A farmer picking cotton in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Local authorities have not been able to entirely tamp down fears around Chinese companies taking local land. License CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Find more stories here.

In the first half of 2025, anti-Chinese content flared up on Uzbek social media. The allegations claimed that Chinese nationals and companies were taking over Uzbekistan by purchasing land and property and securing mining licences to extract gold.  

These were the first instances of large-scale anti-Chinese sentiment in Uzbekistan. They raised questions about the origin of anti-Chinese sentiments and concerns over the future of bilateral engagement, which promises to grow bigger in the coming years. 

The Uzbek government has attempted to calm the population in response, explaining that engagement with China brings benefits to Uzbekistan, and saying the rise in complaints were disinformation campaigns run by third parties based abroad. 

However, given the wide-scale public reaction to the anti-Chinese posts on social media, whether these incidents were indeed foreign manipulations or genuine local discontent built up over the years remains an open question and deserves a closer look.    

“Uzbekistan that is sold to China”

A screenshot of Fazliddin Shahobiddin's YouTube video “Uzbekistan is sold to China.“ Fair use

The start of the anti-Chinese campaign can be traced to the YouTube video titled “Uzbekistan that is sold to China” (XITOYGA SOTILGAN O'ZBEKISTON) from February 23, 2025. In it, a former Uzbek imam, Fazliddin Shahobiddin, laments that businesses with Chinese names, written using Chinese characters, are appearing in the country at a fast rate, while stores with Arabic and Islamic names are forced to adopt Uzbek names. 

He adds that Chinese companies are purchasing property, land, and gold mining licences. There is a warning about Tashkent’s growing foreign debt to Beijing, which Shahobiddin notes comes with a condition that it adopts policies targeting its Muslim population. While human rights organizations agree that Uzbekistan is backsliding on its religious freedom promises, no reports have linked these policies to China, and in fact, much of the crackdown pre-dates significant Chinese investments.

On March 5, another YouTube channel, Demokrat Uz, released a video titled “The Chinese conflict in Uzbekistan: The Chinese are not just coming, they are settling down.” The video complains that Chinese individuals are purchasing property throughout the country, including major markets in the capital, Tashkent: Askiya and Abu Sahiy. It adds that the so-called “takeover” is evidenced by their presence in the makhallas, residential neighborhoods typically inhabited only by locals. 

Screenshot from Hasan Mamasaidov's Telegram channel. Fair use.

Additionally, Hasan Mamasaidov, a local businessman, published a video on many platforms, including a Telegram channel with over 870,000 followers, claiming that the ads in Chinese are subconsciously preparing the Uzbek people for the eventual takeover by China, which will “take place without using force.”

Excerpts from these and other videos, claiming anti-Chinese protests were taking place in the country, quickly spread on social media. 

Denying the rumors and allegations   

Such campaigns don’t bode well for the Uzbek government, since it prioritizes cooperation with China, which serves as Uzbekistan’s largest trade partner and investor. In 2024, the number of Uzbek-Chinese joint businesses rose by 43.6 percent and reached 3,357, cementing China firmly as its closest partner. 

Their bilateral cooperation took off in 2016, when the current President Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power and opened the country to foreign investment after decades of relative isolation. Today, the China-Uzbekistan cooperation covers energy, mining, renewable energy, transportation, agriculture, and many other fields.

Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev shaking hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2025. Image from the PRC Embassy. Fair use.

Thus, the authorities rushed to counter the anti-Chinese messages spread on social media. On February 24, the Center for Subsoil Use of Uzbekistan denied rumors that Chinese companies had purchased 31 gold deposits in the central-north Navoi province through auctions. It noted that the winning companies were either fully or largely owned by Uzbek citizens. 

On March 10, the Cadastral Agency of Uzbekistan took the baton of denying rumors and clarified that foreign citizens and companies, including Chinese, cannot buy Uzbek land or property; they can only lease it. 

Finally, the spokesperson of the Uzbek government, Bekzod Khidoyatov, gave an interview on the matter, noting that the anti-Chinese sentiments appear to be a “third-party controlled manipulation campaign”:

 Призываем наших граждан не верить провокациям.

Китай является историческим и стратегическим партнёром Узбекистана, который уважает нашу территориальную целостность и суверенитет, что подтверждено отдельным соглашением. Таким образом, нет оснований для паники.

We urge our citizens not to give in to provocations.

China is a historical and strategic partner of Uzbekistan, which respects our territorial integrity and sovereignty, which is confirmed by a separate agreement. Thus, there is no reason to panic.

There is some truth to Khidoyatov’s words about the foreign origin of anti-Chinese sentiments and their manipulative nature. 

