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In just under two months in July and August 2024, the Student–People's uprising managed to topple the authoritarian government of Sheikh Hasina, in power since 2009, in one of the most astonishing displays of people power in South Asia. The movement began as a series of student-led protests against the rigged quota system for government positions and erupted into a nationwide pushback against unjust authoritarian policies. The disparate political forces that supported the student movement included the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the country's largest Islamist party, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, which was only recently unbanned in a June 2025 court ruling, leftist political parties, and the country's most well-known civil society leader, economist, and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Muhammad Yunus.

The interim government, led by Yunus, is navigating significant political tensions regarding the timing of national elections. While Yunus’ administration, strongly supported by the newly formed, student-led National Citizen Party (NCP) and the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami party, advocates for delaying elections until April 2026 to implement crucial reforms, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), a key supporter of the 2024 uprising and currently leading in voter surveys, is pushing for an earlier election, ideally by December 2025. This divergence stems from the BNP's concerns about political trust, economic stability, and international relations, while Yunus and his allies emphasize the necessity of foundational reforms — including those related to the judiciary, law enforcement, and the Election Commission — to ensure truly free and fair elections and prevent a return to authoritarianism.

Despite a public commitment to reforms, the interim government has faced challenges, with reports in late May 2025 indicating Yunus was feeling frustrated over slow progress and even considering resigning. Key figures within his administration, however, publicly urged him to remain for the sake of a democratic transition. The lack of tangible progress in reform, particularly on complex issues such as constitutional changes and judicial decentralization, has fueled anti-government protests and political infighting, exacerbating a deteriorating security situation. Both the NCP and Jamaat-e-Islami have conditioned their participation in elections on the completion of these reforms, while the BNP continues to press for an earlier electoral timeline, citing economic stagnation under the unelected government and concerns about the proposed April 2026 date's feasibility due to weather and religious observances.

Throughout June, the Civic Media Observatory has explored two main narratives that portray the current political challenges in Bangladesh. They describe a tense and uncertain political transition, with the interim government led by Yunus aiming for comprehensive reforms before elections in April 2026, while key political parties like the BNP push for earlier polls by December 2025, amidst slow reform progress and simmering instability.

Narrative: Yunus needs more time to complete reforms

Bangladesh's political landscape is currently dominated by a critical divergence over the timing of general elections. The interim government initially hinted at a June 2026 election, but on June 6, 2025, they officially set the date for April 2026. This timeline is largely supported by the student-led National Citizen Party (NCP) and the Jamaat-e-Islami party, both of whom insist that comprehensive institutional reforms, particularly within the judiciary, law enforcement, and the Election Commission, must precede any polls. This stance stems from a belief that such reforms are essential to ensure a truly fair democratic process and to prevent a return to the authoritarianism that characterized the previous regime.

However, this timeline faces significant opposition from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), a major political force that is popular with voters, which has been consistently pushing for an earlier election, ideally by December 2025. This pressure has led to a volatile period, with Yunus reportedly threatening to resign in late May 2025 due to a lack of progress on reforms and insufficient backing from political parties. While he was persuaded to stay, the underlying tensions persist. The interim government's advisory council has emphasized the need for broader unity to maintain stability and complete reforms, but the slow pace of tangible change, combined with calls for early elections from the BNP and even the Army Chief, risks exacerbating political instability and a deteriorating security situation.

How this narrative is shared online

Narrative: Only early elections can secure the country's future

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), a historic political force in Bangladesh that supported the 2024 “July Revolution,” is currently at odds with Muhammad Yunus’ transitional government over the election timeline. Despite outwardly supporting Yunus’ reform agenda, the BNP, which holds a strong lead in voter surveys, is vehemently pushing for elections by December 2025, rejecting the April 2026 date announced by Yunus on June 6. They argue that further delays risk eroding political trust, destabilizing the economy, and damaging international relations, while also citing practical concerns like adverse weather and the timing coinciding with Ramadan. After meeting with Tarique Rahman, the BNP's exiled leader in London in mid-June, Yunus conceded the possibility of holding the election in February 2026.

The pressure from the BNP underscores the deep divisions within the country's political landscape, where the desire for swift electoral return clashes with the interim government's stated aim of enacting comprehensive institutional reforms before relinquishing power. This narrative can provide a check on tendencies to keep Yunus in charge of an unelected government for years, as some of his supporters propose. At the same time, it's the BNP's main stratagem of engineering their return to power, as they appear to be more organized for an early election than the recently formed NCP, and the even more recently unbanned Jamaat-e-Islami, despite the two parties’ alignment with the chief adviser.

How this narrative is shared online

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In early December 2024, the brutal dynastic Assad regime that had ruled Syria since 1963 collapsed in the space of two weeks under a concerted offensive by disparate opposition forces coordinated by the Sunni Islamist militia group Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa.

We analyzed two narratives circulating among Syrians on X, searching for reactions to the major milestones as members of Syrian civil society monitored the establishment of the post-Assad state. Both narratives are prominent examples of how the community expresses its priorities and wishes for the country, and how it expects the political scenario to evolve in the near future.

But first, let's rewind a little. On January 29, 2025, the Syrian Revolution Victory Conference, organized by HTS at the Presidential Palace and attended by the leaders of the armed revolutionary factions that collaborated to topple the Assad regime, announced the appointment of al-Sharaa as transitional president, abolishing the constitution, parliament, military, and security services of the Assad regime. The conference was widely criticized for excluding vast segments of the opposition, such as the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) and its military wing, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and other civil society groups and figures.

In the 20 years since he was imprisoned by US forces in Iraq, Ahmed al-Sharaa, under the nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani, steered salafi jihadism towards Syria to fight the Assad regime, collaborated with and fought against the Islamic State (IS), pledged allegiance to and broke away from Al Qaeda, and, in a series of masterful and ruthless military campaigns, eliminated or coopted his Islamist opponents, eroded non-jihadist revolutionary forces and grappled with popular discontent, to erect a technocratic proto-state in northwestern Syria’s Idlib province. The non-democratic Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) developed the region to some extent and afforded its inhabitants some liberties, but effectively remained authoritarian, with al-Sharaa's style of governance described as “personalistic and dictatorial,” and widely documented human rights abuses attributed to HTS. 

In early March, following coordinated armed attacks by Assad regime remnants against military and security forces in the Latakia and Tartous governorates, sectarian revenge killings involving militias affiliated with the al-Sharaa government targeted the Alawite minority. The ensuing atrocities, reportedly including filmed humiliation, killings of hundreds of civilians, and kidnappings on a large scale, were met with protests and international condemnation. President al-Sharaa established a fact-finding committee to investigate the massacre, calling the attacks a threat on Syrian unity. However, as of yet, the fact-finding committee has not published its findings, and no individuals have been held publicly accountable.

Rather, certain leaders involved in the massacres have been promoted within the country's security apparatus. The most prominent example is Brigadier General Mohammed al-Jassem, also known as Abu Amsha. Formerly the commander of the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division, a faction within the Turkish-supported Syrian National Army, al-Jassem, who was implicated in the atrocities committed during the massacres, was appointed commander of the 25th Division. 

On March 14, President al-Sharaa signed an interim constitution, establishing legislation for a five-year transitional period with jurisprudence based on Islamic law, to be presided over by al-Sharaa himself. Human Rights Watch cautioned that the constitutional declaration “grants the president significant authority, including over judicial and legislative appointments without any checks or oversight.”

Narrative: President al-Sharaa is an authoritarian in disguise

Since the interim constitution was signed, more questions have arisen over al-Sharaa's political goals. In mid-May 2025, in assessing his pledge at the Victory Conference that new state institutions would be founded on transparency and accountability, London-based journal Syria in Transition asserted that “authoritarian mechanisms based on loyalty and patronage appear not as temporary necessities, but deliberate tools of power.” The journal noted that the appointment of the president's brothers in positions controlling access and decision-making is reminiscent of the Assad regime's entrenched nepotism. In mid-January, the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre questioned al-Sharaa's commitment to accountability after the appointment of draconian Islamist Idlib judge Shadi Al-Waisi as minister of justice. Al-Waisi was replaced in the post on March 30, but al-Sharaa continued appointing leaders of factions responsible for international crimes to high-level military positions.

