维，就是单一目标的思考。

Industrialization has fostered a belief that human technology, mechanical engineering, and reinforced concrete can conquer nature. Because it has scientific models, it can calculate water flow, calculate movement trajectories, calculate river channels. The straighter, harder, and smoother, the faster the water passes, the better the flood control effect. This is the kind of engineering machinery, this kind of mechanical engineering thinking, that is, single-minded thinking.

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced his support for sponge cities and made them a top priority for the future.

解决城市缺水问题，必须顺应自然。比如，在提升城市排水系统时要优先考虑把有限的雨水留下来，优先考虑更多利用自然力量排水，建设自然积存、自然渗透、自然净化的'海绵城市'。

To solve the problem of urban water shortages, we must adapt to nature. For example, when improving urban drainage systems, we should prioritize keeping limited rainwater, prioritize using more natural forces for drainage, and build ‘sponge cities’ with natural accumulation, natural infiltration, and natural purification.

Some of the strategies employed to create these so-called sponge cities include green roofs, rainwater storage and infiltration systems, sunken green spaces, permeable pavement, bioretention ponds, wetland revitalization, restoring natural waterflow pathways, and more.

Researchers have found that the sponge city projects in China have significantly improved stormwater runoff control and helped reform unfavorable geographical environments. 

Adaptation in Southeast Asia

Yu believes that his water management concept will be effective in flood-vulnerable countries such as Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia, while some other countries including Singapore, the US and Russia are already benefiting from the implementation of similar concepts. 

In an interview with the Chinese media Sanlian Lifeweek, Yu points out that China and Southeast Asia share the same challenges brought by monsoon climates. 

在季风性气候下，降雨严重不均，一天可能有200毫米的雨降下来，再大的地下蓄水空间，再粗的排水管道和强大的排水泵站，都没办法解决瞬时的排洪排涝问题……最有效的解决方法就是基于自然、适应于自然、借助于自然来解决问题。

Under a monsoon climate, rainfall is extremely uneven. In a single day, as much as 200 millimeters of rain may fall, and no matter how large the underground water storage space, how wide the drainage pipes, or how powerful the pumping stations, the problem of discharging floodwaters instantaneously cannot be solved….the most effective solution is to address problems by being based on nature, adapted to nature, and making use of nature.

Conventional water management approaches, which mainly focus on channeling rainwater out of the city, are unsuitable for cities with monsoon climates, Yu states. 

“These cities fail because they have been colonised by Western culture and copied their infrastructure and urban model,” he says in an interview with the BBC.

Yu and his team have applied the sponge city concept in the bustling urban heart of Bangkok, where they transformed the site of a former tobacco factory into Benjakitti Forest Park. The park reduces the destructive force of stormwater, filters contaminated water and provides a wildlife habitat as well as a public recreational space to residents, according to a press release by Turenspace, an urban design company founded by Yu.  

The project demonstrated success in the summer of 2022, when Bangkok experienced a 10-year rainfall event. Much of the city was flooded, while the park and its vicinity were not.

The design goals of Tianjin Qiaoyuan Park include containing and purifying urban stormwater and improving the saline-alkali soil through natural processes. Image via Wikimedia Commons by Joshua L. CC BY 2.0

Controversies and challenges 

At the same time, sponge cities have faced controversies and skepticism. Though the concept has been piloted in many Chinese cities, it is mostly implemented on a small scale in individual neighborhoods, streets, or areas. As a result, its flood mitigation impacts are often limited to the local level, rather than city- or nationwide. 

In a previous interview, Yu himself acknowledged that scaling up the pilot projects in Chinese cities is challenging, as it demands cross-departmental collaboration, requiring strong political will and extensive administrative coordination.

Some critics also point out that the sponge city design often can’t fully cope with the unprecedented levels of rainfall brought on by the climate crisis. In 2021, when heavy rainfall hit Henan province in China, floods killed 292 people in its capital city, Zhengzhou, which is a major pioneer of the sponge city concept. Many questioned the effectiveness of the sponge city infrastructure after the fatal disaster. 

The floods in 2021 caused great damage to the city of Zhengzhou. Image via Wikimedia Commons  CC BY-SA 4.0

Worse still, under climate change, extreme weather events are becoming more frequent and severe. Some critics argue that design standards are not always fully updated to withstand intensifying precipitation trends under climate change.

Hu Gang, a Chinese urban planning expert explains that the sponge city model can only function during moderate or light rainfall, but not during a recording-breaking rainstorm. To alleviate urban flooding caused by extreme rainfall, Hu says that in addition to continuously building sponge city infracture, establishing a more comprehensive drainage system, emergency shelter and disaster preparedness plans are also key solutions.