Shahobiddin, who has published other videos criticising the Uzbek authorities, appears to be in Turkey, based on the description of his YouTube channel. This would not be surprising given that Turkey has hosted Uzbekistan’s exiled opposition for decades. Meanwhile, Demokrat UZ's YouTube channel is listed as operating from Russia. Criticism of the authorities is largely impossible for media outlets in Uzbekistan due to strict censorship laws and a lack of media freedom, therefore, any critical content is likely coming from outside the country. 

Additionally, a local media outlet, Gazeta.uz, found that the videos of alleged anti-China protests were fakes. The depicted protests either took place abroad or were New Year celebrations in the eastern city of Namangan.   

Separating facts from fiction

Expert opinion on the matter partially converges with the government assessment. An international relations specialist, Yuriy Sarukhanyan, who is based in Tashkent, shared that there is no aggressive sinophobia in Uzbekistan. In an interview with Global Voices, Sarukhanyan explained that China is perceived as a “harmless panda” and not a threat.  

An expert on China, who is based in Uzbekistan and wished to remain anonymous, shared that most people in Uzbekistan hold neutral views on China. In an interview with Global Voices, they noted: “Around 60 percent of people are neutral towards China. Twenty percent have a positive perception, and the remaining 20 percent have a negative perception.”

At the same time, dismissing the anti-Chinese sentiments as lies and manipulation is an oversimplification of the complex and changing perception of China in Uzbekistan. 

According to Yunis Sharifli, a non-resident fellow at the China Global South Project, the public perception of China in Uzbekistan has become less favorable over the years, dropping from more than 70 percent in 2017 to 44 percent in 2023, based on the surveys conducted by the Central Asia Barometer. 

In an interview with Global Voices, Sharifli attributed this to the drastic growth of Chinese presence in Uzbekistan, which can come across as overwhelming and threatening to the local population. “Until 2016, Uzbekistan pursued a more inward-looking and sovereignty-conscious foreign policy, which cultivated a more cautious approach toward new actors among the population.” 

China has emerged as the biggest new actor and investor since 2016.

Sharifli highlighted: “There is sensitivity towards China leasing land, issuing debt, and mining gold, which leads to the conclusion that some people believe that more Chinese investments will erode Uzbekistan’s sovereignty and increase dependence on China.” 

It is not only foreign and opposition media that are fueling anti-Chinese sentiments. A local official in Samarkand was recorded threatening to hand local farmers’ land to the Chinese if they were not more productive. Most likely, this was said to motivate farmers to work hard, but instead, it led to nationwide concerns.

The land grab concerns are also fueled by actual incidents. In April 2025, Radio Ozodlik, an Uzbek branch of RFE/RL, published an investigation on the transfer of agricultural land to Chinese businessmen in two provinces. 

In the eastern Andijan, in 2024–2025, farmers were reportedly forced to give up their land parcels (4,000 hectares in total) to the authorities, who later handed them over to Chinese companies. In south-eastern Qashqararyo, in the same period, the authorities transferred 21,300 hectares to Chinese enterprises. 

Surprisingly, the government did not provide any explanation on the matter, even as the land transfer affected hundreds of farmers and surely created anti-Chinese sentiments at least on the provincial level.          

As close as “lips and teeth”

Chinese state-run media generally does not directly address pushback against Chinese projects in Uzbekistan and elsewhere. However, state-affiliated outlets did address the so-called disinformation campaign, framing it as a consequence of domestic businesses struggling to competing with Chinese businesses. Uzbekistan is presented as a closed economy, which is not used to engaging with foreign investors or international competition. 

Official Chinese narratives tout cooperation between China and Uzbekistan. The state-funded People’s Daily, for example, reported in 2023 that the relationship between China and Uzbekistan is as close as “lips and teeth” (唇与齿) and “hands and feet” (手与足).

Although Chinese authorities do not acknowledge anti-Chinese sentiments in Central Asia, they still take measures to address them. For example, in neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, where locals have held dozens of anti-Chinese protests in the past, China managed to improve its public image in the last three years. 

Kazakh police clash with activists protesting rising Chinese influence in 2021. Screenshot from YouTube. Fair use.

Sharifli explained it with China’s new PR strategy, which emphasizes its investments in renewables, electric vehicles, agriculture, and digitalization instead of talking about extracting natural resources and other environmentally degrading ventures. 

“As a result, people saw that China is not just taking their resources but also creating value for local communities,” he highlighted. He forecasts China will use the same strategy in Uzbekistan and improve its image by spotlighting projects that bring value to locals at the grassroots level.  

Overall, the anti-Chinese sentiments in Uzbekistan appear to be on the rise, but have not yet reached the level of explicit and aggressive Sinophobia. Improving China’s image will require multifaceted efforts from China and the host government alike.