On May 19, Human Rights Watch noted that the Transitional Justice Commission established by the constitutional declaration “is troublingly narrow and excludes many victims,” despite being “tasked with adopting victim-centred mechanisms.”

How this narrative is shared online

Narrative: We are hopeful and want to believe that President al-Sharaa can bring the change we need for Syria

This narrative carries the largely implicit belief that, due to his diplomatic prowess, political cunning, unique historical positioning to bridge the gap between the disparate forces vying over Syria, and the myriad challenges threatening Syria's recovery without other forces presenting themselves as potential solutions, President Ahmed al-Sharaa is the only possible leader who can deliver a peaceful and prosperous future for the country.

In less than six months after toppling the Assad regime, al-Sharaa has been mounting a campaign of diplomatic charm, both domestically and internationally, to build support for his vision of that future, meeting with international leaders and diplomats to secure sanctions relief and cooperation, and attempting to appease political, religious and military factions domestically. The effort culminated in the lifting of all or most economic sanctions on Syria by the United States, the European Union and several Western countries by mid-May.

How this narrative is shared online

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On May 25, 2025, Venezuela held regional and parliamentary elections in a government effort to demonstrate that the country still holds free and fair elections after President Nicolás Maduro's disputed reelection in July 2024 and despite credible evidence to the contrary.

Most of the Venezuelan opposition called for a boycott of the 2025 regional and parliamentary elections, faced with the dilemma of participating and risking winning without any guarantee the result would be recognized or abstaining and effectively handing all power to Nicolás Maduro’s government.

As preparation for the election, the Venezuelan regime launched a new wave of forced disappearances and detentions of dissidents, with Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello celebrating on May 23, 2025, the capture of notable opposition leader Juan Pablo Guanipa, who had been living in hiding since July 2024 and was considered a “terrorist” by the Venezuelan government. On that same day, Cabello announced the arrest of 70 politicians, activists, journalists, and lawyers over “national security” concerns.

Parallel to the crackdown on dissent, in an attempt to humanize the regime leadership and as part of what it calls efforts for the “protection and safe return of migrants” deported by the US, the government announced eleven days before the election the return of Maikelys Antonella Espinoza Bernal, a two-year-old separated from her family by the US government.

Narrative: President Maduro is the savior of the Venezuelan migrants

The people asserting this narrative frame, mostly the Venezuelan regime and its supporters but also desperate families, portray Nicolás Maduro as the only one who can guarantee the safety of the Venezuelan migrants targeted by anti-migration policies in countries like the US.

Under this reasoning, Maduro is depicted as the one making possible the reunification of families separated by anti-migration policies outside Venezuela.

The hostile climate against migrants in the US, where the country's government has sent over 200 Venezuelan migrants to a Salvadoran mega-prison without due process — including at least 50 men who had entered the US legally and never violated any immigration law — and deported thousands back to Venezuela, has become a political gain opportunity for the Venezuelan regime. 

The Trump administration's crackdown on migration has also affected around 350.000 Venezuelans under Temporal Protection Status, who are now looking desperately for an alternative after the US Supreme Court cleared the revocation of the program.

The Venezuelan regime shares this narrative frame, disregarding that, according to the UNHCR, nearly 8 million Venezuelans have fled the country due to widespread violence, hyperinflation, gang warfare, soaring crime rates, and severe shortages of food, medicine, and essential services.

The collapse of the Venezuelan economy has been linked to “decades of disastrous economic policies — and more recently, to economic sanctions” and the human rights crisis extensively documented by organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

Espinoza Bernal, now seen as the face of the regime's success story, was separated from her family upon arriving in the US in 2024. She remained in government custody after her parents were deported due to alleged ties to the Venezuelan-based Tren de Aragua gang, according to US authorities.

Yorely Bernal, Espinoza Bernal's mother, was deported to Venezuela on April 25, 2025. Espinoza Bernal's father was also deported around that same time — he is one of the men sent to the El Salvador jail.

How this narrative is shared online

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On May 2, 2025, Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) officially designated the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) as a “proven right-wing extremist organization.” The classification followed an internal report that concluded the party fosters anti-immigrant sentiment, racism, and Islamophobia and actively undermines Germany’s democratic order.

The BfV’s designation permits authorities to use tactics to watch the party and its members, including recruiting AfD members and those connected to the party as confidential informants, known as “trusted persons.” It also allows for telecommunications monitoring in specific situations.

Germany’s far-right AfD party launched a counteroffensive on May 5, 2025, challenging its designation as a right-wing extremist organization and accusing the BfV of violating the constitution by seeking to criminalize what the AfD argues were legitimate expressions of opinion and criticism of Germany’s immigration policy over the past decade. In a statement, the party co-chairs, Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla, said that with their lawsuit, they were “sending a clear signal against the abuse of state power to combat and exclude the opposition.”

After receiving the AfD’s lawsuit, the BfV followed a so-called “standstill commitment” (Stillhaltezusage), putting its official reclassification of the AfD as a right-wing extremist party on hold. The action, part of the due process of Germany, which gives the court time to conduct a proper review, was classified as a victory by the AfD.

The debate around the classification of AfD arose simultaneously with conservative leader Friedrich Merz, from the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), trying and barely securing the parliamentary vote to become Germany’s chancellor after an unprecedented failure in the first voting round.

Narrative: Germany is a tyranny in disguise

The people asserting this narrative frame, mostly AfD politicians and supporters, believe that the classification of the AfD as a right-wing extremist organization by the BfV is evidence of the decline of Germany's democracy.

Publicly, the AfD seeks to maintain a clear distinction between itself and Neo-Nazi organizations. Yet investigative reports showcase that the party retains relations with such organizations, and one of its current co-chairs, Alice Weidel, has been linked to Nazi heritage.

The BfV’s classification of AfD is not the first effort against the alleged unconstitutional activities of the AfD and its affiliates. Three years before, on March 22, the administrative court of Cologne had ruled that the BfV could apply such a classification. On May 13, 2024, the Münster administrative court confirmed the decision of the lower court in Cologne, permitting the BfV to classify the AfD as extremist and allowing the domestic intelligence service to keep monitoring the opposition party.

In December 2022, German police arrested 25 members of the Reichsbürger movement for plotting a monarchist coup. Among them was a former far-right AfD parliament member. Another ex-AfD lawmaker went on trial in January 2022 for inciting the overthrow of the state and participating in the 2020 protests against COVID-19 measures at the German parliament.

In January 2024, Correctiv, the nonprofit investigative journalism newsroom based in Essen and Berlin, shared an investigation on a meeting held in November 2023, where members of AfD met with a far-right network. The topics discussed at the meeting reveal a plan for forced deportations of millions of people currently living in Germany and address the issue of “ethnic vote” — foreigners who can vote and would likely support immigration-friendly parties. At the encounter, the participants also discussed an agenda to set a favorable climate, including propaganda tactics questioning elections and discrediting the constitutional court. One of the AfD attendees, Roland Hartwig, personal aide to party leader Alice Weidel, indicated the party board was willing to discuss the topics covered at the meeting.

In addition to significant voter approval, the AfD has the support of Elon Musk, who has called it a “centrist” party and has used X to promote party leader Alice Weidel, calling on Germans to forget Hitler and Nazi crimes.

How this narrative is shared online

Narrative: Germany’s democratic freedom protections are not unconditional

Those asserting this frame consider that under the basis of Germany’s commonly referred to in English as militant/defensive democracy doctrine (“Wehrhafte Demokratie” in German, also translated as resilient democracy), those who attack the fundamental democratic order must face resistance from the country’s institutions, as democracy must protect itself. They consider that the BfV's classification of the AfD as an extremist far-right organization is within the scope of action of Germany’s defensive democracy and, consequently, is coherent with the country's values.

Germany’s concept of resilient democracy emerged in response to the National Socialists’ efforts to undermine the Weimar Republic. The country’s legal framework gives the BfV the power to conduct efforts and analyze information about possible activities that oppose the democratic constitutional order, threaten the existence or security of Germany or its federal states, endanger Germany’s foreign interests through force or its preparation, or undermine international peace and understanding, especially peaceful relations between nations.