From the perspective of Southeast Asia, there are obstacles to implementing the sponge city concept. For example, for flood-prone Jakarta, the high cost of developing sponge city infrastructure is often cited as one of the biggest challenges. Other obstacles include an aging drainage system and a lack of space for new construction or redevelopment in the overcrowded capital.

In 2022, Indonesian officials announced that to absorb rainfall and minimize flood damage, the sponge city concept would be implemented in Indonesia's upcoming capital city, Nusantara, which is currently being constructed in East Kalimantan and will replace Jakarta upon completion. The city is being built from the ground up, and officials are claiming it will be the “world's most sustainable city.” The project is one of the first instances of a country moving its capital due to climate pressures, and has not unfolded without controversy. 

Nusantara will incorporate large open spaces connected to its hydrological system to retain and store rainwater, according to the report. The new capital city will also feature porous road surfaces and green rooftops to reduce direct runoff. However, the construction of the new capital city is currently shadowed by budget cuts, and concerns grow that the development of Nusantara will not be completed anytime soon. 

Originally published on Global Voices

Parts of the Aral Sea, a once-expansive body of water between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, have dried up, leaving boats grounded and the region desertified. Image from Flickr. License: CC BY 2.0

This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Find more stories here.

Once the fourth-largest lake in the world, the Aral Sea is now almost entirely a desert, having lost more than 90 percent of its surface area since the 1960s. The water that is left has become highly salinated and polluted, which has caused ecological devastation. In 2010, then UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon flew over it on a helicopter and, in a state of shock, admitted the experience left him “with a profound impression, one of sadness that such a mighty sea has disappeared.” 

The lake is situated on the border between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In the 1960s, when both nations were part of the Soviet Bloc, officials launched a plan to cultivate vast stretches of barren land in Central Asia by redirecting water from the two main rivers that fed the Aral Sea: the Syr Darya and Amu Darya. No one managed to foresee the devastating effects that would ensue.

Without water from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, the lake dried up. For decades, the lakebed accumulated toxic pesticides and fertilizers washed down from the cotton fields. 

NASA’s Terra and Aqua satellites have been documenting the diminishing of the Aral Sea since 2000. Image from NASA Goddard Photo and Video. License: CC BY 2.0

While there have been various attempts to restore the sea over the last 34 years, neither country has achieved a significant breakthrough. In 2005, Kazakhstan completed the Dike Kokaral Dam, which trapped water in its part of the lake and somewhat revived commercial fishing in the northwestern part of the sea, though the total lake volume continues to drop. Uzbekistan has not had any success in addressing the desertification, soil erosion, and sand/salt storms brought by the disaster.

Kazakhstan's Dike Kokaral Dam. Image from Wikimedia Commons via the EU's Copernicus satellite. Contains modified Copernicus Sentinel data 2021. Free to use.

However, Uzbekistan is now enlisting help from China, a global leader in fighting desertification and soil erosion, and the situation is looking up for the first time in decades. China has extensive experience implementing drip irrigation methods (also known as micro-irrigation), a process where water is dripped directly into the soil near the roots of crops through tubing. This process can save 50–80 percent more water than traditional farming methods and can achieve water-fertilizer integration.

As one industry analysis report from the China Report Network (中国报告网) noted:

省水、省工、增产、节能、灌溉效果最佳、地形适应力强.

It saves water, saves labor, increases yield, saves energy, has the best irrigation effect, and has strong adaptability to terrain.

The cost of “white gold” 

The Aral Sea disaster is tightly linked to Uzbekistan’s cultivation of cotton, or “white gold” as it is sometimes called. The Soviet Union’s agricultural plans turned the country into a giant cotton plantation with an annual production of 4.5 million tons, which accounted for more than 30 percent of the bloc’s total cotton output. 

Cotton fields in Uzbekistan's Tashkent region. License CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

The loss of such a colossal body of water significantly affected the climate, manifesting in unbearably hot summers and harsh frosts in winter. The residents of the Aral Sea region were hit hardest. In the late 1990s, the child mortality rate in the region was the highest in the world, and the situation remains dire. 

Every year, storms disperse 80 million tons of toxic sand and salt from the lake bed, which poisons the population, leading to a myriad of chronic and deadly diseases. 

Various regional studies found toxic substances, insecticides, and dangerous pesticides in the blood and urine of adults and children, and even in the milk of nursing mothers. Adults and children in the region often suffer from anemia, cancer, kidney disease, and epidemic-spreading tuberculosis. 

Drip irrigation and salt-resistant plants

The environmental cooperation on the Aral Sea is just one aspect of the rapidly growing engagement between Uzbekistan and China, which covers energy, mining, car manufacturing, renewable energy, transportation, and agriculture, among others. China is simultaneously Uzbekistan’s largest trade partner and investor. In 2024, the number of Uzbek-Chinese joint enterprises rose by 43.6 percent and reached 3,357, cementing China's role in the region. 