The German government has historically employed constitutional safeguards to limit the influence of parties that threaten democratic principles. In 2024, the far-right extremist National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), now known as Die Heimat, was excluded from state funding for six years. This measure followed prolonged efforts to sanction and ban the party due to its anti-constitutional activities.

How this narrative is asserted online

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India and Pakistan have been a part of our coverage at the observatory for the past five years, and Global Voices has been reporting on underrepresented issues in the region for over 20 years. In past editions, we have focused on stories that hardly ever become part of the mainstream, such as the political battle over India’s holy rivers or growing toxic masculinity narratives in Pakistani media and beyond. This week’s two narratives underscore the humans between the attacks and the context behind them.

A region in dispute 

The partition of British India, under the Indian Independence Act of 1947, designated India and Pakistan (the latter consisting of West Pakistan, now Pakistan, and East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh after its independence in 1971) as two independent dominions. The act separated the Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh populations, causing one of the most significant forced migrations in history.

In this division of British India, the diverse regions of Jammu and Kashmir could accede to either country. After failing to gain independence, Kashmir monarch Maharaja Hari Singh’s decision to join India sparked a dispute between India and Pakistan, leading to armed conflict later that year.

In July 1949, India and Pakistan agreed to establish a ceasefire line through the Karachi Agreement, supporting the halt in hostilities outlined in Part I of the United Nations Security Council Resolution dated 13 August 1948. The initiative eased tensions for several years. Yet, the two countries battled for the territory again in 1965, 1971, 1989, and 1999.

The two countries had been living under a fragile ceasefire since 2003, with both Pakistan and India periodically reporting several violations of the agreement.

On August 5, 2019, the Indian government revoked Article 370 of the country’s Constitution, removing Jammu and Kashmir's special status and splitting it into two union territories under strict security and communication lockdowns. In December 2023, the Supreme Court upheld the move. Prime Minister Modi pledged then to extend development benefits to what he considered the “marginalized communities” affected by the conditions established in the abrogated Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.

Five years after the revocation of Article 370, in July 2024, Human Rights Watch cited continued abuses by Indian security forces, including arbitrary detention and extrajudicial killings. In September of that same year, Amnesty International noted a climate of fear created by punitive measures and restrictions, contrasting Indian Prime Minister Modi’s claims that the region has been returning to normalcy since the 2019 decision.

Narrative: Kashmiris are not the enemy

On April 22, militants killed 26 individuals, primarily Hindus, in the tourist town of Pahalgam. The incident triggered a series of retaliatory actions between India and Pakistan, escalating tensions and raising the possibility of a full-scale conflict between the two nuclear-armed nations.

In the aftermath of this event, Kashmiris have suffered widespread retaliation and violence, from locals having their houses damaged during the demolition of militants’ houses by the Indian military to attacks on Kashmiri vendors across India and even Kashmiri students fleeing their studies after multiple incidents of reprisal attacks by Hindu right-wing groups.

The Kashmiri population, which includes residents of the Kashmir Valley and speakers of Kashmiri language variants in the Jammu region, is mainly Muslim. However, there is also a Kashmiri Hindu community, many of whom have migrated from the valley and now live in Jammu or other parts of India. 

In response to the rise of hate against Kashmiris, the people supporting this narrative frame plead for Indian unity and coexistence while condemning the Pahalgam attack. In addition, the narrative is used to counter Islamist militants intending to exploit the repealing of autonomy imposed on Kashmir by the Indian government.

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Narrative: India is emulating the “Israel model” over Kashmir

Proponents of this narrative frame, primarily anti-colonialist activists and pro-Palestinian progressive intellectuals are pointing to the historically recent alliance between the Hindutva and Zionist ethnonationalist movements politically incumbent in India and Israel, based on their shared Islamophobic rhetoric and far-right authoritarian policies and their obsession with militarization, propaganda, and population control in pursuit of colonialist expansionism.

It’s been 19 months since the Hamas-led attack on Israel, followed up by the ensuing siege and invasion of Gaza that developed into what UN experts, human rights organizations, and Holocaust scholars are describing as a campaign of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Politicians from India's ruling BJP party and right-wing propagandists have been increasingly floating an “Israel-like solution,” or “Israel model’ for dealing with Kashmir in recent years, a trend that burgeoned into full-fledged anti-Muslim instigation on social media after the attack by militants targeting Hindu tourists in Pahalgam on April 22, 2025.

On May 6, 2025, the Indian armed forces launched Operation Sindoor against Pakistan in response to the Pahalgam attack. Israel's ambassador to India expressed support for the operation and India's right to self-defense.

How this narrative is asserted online

On May 10, 2025, India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire after US pressure and four days of fighting. However, hours after the agreement, explosions were heard in border cities and towns, with both sides accusing each other of violating the pact.

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The Holy See’s calls for peace in the Holy Land and Jerusalem have been recurring for decades now, aiming for coexistence and freedom of religion for Christians, Jews, and Muslims. On April 20, 1984, in the Apostolic Letter Redemptionis Anno, Pope John Paul II, recalling a sentiment already shared by Pope Paul VI after visiting the Holy Land and Jerusalem in 1964, stated that from his point of view, the “failure to find an adequate solution to the question of Jerusalem” compromised further the “longed-for peaceful and just settlement of the crisis of the whole Middle East.”

Under the 1993 Fundamental Agreement between the Holy See and the State of Israel, when the two states established formal diplomatic relations, the Holy See and Israel committed to the “promotion of the peaceful resolution of conflicts among States and nations, excluding violence and terror from international life.”

In March 2000, in his jubilee pilgrimage to the Holy Land, in the speech he gave when visiting Palestine's autonomous territories governed by Chairman Yasser Arafat, Pope John Paul II noted that the Holy See “has always recognized that the Palestinian people have the natural right to a homeland, and the right to be able to live in peace and tranquillity with the other peoples of this area.” Yet it was not until 2015, under Pope Francis’s papacy, that the Holy See officially recognized the State of Palestine in a comprehensive agreement.

Narrative: Palestine lost a friend and an ally in Pope Francis

Pope Francis's active advocacy for justice in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has resonated deeply with Palestinians and defenders of their rights, regardless of their religious affiliation. Those asserting this narrative frame consider Pope Francis a true friend and ally of the Palestinian cause and see his death as a significant loss for those advocating for a peaceful solution that recognizes Palestinians’ rights.

Since the beginning of his papacy, Pope Francis has been a vocal advocate for the rights of Palestinians, not only recognizing the State of Palestine but repeatedly calling for a ceasefire after the Hamas-led attack on Israel in October 2023 and the consecutive launch of Israel’s war on Gaza and until his final address.

In November 2023, after meeting with relatives of Israeli hostages and Palestinian families affected by the war, Pope Francis denounced the violence in Gaza as an act of terrorism, criticizing both sides of the conflict. A month later, in December, he reiterated this condemnation, again describing the war as terrorism, this time in response to an Israeli attack on Gaza’s Catholic parish.

In mid-November 2024, Pope Francis called for an investigation to assess whether Israel’s actions in Gaza constituted genocide, stating that there was a need to carefully determine whether they fit “into the technical definition formulated by jurists and international bodies.” To date, the cost of human lives from this conflict has been enormous and is still rising. Pope Francis was not the only one asking if Israel’s actions are genocide; the United Nations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other international actors have said the same.  

Some groups within the Catholic Church view Pope Francis’s stance on Israel’s war on Gaza, where he actively advocated for justice in addition to peace, as conflicting with the principles that uphold the unique relationship between Judaism and Catholicism, with some academics claiming that his statement on the investigation of the genocide accusation against Israel crossed a line, “that of neutrality,” and that his remarks posed a “risk for Israel as a state and for Jews worldwide.”

How this narrative is asserted online

Read more on the reactions to Pope Francis’s passing

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The admiration of populist leaders has become a defining trait of this movement, where these figures are seen not only as personifications of national or cultural identity but also as messianic symbols promising salvation and renewal.

As Feeza Vasudeva writes in “Political Deification and Religious Populism in Modi’s India,” an article published in the journal “Populism,” leaders in countries like Turkey, Hungary, Brazil, and the US have used religion to strengthen their political image. They present themselves as defenders of faith-based values against secularism and external influences and even as quasi-religious figures. So has India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi.

The agenda of India’s ruling party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), is defined by Hindutva, a political ideology emphasizing Hindu religious and cultural nationalism. Since coming to power in 2014, the BJP has significantly emphasized policies and initiatives that resonate with its core Hindu voter base. Vasudeva explains that the “use of religious iconography, coupled with modern media technologies, has enabled Modi to embody a form of authority that transcends the conventional boundaries of political leadership, thus positioning him as the guardian of the nation’s spiritual and moral essence.”

The BJP’s efforts to “guard” Hindu religious and cultural nationalism have been reported to fuel hate speech against Muslims and other minority groups, especially under the “Bulldozer Justice” initiative led by the leader of the most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, Ajay Singh Bisht, a Hindu monk who goes by Yogi Adityanath. Under his purview, the authorities have deployed bulldozers to demolish the houses of accused individuals, mainly Muslims, even before the case or dispute is resolved through the judicial process. Amnesty International has deemed the de facto policy of punitively demolishing Muslim properties “ forced eviction and collective and arbitrary punishment under international law.”

One of the policies helping Prime Minister Narendra Modi to secure his reputation as a guardian of the nation's religious values in this battle to equate Indianness with Hinduism is the Namami Gange Programme, a project launched in June 2014 to conserve and rejuvenate the River Ganges, which is part of the second-largest river system on Earth by water discharge, and has immense religious significance in Hinduism.

Narrative: The BJP is the only one protecting India's rivers

Under this narrative frame, the BJP politicians and supporters promote the belief that they are the only party working on and advocating for the protection of India's rivers, ensuring Hindus can maintain their religious rituals.

Between late 2024 and early 2025, two significant religious festivals reignited concerns over pollution in Indian rivers.

During the four-day Chhath Puja in November 2024 in Delhi, safety concerns arose as devotees bathed in the Yamuna River, which was covered in toxic foam — a development later linked by Arvind Kejriwal, the leader of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) and the former Chief Minister of Delhi, to the BJP-led Haryana government. Kejriwal accused the Haryana government of deliberately poisoning the Yamuna River's water entering Delhi, prompting the Haryana government to lodge a criminal complaint and the Election Commission to demand proof of the allegation.

A few months later, in January 2025, during the Maha Kumbh Mela celebrations — a pilgrimage and Hindu festival held in Uttar Pradesh at that time — the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) of the Indian government reported that the Ganges and Yamuna rivers had elevated coliform levels. As a result, they advised against bathing in the Triveni Sangam — the holy confluence of the Ganges, Yamuna, and mythical Saraswati rivers located in Uttar Pradesh — due to health risks.

During the Maha Kumbh Mela celebrations, Delhi was also in the midst of the 2025 Delhi Legislative Assembly election campaign, which the BJP would later manage to win. The political debate intensified during the campaign, partly due to comments made by Yogi Adityanath. At a BJP rally in Delhi, Adityanath accused the AAP and its ministers of allowing illegal settlements of Bangladeshis and Rohingyas — migrant minorities criminalized by both parties during the election. He claimed that AAP had turned the Yamuna River into a “polluted drain,” which he described as a “sin.” Then he challenged AAP leader Kejriwal to bathe in the Yamuna, as he had done at the Triveni Sangam during the Maha Kumbh Mela.

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Read more: The Garo tribe are stewards of the forest in India's Meghalaya hills

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In 2015, United Nations (UN) leaders, as part of their agreement under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, committed to a world in which “democracy, good governance and the rule of law, as well as an enabling environment at the national and international levels, are essential for sustainable development, including sustained and inclusive economic growth, social development, environmental protection and the eradication of poverty and hunger.” The 2030 Agenda reiterated the pledges already made during the 2005 World Summit and outlined in the Millennium Declaration.

Today, a decade after the launch of the UN’s 2030 Agenda, the goals set forth still appear far from being achieved. But what is preventing countries from moving faster? The list of factors is endless. Yet, the global rise of populism, a political approach that is “invariably divisive,” “thrives on conspiracy,” and “criminalizes all opposition,” seems to be one of the key variables undermining the pluralistic aspect of good governance and democracies.

As academic Kenneth M. Roberts explains in “Government and Opposition,” a journal published by the University of Cambridge, “polarization may be the most consistent effect of populism,” as it constructs “an anti-establishment political frontier, politicizes new policy or issue dimensions, and challenges democracy’s institutional and procedural norms.”

The principles of “separation of powers” and “judicial independence” are recognized by the United Nations as essential elements of a democratic system — a part of the “institutional and procedural norms” that Roberts describes as a target of populism.

Narrative: Members of the judiciary are operating as activists

This narrative frame is supported by the belief that judges and sometimes the whole judicial branch issue rulings and act in favor of a specific political party or side of the political spectrum.

The politicians and public personalities advancing this narrative frame portray themselves as champions of democracy, positioning their critique of the judiciary as a step toward building a more just democratic system in their nations. Yet, they fail to acknowledge that the criteria behind the decisions of the judicial branch should be the country’s law, as its crucial role is to resolve disputes by applying the rule of law, which does not always align with their interests. 

During the 2024 US presidential campaign, candidate Donald Trump and his allies portrayed the criminal investigations against him for actions in his first term as president as a deliberate effort to undermine his credibility, accusing his opponents of political persecution. Similarly, after assuming office, President Trump has repeatedly questioned, and at times ignored, the rulings of judges who issued orders blocking policies he sought to implement that did not always align with the country's legal framework.

More recently, on March 31, 2025, Marine Le Pen, France's leading far-right politician, was found guilty of embezzling funds from the European Parliament. The court imposed a four-year prison sentence and prohibited her from holding any public office for five years, effectively disqualifying her from the 2027 presidential race, where she had been viewed as a top contender. Le Pen and her supporters argue that the ruling is an effort to undermine her presidential candidacy, framing it as part of a political “witch hunt” to disrupt the upcoming elections.

Read how this narrative is also shared in Italy, Brazil, and Spain

Originally published on Global Voices

Image edited by Global Voices. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan n.d., Photo: Fotos Públicas. Ursula von der Leyen in Brussels April 03, Photo: ucrania@vonderleyen/Fotos Públicas. Elon Musk in Washington, D.C January 12, Photo: RS/Fotos Públicas. Donald Trump in Washington, D.C. April 09, Photo: Daniel Torok/White.

This story is part of Undertones, Global Voices’ Civic Media Observatory‘s newsletter. Subscribe to Undertones.

On March 19, 2025, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu was detained along with around 105 other municipal officials and politicians on the alleged crimes of corruption and aiding a terrorist organisation, in what Human Rights Watch has called an attempt to suppress legitimate political engagement. The Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor's Office decision came just days before İmamoğlu was expected to win the primary election of Turkey's main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), to run against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the next presidential elections to be held no later than May 7, 2028.

President Erdoğan's representatives promptly tried to clarify that the criminal investigations against Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu were not politically motivated, claiming effective rule of law. Hours after the arrest, Turkey's Justice Minister Yilmaz Tunc made a press statement about the actions of the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, where he said that “the rule of law is essential” and that “attempting to associate judicial investigations and cases with our president is, to say the least, an act of audacity and irresponsibility.”

On the day of the detention of the Istanbul mayor, massive protests erupted, with demonstrators gathering in the streets, on university campuses, and even in subway stations, loudly voicing anti-government slogans — an expression of public outrage not witnessed in recent years. Since then, the protestors have taken to the streets not only to object to the mayor's arrests but to voice their concerns about the erosion of rights and freedoms in Turkey, as well as the ongoing economic crisis. The security forces have responded to the rallies using teargas, water cannons, and pepper spray — all classified by Human Rights Watch as “unwarranted and unlawful use of police force,” — and detaining hundreds.

Turkey's government's latest authoritarian move is being perceived by many as a significant escalation of the already questionable autocratic practices carried out by President Erdoğan.