A drip irrigation project in Uzbekistan. Image via UNDP Uzbekistan Flickr. License: CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

In 2016, the two countries made the first step towards jointly addressing the Aral Sea crisis when a group of Chinese scientists visited the region for a study, which lasted more than five years. In 2022, the researchers concluded that the main reasons for the lake’s dessication in the last 20 years were climate change and lack of water-saving technologies on agricultural lands. Farmers utilize water-saving technologies on only five percent of the arable land in Uzbekistan, leaving a massive potential for water-saving technologies.

The hands-on cooperation started in 2020 when the Xinjiang Institute of Ecology and Geography (XIEG) under the Chinese Academy of Sciences started rolling out drip irrigation systems in several locations across Uzbekistan to showcase its efficiency. 

Chen Xi, Director of the Research Center for Ecology and Environment of Central Asia under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, shared:

棉花种植的高耗水量可以通过推广节水技术增加用水效率来解决，高效节水技术可使乌兹别克斯坦每年节约80-100亿立方米的水资源，可用于产业发展和咸海生态修复。

The high water consumption of cotton cultivation can be solved by promoting water-saving technology and increasing water use efficiency. High-efficiency water-saving technology can enable Uzbekistan to save 8–10 billion cubic meters of water each year, which can be used for industrial development and Aral Sea ecological restoration.

This would be a huge positive development given that no water feeds the Uzbek part of the lake, and the Kazakh side got only 2.6 million cubic meters in 2024.  

Boats have been left grounded in Uzbekistan's Moynaq region as the Aral Sea's once-expansive water has dried up. Image from Wikimedia Commons. License: CC BY 2.0

In parallel to promoting efficient irrigation systems, China has been working on afforestation programs. In 2020, XIEG built a nursery garden on the lake shore, where dozens of salt-tolerant plants were successfully grown, showing their potential for scaling up and reducing the salinity in the soil.

This was followed up on a much larger scale. In 2025, Abdirashit Mirzambetov, Head of the laboratory of biotechnology and plant physiology of the International Innovation Center of the Aral Sea region, shared:

Мы привезли из Китая свыше двухсот видов солеустойчивых и засухоустойчивых растений. Их семена будут выращиваться в регионах Приаралья с последующим их выращиванием на осушенном дне Аральского моря.

We've brought over two hundred species of salt- and drought-resistant plants from China. Their seeds will be grown in the Aral Sea region and then cultivated on the reclaimed bed of the Aral Sea.

According to the Chinese Academy of Sciences, in early 2025, XIEG shipped 1.5 tons of salt-tolerant plant seeds to Uzbekistan to establish a joint saline plant garden. “These seeds will support land restoration efforts and serve as a foundation for biodiversity research,” Wang Ping from XIEG said.  

The latest technological know-how brought by Chinese scientists to the Aral Sea region is solar-powered solutions. In this regard, in 2025, XIEG installed “drip irrigation systems powered by photovoltaic panels” and an “innovative solar-powered smart irrigation system for cotton cultivation.” XIEG states that “the project has tripled cotton yields and significantly reduced production costs and water consumption.” 

Green diplomacy

China has touted its efforts in aiding Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan with the shrinking of the Aral Sea. This allows China to brand itself as a high-tech superpower in messaging directed toward Central Asia. Likewise, China can depict itself as ecologically friendly.

At a time when Western powers are increasingly wavering on their international commitments, the Aral sea crisis is also understood as a way for China to solidify ties with Uzbekistan and other central Asian countries, in “upholding the principles of ‘science without borders,’” with the implication that Western countries have abandoned this task or sought to use scientific assistance as a coercive tool.

In assisting Uzbekistan, China draws on its own experiences in fighting desertification and soil erosion. China has created the world’s largest man-made forest in Saihanba, Hebei, as well as sought to transform the desert in Inner Mongolia. It's experience in restoring the Tarim River basin in northeastern China is seen as especially relevant, however, in that conditions there are seen as similar to the Aral Sea. 

The Saihan Tower at Saihanba National Forest Park in Hebei, China. This park is the largest man-made park in the world, and is an example of China's reforestation experience. Image from Wikimedia Commons. CC BY-SA 4.0

Given this experience, China has sought to frame itself as an expert in combating desertification as a means to strengthen ties with Uzbekistan and other countries facing issues with soil erosion and desertification. 

Ultimately, the success of this cooperation and the overall responsibility to deal with the Aral Sea disaster lay on Uzbekistan’s shoulders as the host nation. China has already emerged as a winner by positioning itself as the leader in this field and a responsible foreign actor willing to engage beyond extracting resources. 

Such cooperation helps China improve its public image in Uzbekistan, especially among regular citizens. It will likely take decades to see any improvement in the Aral Sea crisis, but China will be remembered as having lent a helping hand to reverse it.