Narrative: Erdoğan’s totalitarian pivot is emboldened by Trump and tolerated by the EU

People who communicate this narrative frame consider that President Erdoğan's move to arrest Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu was made possible by the return of Donald Trump to power in the United States and by the erosion of European values underlying the European Union's “pragmatic” cooperation with President Erdoğan. Those asserting it see the strong return of Donald Trump, swamped with authoritarian patterns, as an indirect factor that gives further confidence to authoritarian leaders to maintain their practices. 

Turkey's relationship with the United States is partly shaped by their mutual interest in “Syria's stability.” Syria's uncertain future, after the collapse of the country's once ruthless and seemingly unshakable regime, has drawn intense interest from Israel, Turkey, and the United States — each viewing the power vacuum as a chance to further their specific regional ambitions. Additionally, Erdoğan has positioned himself as a key ally in Trump's attempts to broker peace in the ongoing war in Ukraine. 

Turkey's relationship with the European Union is marked by stalled negotiations around Turkey's possibility of joining the supranational political and economic union and a controversial yet “technically effective” migration agreement signed in 2016.

The 2016 EU–Turkey migration deal, created in response to the 2015 refugee crisis, has become a significant leverage point. This agreement aims to reduce the flow of migrants into Europe, mainly via Greece, by proposing that “for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria.” However, humanitarian and human rights groups like MSF and Amnesty International have opposed the deal since its inception, arguing that it prioritizes stopping migration over protecting human lives. 

Turkey also holds a vital position in the global grain trade as a key transit hub. It serves as a pivotal gateway for grain movement between Europe and Asia, allowing the country to help secure the export of essential food supplies through the Black Sea from Ukraine to the rest of the world. Likewise, Turkey is rapidly becoming a vital potential partner in reshaping European security, diplomats and analysts say, as Europe seeks to reinforce its defense capabilities and secure guarantees for Ukraine in the face of a potential ceasefire agreement encouraged by the United States.

Narrative: Elon Musk is supporting totalitarianism in Turkey by censoring opposition accounts on X

Elon Musk’s 2022 acquisition of Twitter (now called X), initially framed as promoting free speech, led to significant user migration and controversy. His policies and promotion of divisive narratives increased polarization and disinformation, and despite his stated intentions, he later enforced speech restrictions on the platform.

X's censorship practices didn't start with Musk's acquisition. Turkey became the platform's leading censorship country in the world after the Gezi Park protests between May and August 2013. During those months, the platform played a historic role and was used to expose government corruption, to the extent that Erdoğan vowed to eradicate the platform in the following year.

In 2023, Elon Musk faced criticism for restricting content before Turkey's elections. Later that year, Turkey imposed an ad ban on X, which was lifted in May 2024 after the company met local requirements by setting up an office and appointing a representative.

Musk's business dealings with the Turkish government may have played a role in his acquiescence to their demands — in September 2021, his other company SpaceX signed a deal to launch Turkey's first domestically produced satellite. In September 2023, President Erdoğan invited Musk to open a Tesla factory.

In March 2025, amid protests after the detention of the Istanbul mayor, the platform suspended multiple accounts of opposition figures in Turkey.

Originally published on Global Voices

Illustration by Global Voices

This story is part of Undertones, Global Voices’ Civic Media Observatory‘s newsletter. Subscribe to Undertones.

Last month, Netflix launched Adolescence, a four-episode series on cyberbullying and the influence of social media narratives on boys, which has become a call to action for parents and policymakers and has opened up the conversation around toxic masculinity and the manosphere. Yet, toxic masculinity is far from being a new phenomenon — misogyny, LGBTQ+ phobia, and other consequences of hegemonic violent masculinity have been around for a long time.

In Hungary, Viktor Orbán government's anti-migration narratives seek to define the country's “masculine” national identity in opposition to the “feminized” Western international sphere, using competing claims of sovereignty to reinforce this distinction, fortifying the tie between masculinity and power. Éva Fodor links anti-migration and anti-gender policies in her book, The Gender Regime of Anti-Liberal Hungary, where she explains that, in the fight against the European Union migration quota, the Hungarian government has framed the European Union as a “pro-gender enemy of the Hungarian nation.”

In Russia, since the start of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, government propaganda has linked masculinity with the war in an attempt to recruit new soldiers. As we have mapped in previous research, the Russian government has presented joining the army as the best way to showcase patriotism and virility, which has fed the cycle of violence against women in Ukraine and Russia.

The hype around toxic masculine behavior has also permeated the leadership of Western countries. US President Donald Trump's current anti-diversity speech and policies are directly linked to the promotion of masculinity, with members of the administration and even the president correlating leadership inefficiency and weakness with women. 

The notion of strength behind the concept of masculinity has also reached social media platform executives, with Meta's CEO Mark Zuckerberg tying the company's policy changes with the need for more “masculine energy” and stating that “having a culture that celebrates the aggression a bit more has its own merits that are really positive.’

Narrative: “Women should know their role and abide by it. If they don't, they should deal with the consequences”

According to the people asserting this narrative frame, women who don't adhere to the roles imposed on them by traditional patriarchy as child-bearers, child-rearers, and home caterers should face the consequences.

The reasoning behind this idea upholds a gender-based hierarchy that impacts personal lives, careers, family roles, and broader societal structures, positioning both cis and trans women as subordinate to men.

The reinforcement of traditional gender roles for women in Western societies is often driven by a nostalgic glorification of “old masculinity” — an idea promoted as a response to the perceived emasculating effects of “woke culture.”

Narrative: “Women share a part in the demographic crisis and should assume their role in bearing children”

The proponents of this narrative frame affirm that women hold the responsibility to improve the natality rates because of their biological features. From their point of view, there is a direct tie between nationalism and gender roles. As Annabelle Chapman explains eloquently in her essay “Where gender meets nationalism,” “If, from nationalists’ perspective, men's role is to protect the nation, then women's role is to perpetuate it,” which naturally becomes a reason to pressure women into having children.

Demographic crises in places like the European Union have presented an opportunity for conservative leaders to promote this narrative. In Italy, for example, right-wing government leader Georgia Meloni has exploited what they call a “demographic winter” as the country's births reach an all-time low, according to the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).

This rhetoric regards the decision to have children through the lens of national survival rather than prioritizing women's rights, personal choices, and aspirations.

News from the Civic Media Observatory

We are excited to share that Undertones will resume weekly with stories on narratives catching the eye of our editorial and research team. If you haven’t already, subscribe.

Originally published on Global Voices

Image made by Giovana Fleck, used with permission.

For the past year, the Civic Media Observatory — through its Data Narratives project — conducted research in Brazil, El Salvador, India, Turkey, and Sudan about the discourse involving data governance in these countries.

For the purpose of this research project, we employed a definition of data governance from Tim Davies’ literature review on the topic:

Data governance concerns the rules, processes and behaviours related to the collection, management, analysis, use, sharing and disposal of data – personal and/or non-personal. Good data governance should both promote benefits and minimise harms at each stage of relevant data cycles.

The reports examined the complexities of the data governance landscape across the five countries through the lens of the data narratives and counter-narratives that shape conversations in each country. The investigation focused on incidents concerning the misuse of data, the manipulation of information, and the various political motivations behind the collection and distribution of data. The analysis revealed common themes across the countries’ data governance narratives, including the following:

• A lack of government transparency with regard to the public’s data
• A failure to adequately address and disclose security incidents
• The exploitation of neo-colonial policies to profit off of national resources
• The misrepresentation of public-private partnerships as beneficial to the country when they primarily advance corporate interests
• The use of digital authoritarianism to control the narrative around policies and other political agendas

Our findings conclude that emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and cryptocurrency pose unique regulatory and governance issues for the countries observed. Each country examined has attempted to address these issues in various ways. However, the conversation around data governance and the policies arising from it often undermines rather than supports citizens’ interests. The use of digital authoritarianism to control the data governance narrative became a common theme across the reports, which also underscored the need for increased transparency, improved data security, and greater consideration of the impact of new and emerging technologies on civil society.

We also published a summary of our reports as one-page files. You can learn more about the Data Narratives Civic Media Observatory here. If you are interested in how we conducted this research and want to know more about the data we collected, access our public dataset.

Originally published on Global Voices

Image made by Giovana Fleck, used with permission.

This report is part of Data Narratives, a Civic Media Observatory project that aims to identify and understand the discourse on data used for governance, control, and policy in El Salvador, Brazil, Turkey, Sudan, and India. Read more about the project here and see our public dataset.

Powerful actors, governments, and corporations are actively shaping narratives about artificial intelligence (AI) to advance competing visions of society and governance. These narratives help establish what publics believe and what should be considered normal or inevitable about AI deployment in their daily lives — from surveillance to automated decision-making. While public messaging frames AI systems as tools for progress and efficiency, these technologies are increasingly deployed to monitor populations and disempower citizens’ political participation in myriad ways. This AI narrative challenge is made more complex by the many different cultural values, agendas, and concepts that influence how AI is discussed globally. Considering these differences is critical in contexts in which data exacerbates inequities, injustice, or nondemocratic governance. As these systems continue to be adopted by governments with histories of repression, it becomes crucial for civil society organizations to understand and counter AI narratives that legitimize undemocratic applications of these tools.

We built on the groundwork laid by the Unfreedom Monitor to conduct our Data Narratives research into data discourse in five countries that face different threats to democracy: Sudan, El Salvador, India, Brazil, and Turkey. To better understand these countries’ relationships to AI, incentives, and public interest protection strategies, it is helpful to contextualize AI as a data narrative. AI governance inherently involves data governance and vice versa. AI systems rely on vast quantities of data for training and operation, while AI systems gain legibility and value as they are widely integrated into everyday functions that then generate the vast quantities of data they require to work.

AI terminology as a narrative and an obstacle

The term artificial intelligence itself is controversial. Conventional definitions of artificial intelligence — such as the one established by the EU AI Act — attempt to provide policymakers with the necessary scope to establish effective governance policies; however, these attempts almost always fall short by inadvertently excluding some systems from oversight because of the variability in the forms and functions of so-called intelligent systems at large. Approaches to defining artificial intelligence further vary by field. This is illustrated by survey data in which computer scientists focus on technical system functions while policymakers focus instead on metaphoric connections between system aspects they believe to be like human thinking and behavior. This demonstrates how even the term artificial intelligence has a narrative. We begin to understand it by accepting the broad uses in popular media alongside government and research-based ones.

Global diversity in the narratives of AI terminology reflects international variance in cultural values and priorities. Many languages ascribe the word “intelligence” to these systems, but cultures vary in terms of their concepts about what intelligence entails. The mere use of the term “intelligence” ascribes human-like qualities to the technology, which can create a false sense of AI as autonomous and powerful rather than a tool developed and controlled by human actors. Anthropomorphic descriptors of AI can obscure the underlying infrastructure and business interests behind its development — and mislead the public by prompting them to generate incorrect inferences about how the technology works and whether it should be trusted in particular use cases. Consequently, AI narratives that utilize anthropomorphic descriptions may prevent public critique of AI systems.

The language that ascribes more intelligence than a system is capable of can be understood under corporate-framing narratives that market these tools. Because advanced AI systems, particularly generative AI, require massive computational resources and infrastructure that only a handful of companies can afford, power over AI development has been concentrated in Big Tech companies like Google and Microsoft. This technical dominance gives these companies an advantage over narratives about AI systems, pushing narratives that suggest their privileged control over this technology is in the public good because of promises that it will “democratize AI” for everyone. In fact, these models are wildly incapable of democratizing knowledge in equal parts because these technologies cannot distinguish fact from fiction in their outputs to justify even a liberal definition of “knowledge” and because they provide different responses to different people due to the nature of identity-information encoded in users’ speech. The popularity of generative AI further expands US corporate influence in other countries, shapes the issues that are raised and the dialogue on social media platforms, and determines what research gets funded.

Framing AI systems as intelligent is further complicated and intertwined with neighboring narratives. In the US, AI narratives often revolve around opposing themes such as hope and fear, often bridging two strong emotions: existential fears and economic aspirations. In either case, they propose that the technology is powerful. These narratives contribute to the hype surrounding AI tools and their potential impact on society. Some examples include:

• An “AI arms race” between the United States and other global powers, particularly China.
• AI is a driver of economic growth and a transformative agent reshaping society.
• AI is a threat to labor.
• AI as a tool for good to benefit society.
• AI is an inevitable force that requires urgent regulation.
• If you don’t use AI, you will fall behind.
• AI is a democratizing force, lowering barriers to entry globally.

Many of these framings often present AI as an unstoppable and accelerating force. While this narrative can generate excitement and investment in AI research, it can also contribute to a sense of technological determinism and a lack of critical engagement with the consequences of widespread AI adoption. Counter-narratives are many and expand on the motifs of surveillance, erosions of trust, bias, job impacts, exploitation of labor, high-risk uses, the concentration of power, and environmental impacts, among others.

These narrative frames, combined with the metaphorical language and imagery used to describe AI, contribute to the confusion and lack of public knowledge about the technology. By positioning AI as a transformative, inevitable, and necessary tool for national success, these narratives can shape public opinion and policy decisions, often in ways that prioritize rapid adoption and commercialization.

Main narratives found in our research

You can click on the table below to navigate through the narratives we've investigated and describe in the following section:

Brazil

The discussion around AI in Brazil is primarily centered on regulatory measures and has gained momentum because Brazil hosted the G20 this year (2024) and conducted a series of preparations and side events involving data governance issues, such as NetMundial+10. The key regulation discussed was Bill 2338/2023, which seeks to establish national standards for developing, implementing, and responsible use of AI systems. Besides this bill, there are also sector-specific legislative proposals, such as those criminalizing pornographic deepfakes, and targeted actions like the 2024 resolutions by the Electoral Superior Court on AI and elections.

In this context, our researcher mapped three essential narratives. The first narrative, Brazil needs to remain at the forefront of regulating new technologies, covers Brazil's current left-wing government and members of civic society's desire to return to the forefront of regulating new technologies as they were in 2014, with “Marco Civil da Internet” (Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Internet). The second narrative, Brazil needs to regulate AI to avoid falling behind, also follows a sense of urgency for regulation, yet promoted by the conservative right wing, the Liberal Party (PL), it prioritizes facilitating a secure business landscape that thrives on AI innovation. The third narrative, Regulating AI hampers innovation in Brazil, advanced by the neoliberal right wing of the country, publicizes the thought that regulating AI will impede the development of the AI industry in Brazil.

India

In November 2023, an AI deepfake video of actor Rashmika Mandanna circulating on social media sparked a significant conversation in India about AI regulation. The confirmation of image manipulation led to discussions on the government's role in controlling AI deepfakes and mitigating potential harm. This debate extended to concerns about AI's impact on elections, prompting the government to warn platforms about AI deepfakes and issue an advisory for self-regulation and labeling AI-generated content. These measures followed Prime Minister Narendra Modi's public addresses, highlighting the threats posed by AI deepfakes and their potential harm to citizens.

During the first phase of the discussion, right after the AI deepfake video was published, our researcher mapped two main narratives. The first narrative, The Indian government is committed to making the internet safe for its citizens, advertised the government's general actions in the form of regulation to address disinformation, hate speech, and online harassment. The second narrative, The Indian government's response to AI deepfakes is confused and reactive, asserted by organizations like the Internet Freedom Foundation, questioned the government's reactive measures and considered them to be taken without informed assessment of the different issues involved.

Later, our researcher mapped three additional narratives when the focus switched to elections. The first two narratives, AI deepfakes will be used by India's anti-national actors, and The makers of AI deepfakes and platforms hosting them are the true drivers of election manipulation, proposed by the government, aim to blame opposition parties, social media platforms, and the people behind the creation of deepfake videos for AI disinformation without facilitating a firm regulation addressing it. The third narrative, The solution to AI dis/misinformation in India should go beyond banning and taking down content, also promoted by organizations like the Internet Freedom Foundation, demands a more efficient response from the government that considers political accountability and strengthens the media system.

Sudan

The civil war in Sudan, ongoing since April 2023, has deeply impacted all aspects of Sudanese society. In May 2023, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) used the national TV station to spread disinformation, claiming that a video of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander, was AI-generated and that Hemedti was dead. However, Hemedti reappeared in July 2023 in a recorded video with his forces, published by the RSF on X (formerly Twitter), which SAF supporters used to bolster their narrative of his death by claiming that “the RSF uses AI deepfakes for military deception.” In January 2024, SAF's credibility was damaged when Hemedti appeared publicly with several African leaders during a tour in the region.

In the middle of this weaponization of AI, our researcher mapped three key narratives. The first narrative, as mentioned above, The RSF uses AI deepfakes for military deception, promoted by SAF and its supporters, aims to discredit RSF by linking them to AI deepfakes and accusing them of deceiving people into thinking that their commander, Hemedti, is still alive. The second narrative, The United Arab Emirates and Israel use AI to pass their agenda in Sudan, also pushed by SAF supporters, argues that the United Arab Emirates used AI to pass its agenda in Sudan to boost RSF while damaging the reputation of the SAF. Israel and the UAE have enhanced cooperation in AI innovation, which has expanded following their peace agreement under the Abraham Accords. The RSF, which has strong ties with the UAE, has sought in the past to establish independent relations with Israel outside official state channels.

The third narrative, The RSF does not use AI deepfakes for military deception, advanced by RSF and its supporters, counters the SAF's accusations and denies using AI deepfakes for military deception in its online operations.

Turkey

In Turkey, hype is a dominant factor when discussing AI, yet AI is often misunderstood and treated as a magical solution. Many public and private sector entities turn to AI to project a tech-savvy, progressive, and objective image, using it as a defense against accusations of bias or backwardness. However, the optimism contrasts sharply with the frustrating or abusive experiences many Turkish people have with AI in their daily lives.

In this clash of perceptions, our researcher mapped two narratives. The first narrative, Artificial intelligence is unbiased and, by itself, can solve many of the Turkish people's problems, advanced by the ruling party, the opposition, and even the country's football federation, portrays AI as always unbiased, objective, and superior to human-made systems, regardless of why/how/where it is used. The second narrative, Artificial Intelligence causes more problems than it solves, is asserted implicitly and showcases the threats of using AI, including exacerbating existing societal issues and creating new ones.

The gap in the conversation

The narratives spotted by our researchers also showcase the absences in the conversations. The most evident case is in El Salvador, where no key narratives discussing AI were found. Our research indicates that the data governance topics that thrive in El Salvador's social dialogue are mainly cryptocurrency policies and data protection issues.

Data protection issues are also factors in the discussion around data governance in India, Sudan, and Turkey. Yet, in any of those countries, concerns about the leaking or misuse of people's data are linked to AI. There seems to be no conversation about the source of the data used to support AI systems and the implications that might or might not have on people's privacy, even in countries where possible regulations are being discussed. The same happens with discussions around AI's potential impacts on employment — no local narratives debate the threats or opportunities AI can present for people in their workplaces.

The narratives mapped in our research also provide little optimism or clear positive associations with AI. Only in Turkey is AI presented as an effective tool, though it is mainly mystified and used in discourse and as a communication tactic to mask inefficiencies.

The work of our researchers also shows no influential narratives in the societies of the countries studied addressing the possible impacts AI can have on the countries’ military or police capability, unlike in the US. Only in Turkey and El Salvador did our researchers find active conversations about possible espionage from their governments. Yet, in any of those incidents, the narratives mapped connect the issue with AI. The same occurred with human rights violations; no discussions on how AI can prevent or facilitate them were registered.

Our research likewise reveals no in-depth social debate about the opportunity AI presents for authoritarian leaders currently in power or desiring to access power. There seem to be little discussions about whether it can exacerbate the notion of no indisputable truth and how that climate of distrust is detrimental to democracies.

Conclusion: AI narrative change

Civil society organizations who want to protect democracy and human rights must gain a better understanding of AI narratives globally. We have now seen the first generative AI-influenced election. Algorithmic-driven authoritarianism and the use of AI for repression is broad, including deep fake propaganda, surveillance, content moderation, cyberwar, and AI weapons. Regional focus on specific AI threats and AI policies exists, but broader public narratives about AI’s impacts on democracy and human rights are necessary. The research conducted through the Data Narratives Observatory shows how regional conversations often miss critical connections between AI systems, data governance, and power. There is a need for narrative change and creating narrative infrastructure. Viewing AI as part of a data ecosystem and not anthropomorphized as intelligence can help counter harmful and oversimplified AI narratives. This can also help educate the public on data and AI rights, as AI policy depends on data governance. This relationship is especially important when considering the growth of AI and the role AI plays in the surveillance pipeline.

Our research reveals significant gaps in the global discourse on AI. In El Salvador, the social dialogue around data governance is centered on cryptocurrency policies and data protection, with minimal attention to AI. AI deepfakes and their use in disinformation are discussed in countries like Brazil, India, and Sudan, but these rarely address AI's implications for data privacy or employment. Optimism about AI is uncommon, except in Turkey, where AI is promoted as a solution, though often superficially. Discussions on AI's impact on military and police capabilities, human rights, and its potential to support authoritarian regimes or undermine democratic values are notably absent, highlighting the need for more comprehensive and critical engagement with AI's societal impacts worldwide.

Promising emergent AI governance approaches could be strengthened with methods that respect the power of narratives around central issues. Community-oriented data and AI governance initiatives like Connected by Data and Indigeneous data sovereignty networks like Te Mana Raraunga demonstrate how collective stewardship can challenge corporate control and state surveillance. Recently, there have also been efforts such as the Fostering a Federated AI Commons Ecosystem policy briefing inspired by the work of Coding Rights that calls on the G20 to support an AI ecosystem that emphasizes task-specific AI that is community-focused and aims to curb tech monopolies’ power. Mozilla Foundation tracks many more data initiatives that empower communities.

These ideas can be powerful, but their success depends on building support within diverse communities. Research on narratives shows they can effectively influence public outcomes, but challenges arise when trying to develop narratives from the grassroots level. Without deliberate narrative change, the dominant AI narratives could intensify and lead to:

• Corporate AI narratives that overstate AI capacity mislead and confuse expectations, making it harder to regulate;
• A normalization of greater surveillance and loss of decision-making by humans, led by state narratives;
• Simplistic AI narratives, such as ones that polarize AI as a threat or AI as a solution, may distract from preventing realistic risks and benefits;
• The extractive practices and the concentration of power in the AI landscape will remain obfuscated;
• Alternative visions of community-centered AI development and governance, data stewardship, and AI commons work will struggle to gain traction.

These findings highlight the critical need for expanded research on AI narratives — to document them but also to help civil society develop effective counter-narratives and strategies. Documentation is critical to enabling societies to build narrative infrastructures that challenge corporate control and state surveillance. Communities’ best shot at resisting AI-enabled repression must integrate a nuanced understanding of how different communities conceptualize and discuss AI to craft messages that resonate locally and contribute overall to a larger, global movement. We start by understanding existing narratives. We use this knowledge to help communities recognize and resist the misuse of AI systems. And they, in turn, can use this information to advance their alternative visions of AI governance centered on human rights and democratic values.

Originally published on Global Voices

Image courtesy of the Civic Media Observatory.

On September 24, 2024, Global Voices hosted a discussion in English about Venezuela’s regime strategy for digital repression, from propaganda to harassment and persecution strategies enabled by the use of technology.

On July 28, 2024, Venezuela's National Electoral Authority (CNE) declared President Nicolás Maduro the winner late on election night without sharing the electoral tallies with the detailed outcome. Hours after the CNE announcement, opposition leader Maria Corina Machado contested the results, claiming González Urrutia had won and presenting the tallies to support her claim.

Protests immediately erupted and have steadily continued for over six weeks, with protestors demanding recognition of the results shared by the opposition, particularly in traditionally pro-Chávez neighborhoods, with over 1,700 detained and 24 killed. International pressure has also mounted on the CNE to release the complete election data while the Nicolás Maduro regime has escalated its repression tactics against dissenting voices.

In this webinar, we explored the Venezuelan regime's “package” of digital repression instruments, how they have evolved in time and analyzed how they have been used after the presidential election on July 28.

The event, co-organized between Global Voices’ Civic Media Observatory and Advox, was moderated by Global Voices’ Civic Media Observatory Lead, Giovana Fleck, and featured the following panelists:

• Mariví Marín, ProBox
• Marianne Díaz, Access Now
• Rafael Osío Cabrices, Caracas Chronicles

Find the full recording of the event here:

Originally published on Global Voices

Image courtesy of Giovana Fleck.

For the last year, the Civic Media Observatory (CMO) has developed a research project to understand and analyze the discourse on data used for governance, control, and policy in El Salvador, Brazil, Turkey, Sudan, and India. The Data Narratives Observatory concludes with a session in partnership with Connected by Data, an organization working to include communities at the center of data narratives, practices, and policies.

What does data governance mean to you? With that question in mind, we will discuss on September 30 (1 pm UTC / 2 pm London / 9 am Washington) what makes data governance relevant when it comes to its impact on people’s lives. The discussion will primarily take place in English.

Connected Conversations is a series of informal, virtual discussion sessions focused on the principles of collective, democratic, participatory, and deliberative data governance. These events aim to explore and deepen understanding of how data can be managed and governed in a way that includes diverse perspectives and promotes shared decision-making.

According to our research, in Sudan, activists and researchers see data governance as the regulations and practices that manage data, with a strong focus on responsible handling to prioritize the well-being of people. Brazil’s regulatory approach acknowledges the complexity and scope of data governance, viewing it as both political and multifaceted. In El Salvador, it is seen as a legal framework centered on data protection, privacy, integrity, and authenticity, especially in relation to artificial intelligence and cryptocurrency regulation. India approaches data governance in layers, addressing data protection, security, and online content governance, recognizing the significant influence of Big Tech in these areas. In Turkey, data governance is viewed as part of digital governance, connected to internet and information governance, but it faces challenges in definition due to overlapping and broad terms.

In this Connected Conversation, we will ask what these ground-up perspectives might mean for global campaigns on data governance, exploring how the findings from the Civic Media Observatory support or challenge existing advocacy for collective and community-driven data governance.

Originally published on Global Voices

On July 28, 2024, Venezuela held presidential elections, which were expected to bring hope and change to the Venezuelan people after years of a prolonged economic crisis.

According to the Carter Center, a US-based organization working on enhancing democracy, invited by the Venezuelan regime to observe the election, the process took place in an “environment of restricted freedoms,” and the Venezuelan Electoral Authority (Consejo Nacional Electoral) showed clear bias towards Maduro's government.

Maria Corina Machado, the opposition candidate, was banned from running. After failing to register Machado’s replacement, the opposition was forced to support Edmundo González Urrutia, an ex-diplomat already registered as a presidential candidate.

Citizens abroad also faced significant barriers to participating in elections due to short registration deadlines, limited public information, and unusual legal requirements. UNHCR, the UN Agency for Refugees, documents that, by the end of 2023, there were “over 7.7 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants globally,” of an estimated population of little over 30 million people. Only 69.000 Venezuelans living abroad were registered to vote at the moment of the election, leaving most of the estimated 3.5 –5.5 million Venezuelans eligible to vote excluded from the election.

Despite the challenges, Machado and González ran the campaign together, articulating one of the country's most significant civil society efforts to ensure electoral transparency. Their campaign messages focused on promising a better future where those living abroad could reunite with their families.

Nicolás Maduro, the current president of Venezuela, ran a reelection campaign that highlighted their efforts to combat imperialism and argued that he was the only one capable of guaranteeing peace in the country.

On the night of July 28, 2024, shortly before midnight, the Venezuelan Electoral Authority declared Nicolás Maduro the election winner but did not provide detailed results by state. Hours later, Maria Corina Machado held a press conference, asserting that they had a representative sample of the electoral tallies and that Edmundo González Urrutia was the clear winner. The results published by the opposition, backed by the tallies and coherent with what the electoral witness reported, indicated that González Urrutia had received twice as many votes as Maduro.

Protests broke out after the election in historically pro-Chavismo neighborhoods, demanding the regime recognize the opposition's published results. In the first two days, over a thousand civilians were detained, and more than 21 people were killed. The majority of the international community has since called on the Venezuelan Electoral Authority to release the detailed election results.

Narrative: “Fear us! If you are not with us, we are going after you”

According to the regime, imperialism, linked to the opposition, is the leading cause of the ongoing political and economic crisis in Venezuela, and any claim of foul play led by the Venezuelan opposition is considered false and an action that promotes the agenda of the US rather than defends the interests of the Venezuelan people.

Government officials assert that the current administration believed its strategies to hinder voting would secure a favorable outcome and that the results released by the opposition appeared to catch the regime off guard. Meanwhile, traditional regional allies, such as Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, continue to demand evidence of the results before recognizing Maduro as the election victor. As a result, the government has shared little to no celebration spirits and instead intensified its repressive tactics, advertising new initiatives to target and criminalize dissent, like Operación Tun Tun (Operation Knock Knock) — a new wave of repression now aimed at electoral witnesses and voters, groups previously not targeted.

The regime then focused on spreading the message that anyone who questions or doesn't support the Venezuelan government should be afraid because showing any sign of discontent is an act of treason — advertising control and repression while spreading fear. It has declared it will use all its forces to stop what it calls a “cyber-fascist” coup, targeting people publishing dissident content on social media and even banning platforms.

How this narrative circulates online

Diosdado Cabello, recently appointed Minister of Interior, Justice, and Peace, advertises the efficiency of “Operation Knock Knock” on Instagram.

The video first shows a TikTok clip of a man insulting Nicolás Maduro and Diosdado Cabello. Then Billy the Puppet from the Saw horror movie says, “Let the game begin,” a countdown starts, and a series of images show state forces detaining the man in the middle of the night, who later apologizes.

Knock Knock is also the name of a famous Venezuelan Christmas song. The song's chorus says, “Knock Knock, who is there? People of peace, please open the door. Christmas has arrived.”

The slogan of Operation Knock Knock is “sin lloradera,” which means no whining, no crying, a common expression used in Venezuela to dismiss other people's suffering.

The item received over 35,000 likes on Instagram and was ranked -3 on our civic score card, the lowest ranking possible, as it incites hate against any show of discontent in the country while celebrating the repressive tactics and human rights violations committed by the state forces. See the full analysis of the item. 

Narrative: We share most of our struggles, and that unites us

For Venezuelans, the current situation exceeds the region's traditional dichotomy of left versus right and evidences a sense of overcoming polarization. There is a general belief inside Venezuela that ideological discussions and confrontations are no longer a priority. The focus is on the challenges that unite the Venezuelan population rather than the elements that separate them.

This narrative conveys a renewed sense of trust among citizens and a shared desire to move forward. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the country's health system and economic weaknesses. The state enforced lockdowns through repressive measures, drastically altering daily life. Isolated communities began to rely on their neighbors for protection from both the virus and repression, while urban areas saw a surge in delivery services as a new form of employment. “Motorizados” (generally people informally working as couriers using their motorcycles), once viewed as criminals or linked to state-backed armed groups, became trusted couriers, fostering a shared sense of community amid widespread hardship and exhaustion.

Many were moved by Machado's and González's promise of a better future where families would reunite after years of being forced apart — a desire shared by all social classes in Venezuela and unifying the country.

How this narrative gains life online

In a video shared by VVperiodistas, members of the Carirubana municipality police removed their uniforms, some even in tears, in front of a group of protesters that chanted “freedom” while applauding.

By removing their uniforms, police officers implicitly tell protestors that they no longer will follow their superiors’ orders to continue repressing them.

The protest was held in Carirubana, a municipality ruled for the last 24 years by the regime's party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) —former V Republic Movement (MVR).

The item ranked +2 in our civic scorecard. It showcases the officers’ willingness to disobey the regime's orders, prioritize people's safety, and seek a peaceful resolution of the country's conflict.  See the full analysis of the item.

Since the start of the elections, Global Voices has published special coverage with stories from our community about Venezuela.

Read more: Venezuela’s fight for democracy

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